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Abstract
Emerging applications in the Internet of Things (IoT) domain, such as wear-
ables, implantables, smart tags, and wireless sensor networks put severe
power, cost, reliability, and security constraints on hardware system design.
This dissertation focuses on the architecture and design of dependable ultra-
low power computing systems. Specifically, it proposes architecture and de-
sign techniques that exploit the unique application and usage characteristics
of future computing systems to deliver low power, while meeting the re-
liability and security constraints of these systems. First, this dissertation
considers the challenge of achieving both low power and high reliability in
SRAM memories. It proposes both an architectural technique to reduce the
overheads of error correction and a technique that uses the nature of error
correcting codes to allow lower voltage operationg without sacrificing reliabil-
ity. Next, this dissertation considers low power and low cost. By leveraging
the fact that many IoT systems are embedded in nature and will run the
same application for their entire lifetime, fine-grained usage characteristics
of the hardware-software system can be determined at design time. This dis-
sertation presents a novel hardware-software co-analysis based on symbolic
simulation that can determine the possible states of the processor through-
out any execution of a specific application. This enables power-gating where
more gates are turned off for longer, bespoke processors customized to specific
applications, and stricter determination of peak power bounds. Finally, this
dissertation considers achieving secure IoT systems at low cost and power
overhead. By leveraging the hardware-software co-analysis, this dissertation
shows that gate-level information flow security guarantees can be provided
without hardware overheads.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The next two decades will see an unprecedented proliferation of computing—
not only will each person carry a mobile phone, but each person will live in
a home with hundreds of devices, will be wearing several devices, and may
even have implanted devices that are all interconnected. Such future usage
of computing, broadly described as the Internet of Things (IoT) or Internet
of Everything imposes several technical challenges on hardware systems (see
Figure 1.1). First, since many IoT devices are likely to be run off of batteries
or energy harvesters and may be implanted within people’s bodies, there is
an extreme downward pressure in terms of power. Second, since there will
be so many of these devices (over 30 billion devices by 2020 [1]) and so many
unique applications (over 25 million applications [1]), the cost of each device
and application must be low. Third, since these applications are fundamen-
tally physically facing, there is an upward pressure on these devices to be
reliable and secure—serious challenges, considering each device is likely con-
nected to the broader internet. Addressing these challenges becomes difficult
since approaches to address any one of these challenges must not exacerbate
the others.
Traditional techniques for addressing the power challenge are constrained
by reliability and cost concerns. For example, memory components of ultra-
low-power systems can limit the power of future low-power processors. His-
torically, one of the most effective knobs for reducing power consumed by
hardware has been voltage scaling. Unfortunately, as voltage is pushed to
ultra-low levels, the device variability of current and future technology nodes
The author has been very fortunate to be a part of several collaborative efforts.
Specifically, the author would like to acknowledge that the symbolic simulation based co-
analysis work was co-led by the author and Hari Cherupalli. The author would also like
to acknowledge the contributions that Weidong Ye, Xun Jian, and Daniel Petrisko made
to various aspects of the work presented in this dissertation.
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Figure 1.1: The Internet of Things (IoT) imposes several severe technical
challenges. There is a large downward pressure in power and cost and
significant upward pressures in reliability and security.
leads to high fault rates in SRAMs. As a result of this reliability concern,
the power of memories dominates chip power or all of the chip, including
logic, must be run a higher voltage determined by the SRAM memories. To
enable further power advantages from voltage scaling while still maintaining
reliability for future power constrained computing systems, this dissertation
explores providing low-cost techniques to correct high SRAM fault rates.
Another traditional approach to producing ultra-low-power devices is us-
ing application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs). ASICs are custom de-
signed to efficiently perform the unique task(s) required by an application.
However, ASICs incur high costs for application development and mainte-
nance (e.g., design and verification effort, debuggability, compiler toolchain
support, and lack of in-field updates). Therefore, many future IoT appli-
cations will be powered by general-purpose embedded microprocessors and
microcontrollers [2, 3, 4] rather than ASICs. This dissertation explores the
following question: Are there unique opportunities for power reduction of
emerging IoT applications that exploit the embedded nature of these ap-
plications given that these applications are often driven by ultra-low-power
microprocessors and microcontrollers?
In answer to this question, we propose a novel co-analysis of both the soft-
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ware run on the programmable processor and the gate-level netlist of that
processor. This co-analysis, based on a form of symbolic simulation, can
provide information about the state of each gate of the processor through-
out any possible execution of the application. With this information, one can
determine which gates are used (i.e., toggled) at which points during the exe-
cution of the application, enabling a plethora optimizations. One use of such
information is to define and control module-agnostic power-gating domains
that allow more gates to be turned off for longer even with the same number
of power domains. A more aggressive optimization all together removes the
unused gates from the design, saving power. Designing such a bespoke pro-
cessor also provides significant area reduction, reducing the cost of a chip.
Another cost-saving approach is to use the detailed activity information from
our hardware-software co-analysis to determine a tight bound on the peak
power and energy that a microprocessor can use during the execution of
a specific application. By accurately determining the required power and
energy an application uses, smaller capacity (and thus cheaper) harvesters
and batteries can be used. Finally, the hardware-software co-analysis can
allow the design and verification of software-based techniques that guarantee
information flow security at the gate level (i.e., the finest digital granular-
ity). These uses represent a series of tools that provide system designers the
ability to develop new applications that are ultra-low-power and cost while
maintaining reliability and security.
Overall, this dissertation focuses on the architecture and design of de-
pendable ultra-low power computing systems. Specifically, it proposes archi-
tecture and design techniques that exploit the unique application and usage
characteristics of future computing systems to deliver low power, while meet-
ing the reliability and security constraints of these systems. The remainder of
this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents an architectural
technique to tolerate the high latency overheads of error correction for high
fault rate on-chip memories. Chapter 3 presents an approach that uses the
characteristics of error correction codes to reduce power further. Chapter 4
describes the core underlying scalable symbolic simulation methodology that
enables dependable application-specific optimizations. Chapter 5 argues for
defining power-gating domains at a fine-granularity across modules. Chap-
ter 6 describes an automated toolflow to reduce the area and power of a
processor by removing gates unused by a specific application. Chapter 7
3
describes how the hardware-software co-analysis can be used to guarantee
the peak power and energy of a processor. Chapter 8 proposes an approach
to provide gate-level information flow security entirely in software. Last,
Chapter 9 summarizes the work.
4
Chapter 2
Correction Prediction: Reducing Error
Correction Latency for On-Chip Memories
The reliability of on-chip memories (e.g., caches) determines their minimum
operating voltage (Vmin) and, therefore, the power these memories consume.
A strong error correction mechanism can be used to tolerate the increasing
memory cell failure rate as supply voltage is reduced. However, strong error
correction often incurs a high latency relative to the on-chip memory access
time. In this chapter, we propose correction prediction where a fast mech-
anism predicts the result of strong error correction to hide the long latency
of correction. Subsequent pipeline stages execute using the predicted values
while the long latency strong error correction attempts to verify the cor-
rectness of the predicted values in parallel. We present a simple correction
prediction implementation, CP, which uses a fast, but weak error correction
mechanism as the correction predictor. Our evaluations for a 32KB four-way
set associative SRAM L1 cache show that the proposed implementation, CP,
reduces the average cache access latency by 38%-52% compared to using a
strong error correction scheme alone. This reduces the energy of a two-issue
in-order core by 16%-21%.
2.1 Introduction
One simple, yet effective, technique to reduce the power of on-chip memories
(e.g., caches) is voltage scaling [5, 6, 7, 8, 9]. Reducing the supply voltage
results in significant reductions in static and dynamic power [8]. One major
challenge of scaling the voltage of on-chip memories is maintaining the de-
sired reliability. Process variations can cause a rapidly increasing fraction of
memory cells to become faulty as the supply voltage decreases [8, 10].
A flurry of recent work has been devoted to providing the desired cache
reliability at low supply voltages [8, 9, 11, 12, 13]. Some propose using
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larger, and therefore stronger, memory cells (e.g., 8T and 10T SRAM cells
or cells with up-sized transistors) to prevent errors from occurring in the first
place. Unfortunately, these methods incur a high static overhead even for
nominal voltage operation (see Section 2.6.1). As a result, many have instead
proposed using error correction to correct the wrong values in memory cells
as the cells become faulty due to voltage scaling. A large number of error
correction techniques have been proposed, spanning from the use of error
correction codes [9, 11, 13] to data remapping [8, 12].
However, error correction inevitably incurs a latency overhead, which may
be significant relative to the cache access time for error correction strong
enough to provide the desired reliability (see Section 4.2). This increase to
cache access time due to strong error correction may lead to a significant
degradation in performance and energy (see Section 2.7) from either an in-
creased clock cycle time [14] or increased pipeline depth. An alternative
supported by some processors is to speculatively execute on the instruction
or data accessed from the cache prior to performing error detection [15]. A
detected error corresponds to a mis-speculation, which causes the appropri-
ate instructions to be squashed and the pipeline to be stalled for correction.
While this technique suffices for scenarios where the bit-failure probability is
low, it incurs a high performance overhead for scenarios where the bit-failure
probability is high (e.g., when the supply voltage is low) due to rampant
mis-speculation leading to frequent squashes and stalls (see Section 2.4.1).
We propose a novel scheme for hiding the latency overhead of a strong error
correction scheme used to ensure reliability. Our scheme, correction predic-
tion, uses a fast mechanism to predict the results of strong error correction.
Subsequent pipeline stages execute using the predicted values. In parallel,
the long latency strong error correction attempts to verify the correctness of
the predicted values. On a mis-prediction, i.e., when the value produced by
the correction predictor is not the same as the result of the strong error cor-
rection, speculative instructions are squashed and the pipeline is re-started.
By allowing the logic core to execute on the predicted data or instructions,
one can effectively hide the latency of the slow, strong error correction, even
at very low supply voltages where cell failure is prevalent. In the context of
hard faults in voltage scaled SRAM L1 caches, we propose implementing the
correction predictor using a fast, but weak error correction mechanism that
produces the same result as strong error correction mechanisms for most but
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not all words. Our implementation, CP, is based on a Correction Prediction
Table (CPT—details in Section 2.5) that can correctly predict over 90% of
cache word corrections.
We make the following contributions:
• We propose correction prediction, a scheme to reduce the latency of
strong error correction by predicting its output. Long latency strong
error correction verifies the correctness of prediction even as execution
continues with the predicted value.
• We present CP, a simple implementation of correction prediction where
a fast, weak correction precedes strong error correction and allows CP
to limit the mis-prediction rate to<0.1%. CP adds<10% area overhead
and <2.5% worst-case latency to a cache with strong error correction.
• We evaluate CP applied to three recently proposed strong error correc-
tion schemes—Hi-ECC [16], VS-ECC [11], and Bit-Fix [8]. Compared
to using the strong error correction technique alone, CP reduces L1
cache access latency by 38%, 38%, and 52%, respectively. For a two-
issue in-order core, this corresponds to a processor-wide energy savings
of 16%, 17%, and 21%.
2.2 Background and Related Work
In this chapter, we apply correction prediction to SRAM-based L1 caches.
Below we discuss the effect of voltage scaling on SRAM cache reliability and
prior approaches to provide reliable cache operation.
2.2.1 SRAM Reliability at Low Voltages
Some SRAM cells in a cache are weaker than other cells in the cache due to
process variations. Although practically every cell in a cache (e.g., 99.999%
plus) is functional at a high supply voltage, more and more of these weaker
cells become faulty as the supply voltage is reduced. A faulty cell can ex-
perience both read failures, where the wrong value is returned or the stored
value is toggled unintentionally, and write failures, where the value in the cell
cannot be toggled [8]. Since these faulty cells are due to permanent defects
7
Figure 2.1: The average fraction of bits and 32-bit words that are faulty in
a cache for 65nm SRAMs.
(e.g., dopant variation), they can be located using a number of built-in self-
test (BIST) routines [8, 11, 12]. Some faults at low voltages are due to soft
errors [17] that cannot be detected by BIST routines. However, the fraction
of such faults at low voltages is minuscule (by over 5 orders of magnitude at
650mV [9]).
Figure 2.1 shows the average fraction of the cells in a 65nm cache that
are faulty as a function of the supply voltage. The calculation is based on
the SRAM failure probability reported in [10] and assumes that the faulty
cells are distributed randomly across the cache, which is consistent with the
assumption made in prior works [8, 9, 11]. We also calculated the fraction of
32-bit words that are faulty; a word is faulty if it contains one or more faulty
bits. The results in Figure 2.1 show that nearly 30% of all words require error
correction when the supply voltage is scaled beyond 650mV, motivating the
need for efficient error correction algorithms.
2.2.2 Error Resilience Techniques in Caches
One technique to improve reliability is using larger transistors to implement
the SRAM cells [10]. Another technique is to use a more fault tolerant SRAM
implementation, such as an 8T or a 10T SRAM cell [10]. The downside of
these techniques is that they incur a significant area and power overhead
8
even when the processor is operating at high supply voltage.
There have been several recent attempts at using strong error correcting
codes to implement a cache that operates reliably at low supply voltages while
incurring a low overhead at a high supply voltage. For example, FLAIR [13]
uses a combination of SECDED (single error correction double error detec-
tion) codes and dual modular redundancy to correct errors in a cache line.
VS-ECC [11] proposes using a combination of SECDED and 4EC5ED (four
error correct five error detect). MS-ECC [9] proposes trading off storage-
overhead for decode latency by using Orthogonal Latin Square Codes (OLSC)
for multi-bit error correction. The downside of these techniques is their high
energy overhead at low voltages due to the high performance cost of detection
and correction (Section 2.7).
Finally, several works observe that since the location of the faulty cells
can be predetermined via oﬄine testing (e.g., BIST), one can remap the
value of faulty cells elsewhere in the cache. PADded Cache [18], for example,
uses a fast, programmable address decoder to remap cache lines into other
sets and disables faulty physical lines. Unfortunately, for low supply voltage
operation, most cache lines would need to be disabled (e.g., >99% of cache
lines at 650mV). Bit-Fix [8] proposes a simple remapping policy that uses
dedicated bits per cache line to record the bad bits in each cache line and
remap their values to a different cache line. Archipelago [12] proposes a
more sophisticated remapping policy that uses a global fault map table to
perform remapping with greater flexibility. The primary downside of these
techniques is the unavoidable latency increase for every cache access due to
data correction after data array access or map look-up before the data access.
This latency increase may have significant performance and energy impact
(Section 2.7).
2.2.3 Tolerating Error Detection and Correction Latency
One simple approach to account for the additional delay in the instruction-
fetch and data-load stages due to error correction without stalling the pro-
cessor pipeline is to slow down the overall core frequency; however, this can
lead to a significant performance degradation (Section 2.7) since the error
correction latency is often a significant fraction of the cache access latency.
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Instead of slowing down the core frequency, Bonnoit et al. [14] propose using
additional pipeline stages to handle the error correction latency. However,
using pipeline deepening to hide correction latency can also lead to a degra-
dation in performance and energy efficiency (Section 2.7) because branch and
data hazards become more expensive. Also, load-dependent instructions are
stalled more frequently and for more cycles. Furthermore, since only low
supply voltage operation requires error correction, the added pipeline stages
result in unwanted overhead for high voltage operation.
Bonnoit et al. [14] also propose avoiding the additional pipeline stages by
decoupling error detection from correction. They observe that error detec-
tion typically incurs a shorter latency than error correction. Therefore, they
propose reducing the clock frequency to accommodate only the error detec-
tion latency, and then stalling the pipeline when errors are detected to wait
for the error correction. However, this technique may result in a significant
reduction in clock frequency when error detection latency is still a large frac-
tion of cache access latency. In addition, this technique leads to frequent
stalling when the fraction of cache accesses with errors is high, which limits
its effectiveness for aggressive voltage scaling.
Some processors [15] attempt to hide the latency of error detection by us-
ing speculation, whereby the word retrieved from the cache is sent directly
to the subsequent pipeline stages, prior to performing any error detection;
meanwhile, error detection takes place in the clock cycles following the cache
access. If errors are detected, the pipeline is flushed, an exception handler
performs the correction, and execution restarts from the erring instruction.
However, this technique is also ineffective at low voltages, where flushing
is frequent due to the large fraction of cache accesses with errors (see Fig-
ure 2.1).
2.3 Motivation
Error correction can be expensive when the number of errors that need to be
corrected is large (as may be the case for low Vmin L1 caches). Consider, for
example, 5-bit BCH-based error correction at 650mV for the SRAM failure
rates in Figure 2.1. BCH-based correction has been used for strong error cor-
rection in past works such as VS-ECC [11]. We calculate the decode latency
10
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Figure 2.2: Latency of different error correction schemes normalized to the
access time of a four-way set-associative 32KB cache at 65nm.
of the BCH code for the three scenarios (no error, one error, multi-bit errors)
assuming 32 data bits per codeword using the methodology in [19, 16] an
using the FO4 delay for the 65nm technology reported in [20] (more modeling
details in Section 2.6.1). Figure 2.2 shows the latency values normalized to
the access latency of a 65nm four-way set-associative 32KB cache with 64-
bit output granularity (see Section 2.6.1 for details). The figure shows that
even in the most optimistic scenario (i.e., codeword is error-free), the decode
latency of the BCH code is a significant fraction (50%) of the cache access
latency. The decode latency is 72% of the cache access latency for single-bit
errors and 647% for multi-bit errors.
Other strong error correction techniques that provide comparable reliabil-
ity are expensive as well. Figure 2.2 shows the decode latency of a 7-bit error-
correcting OLSC code [9], and Bit-Fix, a fault-map-based technique [8]—the
reported implementations provide the same reliability as the 5-bit BCH dis-
cussed above. Results show that the decode latency of OLSC and the decod-
ing and shifting latencies of Bit-Fix are also significant (41% and 140% of
the cache access latency respectively). Moreover, while the error correction
latency of the OLSC code is shorter than that of the BCH code, it comes at
a significant cost in terms of storage overhead. Similarly, while the error
correction latency of seven-modular redundancy is only 6% of that of the
cache access, the corresponding storage overhead is 600%.
Our goal is to develop a technique that allows strong error correction to be
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used for low Vmin caches without the prohibitive latency or storage overhead.
Toward this goal we employ correction prediction used in conjunction with
a strong error correction scheme.
2.4 Correction Prediction for L1 Caches
Correction prediction for L1 caches feeds predicted values to the pipeline
while using strong error correction in parallel. When the predicted value is
correct (i.e., the word consumed by the subsequent pipeline stages is the
same as the output of the strong error correction), the latency of strong
error correction is avoided. On a mis-prediction (i.e., the word consumed
by the subsequent pipeline stages differs from the output of the strong error
correction), the instructions dependent on the consumed predicted word are
flushed and restarted using the output of the strong error correction. The
mis-prediction penalty is the larger of the squash/restart and strong error
correction penalties.
2.4.1 Key Idea
A correction predictor must be both accurate and fast. A correction predictor
must have high accuracy to be effective since a large fraction of words are
faulty at low voltages (e.g., over 30% at 650mV, see Figure 2.3). A high
mis-prediction rate will lead to frequent squashes. A correction predictor
must be fast since even an added cycle of latency may be prohibitive for L1
cache accesses.
A high accuracy correction predictor implementation predicts correctly in
high likelihood scenarios. Figure 2.3 shows that for voltage-scaled SRAMs, a
high likelihood scenario is where a word has zero, one, or two faults. An error
correction mechanism that can correct up to two errors would correct over
99% of words at 650mV. One fast implementation of such an error correction
mechanism is storing information about up to two faults in a table. Since the
table cannot store enough information to correct every word and since the
table itself can suffer faults, the table cannot correctly predict every access.
However, we show in Section 2.5 that it can correctly predict over 90% of all
accesses. By allowing the pipeline to speculatively execute using instructions
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Figure 2.3: Word error distribution at 650mV. 99% of words have two or
fewer errors. This suggests that a weak error correction mechanism
provides sufficient prediction for most cache accesses.
or data that have been predicted by the fast error correction mechanism, our
proposed error correction implementation, CP, can effectively provide error
correction latency similar to that of a fast error correction mechanism with
the same level of reliability as a long latency error correction mechanism.
Figure 2.4 shows the capacity overhead and the average error correction
latency of the CP implementation relative to other strong error correction
implementations that meet the same reliability target (i.e., implementation
can correct 99.9987% of words in the cache for the word error rates shown in
the legend1). Each data point corresponds to a particular implementation of
a correction technique. For the BCH code, the average correction latency is
the average of the correction latency for zero errors, one error, and more than
one error weighted by the frequency of occurrence of these errors (Figure 2.3).
Each CP design point uses BCH as the strong error correction mechanism
while the fast correction mechanism is based on fault-map and can correct up
to zero, one, and two errors (corresponds to zero, one, and two Map Units–
see Section 2.5). The results show that CP indeed provides latency similar to
the low latency correction techniques (e.g., N-modular redundancy) at the
1This means that each implementation has barely enough ECC resources to provide
the same reliability for the voltages shown in the legend as the cache has at 1.2V.
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Figure 2.4: Capacity overhead vs. latency tradeoff.
capacity overhead of capacity-optimized techniques (e.g., BCH).
2.4.2 Microarchitectural Support
Figure 2.5 details the logical flow of an L1 cache access using CP. When the
pipeline requests an L1 cache access, the cache performs the normal cache tag
and data array accesses. In parallel, the cache reads the Correction Prediction
Table entry (see Section 2.5) corresponding to the word being accessed. The
entry indicates whether to perform correction prediction. To predict, the
cache applies fast error correction and feeds the resulting predicted value to
the pipeline. After speculative execution begins using the predicted value, the
slow, strong error correction determines whether the predicted value contains
an error. If the predicted value does contain an error, a mis-prediction has
occurred and the pipeline squashes all dependent instructions. The cache
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then returns the corrected value to the pipeline and the pipeline restarts the
instruction that initiated the cache request with the correct value. When
prediction is not performed, the cache applies strong correction to the value
returned from the data array and returns the correct value to the pipeline.
To support CP, the following changes need to be made to the processor
pipeline:
Cache Support Figure 2.6 depicts the additions the CP cache module re-
quires beyond a traditional cache. The fast, weak correction module contains
the Correction Prediction Table and associated logic (see Section 2.5). This
module determines whether prediction should be triggered and also generates
the predicted value. The slow, strong correction module uses the predicted
value to provide sufficient error correction to meet the reliability requirement.
It outputs both whether it detected an error within the predicted codeword
and also returns the corrected value (i.e., the corrected data bits from the
codeword) in case of an error. If the corrected value does not match the pre-
dicted value, then a mis-prediction occurred. The Pipeline Control module
then indicates that a squash is required. The Pipeline Control module also
stalls the pipeline when the fast, weak correction module does not predict
a value and the strong error correction module must perform long-latency
error correction.
We recognize that the additional logic inserted on the critical path of a
cache access may result in a reduction in operating frequency. We quantify
this overhead in Section 2.5.2 and study the sensitivity of benefits to this
overhead in Section 2.7.3.
Instruction Fetch Applying CP to the instruction cache requires support
for squashing each instruction dependent on a mis-predicted instruction and
restarting the corrected instruction in the decode stage. Also, the predicted
instructions may cause exceptions (e.g., illegal opcode or divide by zero ex-
ceptions). Such exceptions must be suppressed until strong correction com-
pletes. For the core used in our evaluations (see Section 2.6), our strong
correction scheme requires at least two cycles to detect a mis-prediction, re-
sulting in potentially erroneous instruction bits propagating to the decode,
execute, and initial fetch stages. For this core, all exceptions must be sup-
pressed until after the execute stage, which would happen anyway to maintain
precise exception handling.
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Perform fast, weak correction to 
generate new value;
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Figure 2.5: Correction prediction for an L1 cache access.
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Figure 2.6: Modifications to L1 caches. The critical path for the common
case of correction prediction is in bold.
Data Memory Load The core idea behind CP is allowing computation to
continue successfully speculating during error correction. For a data memory
load, this means that the predicted result must be forwarded to any depen-
dent instructions within the pipeline. This avoids execution of dependent
instructions being stalled by the additional latency of error correction. To
allow continued forwarding of predicted data to dependent instructions, ad-
ditional pipeline stages must be added after the data memory stage. The
number of required additional stages is equal to the number of cycles it takes
to perform strong correction. These additional stages are dummy stages
through which instructions flow. These stages also support the forwarding of
predicted values to earlier stages. Note that adding these forwarding stages
to the data cache access has a significantly smaller impact on performance
than adding pipeline stages for error correction (Deep Pipelining). This is
because the dependent instructions are stalled waiting for the strong correc-
tion to complete in the latter case. For the core used in our evaluations (see
Section 2.6), at least two additional pipeline stages are needed after the data
memory stage. Mis-predictions are detected during the write-back stage. On
a mis-prediction, the value generated by strong error correction is written
back to the register file; all following instructions are squashed.
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2.4.3 Tag Array Protection
Note that the above discussion assumes that correction is performed only on
the content of the data array, not the tag array. The tag access is assumed
to be robust at low voltages similar to previous related work [12, 8]. Since
the tag array is significantly smaller than the data array and is less latency
constrained, we assume a 10-T SRAM-based [21] implementation for the tag
array to guarantee robustness at low voltages.
2.5 Implementation, Coverage, and Overheads
For correction prediction to be beneficial, the underlying prediction mech-
anism must only add minimal latency to a regular cache access. As such,
our design goal is to limit the latency of correction prediction to the delay
of a single logic gate. Many prediction mechanisms with varying prediction
accuracies, latencies, and storage overheads are possible. Here we present
one such correction prediction mechanism and leave a full exploration of
correction prediction mechanisms as future work.
The proposed correction prediction mechanism is a fast but weak error
correction mechanism that duplicates a small number of faulty bits in the
cache. The number of duplicate bits is kept small so that they can be stored
in a small enough table, called the Correction Prediction Table or CPT, that
accessing the table is much faster than accessing the L1 cache. The CPT is
accessed in parallel with a L1 cache access. The fast CPT allows the duplicate
bits to be accessed and then processed before a L1 cache access completes;
as such, it allows the duplicate bits to correct the faulty bits in the cache
word at the cost of the delay of a single MUX, which decides what bit—a
regular data bit or a duplicate bit—to output per bit position to subsequent
pipeline stages.
The CPT is organized as follows. There is a CPT entry corresponding
to every consecutive four words (e.g., 128 bits) in the L1 cache. Each CPT
entry contains four predFlags and two Map Units (Figure 2.7). There is a
predFlag for each word that allows CP to avoid bad predictions, such as
when a CPT entry does not have enough Map Units to correct all faults
in the corresponding words or when a Map Unit is faulty. The predFlag
indicates to the cache controller whether to perform correction prediction
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Figure 2.7: Correction Prediction Table entry format. Each table entry
corresponds to four 32-bit words.
or to simply perform strong error correction and stall the pipeline when the
word is accessed. A Map Unit has three fields—valid, location, and value. The
valid bit indicates that the corresponding location and value fields are error-
free. The location field contains the location of one of the single-bit errors
within the 128 bits. The value bit contains the correct current value for the
corresponding cache bit. Note that both the valid bits and the predFlags
are vulnerable to errors; however, errors in the CPT only affect prediction
accuracy, not reliability.
Each CPT entry is populated as follows. Only a CPT entry’s value bits
are set and updated during regular cache accesses, while all other bits in the
CPT are set at runtime by a built-in self-test (BIST) routine that tests the
L1 cache at the target low voltage. The BIST routine first tests the two Map
Units of the CPT entry. If the routine finds any faulty bits in a Map Unit,
the routine sets the valid bit of the Map Unit to false. The routine then tests
the 128 cache bits that correspond to the CPT entry to identify as many
faulty cache bit locations as there are valid Map Units in the CPT entry.
These faulty cache bit locations are then recorded in the location field of the
valid Map Units. Next, for each of the four predFlags in the CPT entry,
the routine sets a predFlag to true if every faulty bit in the 32-bit cache
word that corresponds to the predFlag has a corresponding valid Map Unit.
Finally, for each write to the cache data array (data write or cache fill), the
corresponding CPT entry of written cache word must be read to update the
value bits.
Figure 2.8 shows the fast correction circuitry that uses entries from the
CPT to fix an error in a bit of the data word. The location field bits of the
two Map Units are decoded to determine which of the 128 bits are replaced
by the values stored in the Map Units. The Map Unit valid bit enables
this decoding. The least significant two bits of the word offset are used
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Figure 2.8: Fast, weak error correction circuit for bit x of word i. M.U.
stands for Map Unit, V. stands for valid bit, and L. stands for location
field. Value propagation before data array access completes is bolded.
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Table 2.1: Prediction and mis-prediction rates.
Rate Derived Formula
Value at
650mV
Prediction 1− (p · [1− P (error)] + (1− p) · P (error)) 91%
Mis-prediction p · P (error) 0.089%
to determine if the Map Unit points to Wordi. For every bit in the word
accessed from the cache (WordiBitx), a multiplexer is used to select between
the bit read out from the cache and the values stored in the Map Units. The
valid bit of a Map Unit enables the selection of its corresponding value field.
2.5.1 Detection and Correction Coverage
In order to evaluate the fast error correction mechanism we must calculate
what fraction of words it attempts to predict (the prediction rate) and of
those words how many are incorrectly predicted (the mis-prediction rate).
To calculate the prediction and mis-prediction rates, we first calculate
the probability of observing an error in the output of fast correction. An
error may exist in the output of fast correction if the total number of fault
bits among the four data words that share the same CPT entry exceeds
the number of correct Map Units in the entry. Note that since the Map
Units themselves have the same bit error probability as the words in the
L1 cache, one or more of the two correction units in a CPT entry may be
faulty. To calculate the probability that an error occurs at the output of the
fast correction circuitry, we observe that when the total number of faulty bits
among the four data words exceed the number of non-fault Map Units by one,
an error will appear when one of these four words is accessed. Therefore, the
probability that an error occurs when one of these four words is accessed given
that the error correction capability of the fast correction entry is exceeded
by one is 1/4. Similarly, the probability that an error will occur when one
of these four words are accessed given that the error correction capability of
the fast correction entry is exceeded by two is 2/4. The following equation
summarizes the probabilities of all possible scenarios that cause an error in
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the output of fast correction:
P (error) =
2∑
i=0
·
(
2
i
)
((1− p)9)2−i(1− (1− p)9)i · [
128∑
j=2−i+1
(
128
j
)
pj(1− p)128−j ·min((j − 2 + i)/4, 1)] (2.1)
In Equation 2.1, p is the fault probability of a single bit, i is the number
of faulty Map Units in the entry and j represents the total number of bad
bits in the four words with a total of 128 bits.
To determine the mis-prediction rate, i.e., the probability that the output
of fast correction is faulty, but prediction is still triggered, we note that it
is equal to the probability that the predFlag bit is faulty when the output
of fast correction is faulty. This probability is p · P (error). Prediction is
not attempted when the predFlag bit is fault-free while the output of fast
correction is faulty, even though it would have been beneficial to trigger
prediction. The probability of this occurring is p · [1−P (error)]. Prediction
is also not attempted when a predFlag bit is faulty while the output of fast
correction is not faulty. In this case, the pipeline is correctly stalled until
strong correction completes. The probability of this occurring is (1 − p) ·
P (error). Table 2.1 lists calculated values for our cache operating at 650mV
where the bit failure rate is 0.011 (Figure 2.1). We note that we could
protect the CPT with Schmidt Trigger (ST) SRAM cells or increased supply
voltage. However, only 0.089% of cache accesses are mis-predicted, resulting
in an insignificant performance degradation. We argue that this is a good
tradeoff for not requiring an additional voltage rail or a unnecessary increase
in area (i.e., 100%) for the CPT.
We also note that although our specific implementation of fast correction
leverages characteristics of the fault distribution (e.g., uncorrelated bit errors
where single errors are most common), this is not a requirement of fast error
correction. For example, if faults are correlated within a word, we could
increase the size of our value fields in the Map Units to improve the correct
speculation rate.
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2.5.2 Latency Overhead
We model the CPT for our four-way set associative 32KB cache using CACTI [22]
to determine its latency. The table has a latency of 0.44ns in a 65nm tech-
nology node operating at 1.2V. As shown in Figure 2.8, the critical path of
the fast correction circuit before the MUX that picks between a data bit and
a duplicate bit consists of the following: a 5-to-1 binary decoder, 2 AND
gates, a MUX to select between the outputs of the fast correction entries
that correspond to the two ways in the set, a MUX to select between the
two Map Units, and the three level of inverters required for every location to
drive 32 bit slices. Using the FO4 delay of 65nm technology reported in [20],
these equate to a total delay of 0.2ns. In comparison, the access latency of
a four-way set-associative 32KB L1 cache (the associativity/size of the L1
caches in our evaluations in Section 2.7) is 0.68ns. Therefore, the delay of
fast error correction circuitry prior to the MUX gate can be effectively hidden
by the latency difference between the L1 cache and the CPT. Consequently,
the MUX gate used to select between the data bit and the duplicate bit is
the only additions to the critical path of the cache access. Following the
methodology in [23], we estimate the MUX to be 0.5 FO4. In our evalua-
tions, we increase the clock period of the CP cores by 0.01ns at nominal Vdd
(1.2V) and 0.026ns at 650mV to account for these delays.
2.5.3 Area Overhead
The area overhead of the fast correction technique is dominated by the Cor-
rection Prediction Table. We estimated using CACTI [22] that the area of a
Correction Prediction Table with two Map Units is 8.6% of the size of a four-
way set associative 32KB L1 cache. Depending on the the desired level of
voltage scaling, fewer Map Units may be needed. For design points with only
a single Map Unit plus the four predFlag bits or with the four predFlag bits
only, the area overhead due to the Correction Prediction Table normalized
to cache area would be 5.1% and 1.6%, respectively.
We also estimated the area overhead of the fast correction circuit. As
shown in Figure 2.8, the fast error correction circuit that corrects a single bit
of the 32-bit word requires three MUXes, eight XOR gates, 12 AND gates,
and four 5-to-1 binary decoders, where each requires at most four AND gates,
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for a total of 40 gates. The total number of gates required by the fast error
correction circuit is 40 · 32 = 1240 gates. Assuming that two such decoders
are needed to keep up with the issue width of the processor, this translates
to a maximum of 2480 gates, which incurs an area overhead 1.3% compared
to a 32KB L1 cache.
2.5.4 Energy Overhead
We model the access energy of the CPT using CACTI [22] and determined
that an access to the table results in a 4% energy increase for every cache
access. We also estimated the energy consumed by the correction circuitry
(Figure 2.8) assuming an activity factor of 1 and the switching energy of a
65nm transistor given in [24]. This energy is 0.2% that of the access energy
of the 32KB L1 cache. Static power overheads are no worse than the area
overheads discussed in Section 2.5.3.
2.6 Methodology
In this section, we describe the methodology we used to evaluate CP for a
65nm technology node. Section 2.6.1 describes the strong error correction
baselines to which we apply CP. Section 2.6.2 describes the different designs
we evaluated. Section 2.6.3 describes our experimental details.
2.6.1 Strong Error Correction
CP can be applied to any strong error correction technique to reduce its la-
tency. In this chapter, we use CP in conjunction with three recently proposed
strong error correction schemes—Hi-ECC [16], VS-ECC [11], and Bit-Fix [8].
These strong error correction methods vary in their area, capacity, and la-
tency overheads.
Our Hi-ECC implementation protects every word using a BCH code that is
capable of correcting five erroneous bits within a 59-bit codeword. We employ
an additional parity bit to detect a sixth error within the codeword. If zero
or one errors are detected, the evaluated BCH decoder only incurs the single
error correction latency, but not the much longer multi-bit correction latency.
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Single-bit correction is used instead of the multi-bit correction whenever ap-
plicable. The multi-bit BCH correction is used if single-bit correction fails.
In our implementation, the ECC bits are stored in cache ways during low
voltage operation such that half the ways store data bits, while the other half
store ECC bits. The ECC cache ways store data during nominal operation
as in [9]. Our VS-ECC implementation, based on VS-ECC-fixed from [11]
uses seven bits for SECDED per cache word. At the same time, each cache
line contains four additional 20-bit extended ECC fields to accommodate a
5EC6ED BCH code for up to four words within the line.
The slow, strong correction module in Figure 2.6 contains a BCH decoder
implemented iteratively according to the modified Berlekamp-Massey algo-
rithm presented in [11]. With the addition of a modest amount of logic, this
decoder can detect errors and correct single-bit errors with a small latency
relative to the latency of full 5-bit error correction [16]. Using the latency
equations from [19] and the 65nm technology parameters from [20], we cal-
culate the error detection latency for the 5EC6ED BCH code to be 0.34ns or
50% of the access latency of a four-way set-associative 32KB L1 cache [22].
Single-bit correction, as calculated from [16], takes 0.53ns or 78% of an L1
cache access. Similarly, multi-bit correction requires 4.4ns or 648% of an L1
cache access. Given the iterative BCH decoder used in [11] and Schmidt
Trigger 10-T cell protection for the tag array, Hi-ECC has a total area over-
head of 11.9%. VS-ECC, requiring additional static storage overhead has a
41.4% area overhead compared with our L1 cache.
The energy consumption of the BCH code used by both our Hi-ECC and
VS-ECC implementations depends on the number of errors in the input code-
word (i.e., zero, one, or more than one). At 650mV, an average of 11 bits are
bad per 1000 bits (Figure 2.1). At this bit error rate, the energy overhead of
the BCH decoding is calculated to be 0.86% that of the L1 access assuming
an activity factor of 1. The energy overhead of the BCH encoder is calculated
to be 0.3% that of an L1 access. Static power overheads are no worse than
the previously discussed area overheads.
Our Bit-Fix implementation is adapted from [8]—we assume access at word
granularity. Each access takes three cycles [8]. The decoding circuitry has
fewer than 26,000 transistors [8] or roughly 1.7% of a 32KB caches data array.
Our Bit-Fix implementation also requires the 4.8% area overhead for robust
tag cells (10T-ST) resulting in a total area overhead of 6.5% of a 32KB L1
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Figure 2.9: Impact of adding CP to different strong correction schemes at
650mV.
cache. Using an activity factor of 1, our Bit-Fix circuitry has an energy
overhead of 1.2% the access energy of an L1 cache. Static power overheads
are no worse than the area overheads.
Figure 2.9 presents the latency, area, and energy impact of applying CP to
the above strong error correction schemes. In the worst-case, CP increases
the latency of a cache access by up to 2.2% (e.g., when fast, weak correction
attempts to predict a word, but strong error correction determines that the
predicted word was incorrect). However, as shown in Table 2.1, most errors
can be predicted by fast error correction, allowing CP to reduce the average
latency of a cache access by 38% to 52% depending on the strong error
correction scheme. These benefits come at an area overhead of no more than
8%, a maximum dynamic energy overhead of 4.2%, and a maximum static
energy overhead of 8% at low Vdd.
Table 2.2 compares the latency, capacity, and area overheads of complete
CP schemes (including overheads from both CP and the specific strong error
correction scheme) to those of a strong circuit-level technique. At nominal
voltage, all CP schemes have significantly smaller latency and area overheads
compared to a 10T ST SRAM cell. The 10T ST SRAM [26] has significantly
better reliability at low voltage than 8T [27] and 10T [28], yet it still cannot
provide sufficient reliability for a 32KB cache compared with a strong error
correction technique such as Bit-Fix [8].
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Table 2.2: Latency, capacity, and area overheads normalized to an
unprotected cache.
Low Vdd Nominal Voltage Low Vdd (650mV)
Tolerance Ave Lat Capacity Ave Lat Capacity Area
Technique Over. Over. Over. Over. Over.
CP
2% 0% 24% 100% 20%
+ Hi-ECC
CP
2% 0% 24% 0% 50%
+ VS-ECC
CP
2% 0% 19% 33% 13%
+ BitFix
10T ST
60% 0% 60% 0% 100%Cell
SRAM [25]
2.6.2 Design Points
As shown in Figure 2.9, applying CP reduces the average access latency of
a reliable, low Vdd L1 cache. At the processor level, this can result in sig-
nificant performance and energy benefits for those processors (e.g., in-order
cores) where the latency of cache access can significantly determine perfor-
mance. To quantify the processor benefits, we evaluate CP against three
design points presented in Table 2.3. The first baseline, Nominal Baseline,
is a seven-stage pipeline running at 2.68GHz at 1.2V. Note that cache ac-
cesses take two cycles for this baseline. The second baseline, Deep Pipe, has
additional stages (for both the L1 ICache and L1 DCache) to accommodate
the latency of error correction required during 650mV operation without af-
fecting the frequency of the pipeline during nominal (1.2V) operation. For
Hi-ECC and VS-ECC, error correction latency requires two cycles given the
single-bit correction latency described in Section 2.6.1, while Bit-Fix requires
three cycles. The frequency of the Deep Pipe baseline (and other baselines)
at 650mV is determined using the operating point pairs from [8] and assum-
ing a linear voltage-frequency scaling (this is similar to the methodology used
in [29, 11]).
The third design point is Speculate on Every Access (SEA) where every
cache access is speculated upon. I.e., the uncorrected value is returned to the
pipeline and to the strong correction circuitry at the same time. This design
point represents the natural extension of [15] using hardware error correction.
This design will suffer from frequent squashing of speculative instructions
and more frequent stalls for long-latency correction. SEA also requires the
27
Table 2.3: Operating point parameters.
Parameter
Nominal Deep
SEA CP
Baseline Pipe
Processor Low Vdd — 968 MHz 968 MHz 945 MHz
Frequency Nom Vdd 2.68 GHz 2.56 GHz
L1 $ Low Vdd — 2.37 ns
Latency Nom Vdd 0.68 ns
L1 Singlebit Hi-ECC — 2 cycles
Correction VS-ECC — 2 cycles
Latency BitFix — 3 cycles
L1 Multibit Hi-ECC — 13 cycles
Correction VS-ECC — 13 cycles
Latency Bit-Fix — 3 cycles
Pipeline
Hi-ECC 7 11 9 9
Stages
VS-ECC 7 11 9 9
Bit-Fix 7 13 10 10
L2 Latency 10 ns
additional pipeline stages that CP needs for forwarding speculative values. A
fourth design point is SECDED+Disable where each word is protected by an
ECC that can correct up to one error (this is the same SEC as used for our
VS-ECC implementations). If more than one error is identified, that word is
disabled, requiring an access to the next level in the cache hierarchy. Since
SECDED requires more than one cycle of additional latency, implement it
in an 11-stage pipeline. The final design point is CP. It has a slightly lower
frequency at nominal voltage than the other design points and a slightly lower
frequency than Deep Pipe and SEA at 650mV to account for the addition of
two MUXes to the critical path of a cache access (see Figure 2.8).
2.6.3 Experimental Setup
We evaluate CP over benchmarks from the Spec2000 [30] and Spec2006 [31]
benchmark suites executing on a two-issue in-order core. Core microarchi-
tectural parameters were chosen to be similar to the ARM Cortex-A7 [32]
and are enumerated in Table 2.4. An aggressive branch predictor was cho-
sen to not unduly penalize Deep Pipe. Performance simulations were run
using gem5 [33], fast forwarding for 1 billion instructions and executing for 1
billion instructions. Frequency for a given voltage was determined by the
linear scaling in [11]. Nominal dynamic and static power overheads were de-
termined using the simulation results and McPAT [34]. Low supply voltage
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Table 2.4: Basic core characteristics.
Number Cores 1 in-order
Register File 32 Int, 32 FP
Fetch/Decode/Issue Width 2/2/2
BTB Size 4096 entries
RAS Size 16 entries
Branch Predictor Tournament
ALUs/FPUs/MDUs 2/1/1
Cache Line Size 64B
L1 I$
Nominal (1.2V, all designs) 32KB, 4-way
Hi-ECC (650-840mV) 16KB, 2-way
VS-ECC (650-840mV) 32KB, 4-way
Bit-Fix (650-840mV) 24KB, 3-way
L1 D$
Nominal (1.2V, all designs) 32KB, 4-way
Hi-ECC (650-840mV) 16KB, 2-way
VS-ECC (650-840mV) 32KB, 4-way
Bit-Fix (650-840mV) 24KB, 3-way
L2 Unified $ 1MB, 8-way
Memory Configuration 2 GB of 1066 MHz DDR3
dynamic power was scaled quadratically with respect to voltage [8]. Low
supply voltage static power was scaled cubically with respect to voltage [8].
The L2 and the main memory are not scaled (i.e., we model them to have
an absolute latency in terms of ns).
2.7 Experimental Results
In this section, we evaluate the impact of the reduced error correction latency
enabled by CP on processor-level performance, power, and energy.
2.7.1 Low Voltage (650mV) Operation
Figure 2.10 shows the performance of the different schemes at 650mV com-
pared to the nominal baseline operating at 1.2V. For simplicity, we discuss
Hi-ECC results here, although the trends for VS-ECC and Bit-Fix are sim-
ilar. We see a 22% performance benefit over the deepened pipeline design
in spite of slightly lower frequency (945MHz vs. 968MHz). This is due to
a reduced penalty for branch and data hazards since the number of pipeline
stages is smaller (9 vs. 11). Furthermore, the additional pipeline stages in CP
continue to forward to dependent instructions, while the additional pipeline
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Figure 2.10: Performance for 650mV operation.
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Figure 2.11: Energy for 650mV operation.
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Figure 2.12: Performance for nominal voltage operation.
stages in the deepened pipeline design lead to stalls for the load-dependent
instructions. CP increases performance by 42% over the SECDED with word
disable scheme, which performs the worst of all correction schemes on aver-
age. When compared to Speculate on Every Access (SEA), CP increases
performance by 18%. There are two reasons for this performance improve-
ment. First, CP reduces the mis-prediction rate and thus the penalty from
squashing speculative instructions. Second, CP reduces the number of long-
latency stalls for strong error correction because the fast, weak correction
in CP can correct errors within the data word, which may reduce multi-bit
errors to single-bit errors. Finally, CP achieves average performance within
13% of the ideal, zero-latency, zero-capacity correction. The slight differ-
ence in performance is due to the slightly lower frequency of operation at
650mV, stalls due to non-predictions and mis-predictions (see Table 2.1).
When compared against the SECDED+Disable design point, CP has a per-
formance benefit of 42% because SECDED requires additional pipeline stages
for both L1 caches and also incurs long-latency misses to the next levels of
the cache hierarchy.
Figure 2.11 shows the energy benefits that the error correction predic-
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tion scheme can provide over the reduced frequency and pipeline deepening
schemes. The observed benefit of CP compared to the deepened pipeline
design is 19% and it occurs due to the 22% higher performance. CP has 16%
lower energy than SEA because of the increased performance from correct
prediction and decreased power consumption. All error correction techniques
show a reduction of average energy by 58% or more relative to the nominal
baseline. We report energy benefits for a core where logic and SRAMs are on
a single power rail. If logic and SRAMs are on different rails, energy benefits
will still be significant because SRAM energy would dominate at low supply
voltages.
2.7.2 Nominal Operation
We recognize that for many applications low power/energy operating points
are desirable, but they must not come at the price of hurting performance at
nominal operating points. We evaluated the performance of each design point
at the nominal voltage (1.2V). Figure 2.12 shows that CP has only a slight
performance degradation of 1.2% when operating at the nominal voltage
due to the addition of a MUX on the critical path of L1 cache accesses.
This shows that CP is not only an attractive design point for fixed voltage
systems running at low voltages (e.g., 650mV), but also for systems that
support DVFS to provide high performance at nominal operating points. In
contrast, pipeline deepening has an average performance degradation of over
15%. The high performance degradation is due to two factors (1) data and
control hazards are more expensive because of increased number of pipeline
stages, and (2) since the additional pipeline stages corresponding to the data
cache accesses cannot forward values until the access is complete, dependent
instructions have to stall. Finally, the reduced frequency design and SEA
have high performance at nominal operation. However, these designs may
have significant performance and energy overhead at low voltage operation
(Figure 2.10, Figure 2.11).
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Figure 2.13: Voltage scaling sensitivity study.
2.7.3 Sensitivity
The benefits provided by CP are dependent on several parameters, including
the voltage of operation, the latency impact of CP, and the fault rates of
a given voltage. In this section we perform a sensitivity analysis of these
parameters.
Our results in Section 2.7.1 were presented for 650mV. It is the lowest
voltage at which all the ECC bits for a 32-bit data word can fit within an-
other 32-bit word. In this section, we compare the performance of correction
prediction against other design points over higher supply voltages and corre-
sponding error rates. For Hi-ECC and VS-ECC, we select the weakest BCH
code which guarantees reliability at that voltage equivalent to the reliability
at nominal voltage. This means that the given supply voltage is the lowest
supply voltage at which the design can be run (e.g., the BCH decoder that is
required for 840mV operation would not be sufficient to operate at 700mV).
The CP error correction hardware is constant across all supply voltages.
Figure 2.13 shows the results. The results show that CP allows operation
over a large voltage range at a performance comparable to the ideal scheme.
Performance degradation of CP applied on top of Hi-ECC compared to the
ideal is only 13%, 7%, and 7% at 650mV, 700mV, and 840mV respectively.
The primary reason why CP performs comparably to the ideal is that a
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Figure 2.14: Fast correction table latency sensitivity study.
large fraction of errors over a wide voltage range are predictable by the fast,
weak correction. We also observe that while CP provides better performance
than other design points over the entire range that was evaluated, the per-
formance advantage depends on the operating voltage. For example, while
CP has nearly identical performance to SEA at 840mV, the performance ad-
vantage increases to 18% at 650mV. This is because the number of errors is
considerably higher at 650mV than 840mV. For SEA, this leads to signifi-
cantly higher number of squashes and long-latency stalls. For CP, most of the
cache accesses continue to be predicted by the fast, weak correction scheme
at 650mV. Finally, CP continues to perform much better than reduced fre-
quency and pipeline deepened designs even at higher supply voltages (e.g.,
840mV). This is because the reduced frequency design has significantly lower
frequency even at 840mV (1.111GHz vs. 1.524GHz). Similarly, the deepened
pipeline not only suffers from the standard disadvantages of having a large
number of pipeline stages (increased cost of branch and data hazards), but
also has additional stalls due to the load-dependent instructions waiting for
the error correction for the data cache access to complete.
The results in Section 2.7.1 correspond to a 2.5% latency overhead for
CP as modeled by the methodology in Section 2.5.2. Figure 2.14 shows the
performance of CP applied to Hi-ECC (the correction scheme CP performs
worst with) assuming its latency overhead is double and quadruple our calcu-
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Figure 2.15: Fault rate sensitivity study.
lated value. Despite the increased overhead (5% and 10%), CP still increases
performance by 16% and 12%, respectively.
Our results in Section 2.7.1 are based on the 65nm fault rate data from [10]
(note that prior work [11, 8] used 130nm fault rate data). We explored the
sensitivity of benefits to fault rates nearly 5x lower than [10]. Figure 2.15
shows that CP can still provide performance improvements of 14-20% for
a lower fault rate vs. voltage curve. These results (including results in
Figures 2.13, 2.14, and 2.15) attest to the generality of our approach.
The results reported above are for min-sized 6T SRAMs. Prior work
(e.g., [25]) has demonstrated that circuit-level techniques such as doubling
the size of transistors in 6T cells or using 8T cells may allow reduced volt-
age operation. However, CP can still yield performance benefits when used
with such circuit-level techniques. To quantify the benefits we rely on the
fault rate vs. voltage dataset from [25] and voltage versus frequency scaling
dataset from [35].2 The 6Tx2 SRAM cells allow operation at 454mV with the
evaluated strong error correction techniques. When implemented on top of
6Tx2 SRAM cells, CP can achieve a performance improvement of up to 13-
2We use fault rate vs. voltage data from [25] since the data set used for our main set
of results in Section 2.7.1 did not have fault rate vs. voltage data for 6T upsized or 8T
SRAM cells. We use the non-linear voltage vs. frequency scaling data from [35] since
the linear voltage vs. frequency scaling assumption no longer applies for the low voltages
allowed by 6Tx2 and 8T cells.
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Figure 2.16: 6T 2x upsized sensitivity study using [25, 35].
20% as shown in Figure 2.16. Such upsizing results in a 33% area increase and
a doubling of static power. By using 8T SRAM cells, the additional static
power can be reduced, while still allowing a minimum voltage of 454mV.
When implemented on top of 8T SRAM cells, CP provides up to a 13-20%
performance improvement as shown in Figure 2.17. For completeness, Fig-
ure 2.18 shows CP results when applied to 6T cells using these datasets. At
the lowest voltage where the reliability target can be met, CP shows a per-
formance benefit of 12-19% for 6T transistors, similar to the primary results
presented in Section 2.7.1.
2.8 Future Work and Discussions
In this chapter, we explore one implementation of correction prediction; many
other implementations with different tradeoffs exist. For example, instead of
using a BIST routine to populate the CPT as described previously in the
chapter, one can use a learning mechanism to populate the CPT by dynam-
ically identifying the weak memory cells at runtime. Also as an example,
instead of allocating a static CPT entry to every group of four words as
described previously in the chapter, one can also use a smaller CPT table
with fewer dynamic entries that correspond to the most frequently accessed
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Figure 2.17: 8T sensitivity study using [25, 35].
words. Finally, other implementations of correction predictors are possible,
such as weak error-correcting codes or history prediction.
While our evaluation is performed in the context of an L1 cache, the con-
cept of correction prediction is applicable to other on-chip memories. Exam-
ples include L2 and L3 caches, as well as non-cache on-chip memories such
as GPU register files and the memory systems of embedded processors which
often reside on-chip. Correction prediction is also applicable to emerging
technologies such as STT-RAMs, where fault rates are high [36]. In addi-
tion to in-order cores, correction prediction can be applied to other processor
micro-architectures that support speculative execution, such as out-of-order
processors and processors with runahead threads. The details needed to ap-
ply correction prediction to these different contexts are outside the scope of
this dissertation.
Finally, correction prediction bears some resemblance to value prediction,
which seeks to predict the value of a load before the load instruction com-
pletes. They differ in three main ways. First, value prediction is beneficial
only for accesses to words with value locality, while correction prediction is
not limited by this requirement. Second, value prediction benefits only load
instructions, while correction prediction benefits all instructions by predict-
ing the correct values of instruction words accessed from the I-cache. Third,
by predicting the values of weak cells in a word, instead of predicting the com-
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Figure 2.18: 6T sensitivity study using [25, 35].
plete value of the whole word, correction prediction can require significantly
lower overheads than value correction while providing the same prediction
accuracy.
2.9 Summary
On-chip memories consume an increasingly large fraction of chip power. The
reliability of on-chip memories determines their voltage and, therefore, the
power these memories consume. Voltage scaling can be used to significantly
reduce the power consumed by on-chip memories and chips as a whole. How-
ever, aggressive voltage scaling leads to high error rates in on-chip memories
(e.g., caches). Strong error correction can be used to tolerate high error rates
in on-chip memories. However, such strong error correction may require sig-
nificant latency relative to the memory access itself. We propose correction
prediction, a scheme that reduces the latency of strong error correction by
using a fast mechanism to predict the result of strong error correction. We
present CP, a fast, weak correction mechanism that predicts the result of
strong error correction with a mis-prediction rate of <0.1%. This reduces
the effective access latency of a 32KB, four-way SRAM L1 cache by 38%-
52%. For a two-issue in-order core, CP provides 16%-21% energy reduction
37
compared with using a strong error correction scheme alone, while incurring
less than a 1.2% performance degradation at nominal voltage.
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Chapter 3
Rescuing Uncorrectable Fault Patterns in
On-Chip Memories through Error Pattern
Transformation
In Chapter 2, we presented an architectural technique for improving the per-
formance and energy of a processor by reducing the latency overhead of error
correction. In this chapter, we propose error pattern transformation, a novel
low-latency error correction technique that allows on-chip memories to be
scaled to voltages lower than what has been previously possible while still
maintaining the same reliability targets. Our technique relies on the obser-
vation that the number of on-chip memory errors that many error correcting
codes (ECCs) can correct differs widely depending on the error patterns in
the logical words they protect. We propose adaptively rearranging the logical
bit to physical bit mapping per word according to the BIST-detectable fault
pattern in the physical word. The adaptive logical bit to physical bit map-
ping transforms many uncorrectable error patterns in the logical words into
correctable error patterns and, therefore, improving on-chip memory reliabil-
ity. This reduces the minimum voltage at which on-chip memory can run by
70mV over the best low-latency ECC baseline, leading to a 25.7% core-wide
power reduction for an ARM Cortex-A7-like core. Energy per instruction is
reduced by 15.7% compared to the best baseline.
3.1 Introduction
Current and future process technologies face serious power challenges. A
well-known technique that effectively reduces processor power consumption
is supply voltage scaling. One major challenge for voltage scaling is that the
reliability of SRAM cells decreases with the supply voltage. As the supply
voltage decreases, an rapidly increasing fraction of SRAM cells become faulty
due to process variations [26, 25]. This problem becomes more pronounced at
smaller feature sizes (Figure 3.1) and is expected to get worse [21]. As such,
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the reliability of SRAM cells, and not the reliability of logic circuits, often
determines the extent to which supply voltage can be reduced [8, 37, 38].
Although using more robust SRAM cell implementations with larger area
and leakage can improve the reliability of SRAMs at low supply voltages, a
significant fraction of these SRAM cells are still faulty at low voltages, as
shown in Figure 3.2.
Many recent works have investigated using an error correcting code, or
ECC, to tolerate the high fault rates of SRAMs at low supply voltages
[9, 11, 39, 13]. However, there is often a strong trade-off between error
correction coverage and latency between different ECC schemes. For exam-
ple, Figure 3.3 shows that the four-bit-correcting BCH (127,64) ECC can
tolerate many factors higher bit failure rates than weaker ECC schemes for
the same coverage; however, this comes at the cost of incurring up to 20X
higher latency overhead.1 Although stronger ECC schemes provide the high
error correction coverage needed to enable low supply voltage, their high er-
ror correction latencies make them unattractive for on-chip memories, where
latency is often critical.
In this chapter, we propose error pattern transformation, a novel low-
latency microarchitectural technique that allows on-chip memories to be
scaled to voltages lower than what has been previously possible. We ob-
serve that although many ECCs only guarantee correction of a few memory
errors, they can opportunistically correct more errors depending on the error
pattern in the logical words they protect. As such, we propose transforming
the uncorrectable error patterns in logical words into correctable ones by in-
telligently rearranging the logical bit to physical bit mapping when storing a
logical word into a physical word in an on-chip memory. This improves on-
chip memory reliability and, therefore, leads to a reduction in the minimum
voltage at which on-chip memory can be run reliably.
Error pattern transformation (EPT) is a general technique that can be
applied on top of many prior works on improving on-chip memory reliability.
EPT can provide reliability benefits even in the presence of soft errors and
erratic faults. Our evaluations show that EPT reduces the minimum volt-
age at which on-chip memory can run by 70mV over the best low-latency
1BCH decoder latency is taken from [19]; the calculation assumes an oracular BCH
decoder whose latency depends on the actual number of faults in a word, as opposed to
having a constant worst-case latency.
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Figure 3.1: SRAM failure probability w.r.t. to voltage for different
processing technologies [26, 25, 40]. Technologies with smaller feature sizes
exhibit higher fault rates.
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Figure 3.3: ECC latency and coverage for 64-bit data words. Low-latency
ECCs typically provide lower coverages than long-latency ECCs.
ECC baseline, leading to a 25.7% core-wide power reduction. Energy per
instruction is reduced by 15.7% compared to the best baseline.
3.2 Motivation
The key insight driving the work in this chapter is that for for many ECCs,
the number of errors that they can correct differs widely depending on the
observed error pattern (i.e., the bit locations of the individual errors). Con-
sider, for example, a segmented ECC, which breaks a word into several in-
dependent and equally sized segments, each with its own check bits for error
correction [9]. The number of errors that a segmented ECC can correct
segment' segment' segment' segment'
'word:'
'word:'
segment' segment' segment' segment'
Figure 3.4: Uncorrectable (above) and correctable (below) error patterns in
a segmented ECC that corrects one error per segment. Low-latency ECCs
can correct different numbers of errors for different error patterns.
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Many t-bit errors are correctable even for large values of t.
depends on how many errors are located in each segment, as illustrated in
Figure 3.4.
Our second example ECC does not break a word into independent seg-
ments. An Orthogonal Latin Square Code, OLSC(128,64), protects 64 bits
of data with 128-64=64 bits of redundancy. OLSC(128,64) performs error
correction in multiple levels of majority voting, where each level consists of
multiple majority voters processing overlapping sets of input bits in parallel
for low-latency error correction. When there are too many errors in the in-
puts to one of the majority voters, the output of the voter can flip; this can
in turn flip the outputs of subsequent voting levels. As such, the number of
errors that the OLSC ECC can correct again depends on the error pattern.
OLSC(128,64) can correct up to 32 bad bits among the 128 bits for some spe-
cific error patterns; for all error patterns in general, however, OLSC(128,64)
only guarantees correction of up to four bad bits.
In fact, it is quite common for many low-latency ECCs (the latency-
coverage trade-offs of different ECCs are shown in Figure 3.3) to have some
error patterns for which more errors can be corrected than other error pat-
terns. Figure 3.5 shows the fraction of t-bit error patterns that are correctable
under different ECCs. Figure 3.5 considers 64-bit data words; it presents
the unsegmented OLSC(128,64) ECC as well as a segmented Hamming(7,4)
ECC and a segmented OLSC(8,4) ECC, where a segmented ECC(n,k) breaks
a 64-bit data word into segments of k data bits with n − k check bits per
segment. Figure 3.5 shows that a significant fraction of t-bit error patterns
are correctable for a large range of t even though segmented Hamming(7,4),
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Figure 3.6: Possible logical to physical bit orderings. The error pattern in a
logical word depends on the bit ordering used to access the physical word.
segmented OLSC(8,4), and OLSC (128,64) guarantee correction of only 1, 1,
and 4 errors, respectively.
In this chapter, we improve the coverage of low-latency ECCs by adap-
tively transforming an uncorrectable BIST-detectable t-bit error pattern in
a logical word into one of the many correctable t-bit error patterns (the
latency-coverage trade-offs of different ECCs are shown in Figure 3.3). This
allows low-latency ECCs to obtain similar coverage as high-latency ECCs
(e.g., the coverage of the BCH(127,64) shown in Figure 3.5), while incurring
only a small fraction of the latter’s long latency overhead. The improved
coverage allows on-chip memories to be scaled to voltages lower than what
has been previously possible.
3.3 Error Pattern Transformation
Consider the proposed technique in context of a cache. We observe that the
same physical fault pattern in a cache word can manifest as different error
patterns in the logical word presented to the ECC decoder depending on the
mapping of the logical bits in a cache word to the physical bits stored in the
physical cache word. For example, the logical bit to physical bit mapping
from a logical word to a physical cache word, or simply bit ordering, shown in
the left half and the right half of Figure 3.6 generates error vectors ‘01010000’
and ‘10000001’, respectively, even though the physical fault pattern in the
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Figure 3.7: The physical fault coverages of low-latency ECCs with different
numbers of bit orderings. With multiple bit ordering options, the
low-latency ECCs approach, and sometimes, exceed the slow BCH ECC in
coverage.
cache word remains the same. We seek to transform uncorrectable error
patterns in the logical words into correctable error patterns by supporting
multiple bit orderings per physical cache word. In comparison, conventional
cache designs support only a single bit ordering, which maps bit x in a logical
word (e.g., logical bit 0) to the same bit x in the physical cache word (e.g.,
physical bit 0).
When accessing a cache word with a known (BIST-detectable) physical
fault pattern, our proposal uses a pre-recorded bit ordering that generates
only correctable errors for the known physical fault pattern in the cache word;
the pre-recorded bit ordering is selected from a pool of available bit orderings.
Under our proposal, a physical fault pattern in a cache word is uncorrectable
only if no bit ordering that generates only correctable error patterns for the
given physical fault pattern can be found; intuitively, the larger the number
of supported bit orderings, the less likely that a bit ordering that generates
only correctable error patterns cannot be found for a given physical fault
pattern.
Figure 3.7 shows the calculated ideal fault coverages for different ECCs
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under different numbers of supported bit orderings.2 Figure 3.7 shows that
the fraction of correctable fault patterns increases significantly as the number
of supported bit orderings increases. In fact, for a sufficient number of avail-
able bit orderings (e.g., 32 to 256 bit orderings), coverage approaches, and
sometimes, exceeds the high-latency BCH ECC. This improved coverage can
be used to to be scale voltages lower than what has been previously possible
for cache memories.
Our proposal requires addressing three main challenges. First, how to
identify the appropriate bit ordering for each cache word. Second, how to
record the identified bit orderings in a space-efficient manner. Third, how
to enact the appropriate bit ordering during cache accesses at low latency
overhead. We address these challenges in Section 3.3.1 through Section 3.3.3.
Finally, Section 3.3.4 walks through examples of how to apply our proposal.
3.3.1 Bit Ordering Selection
Low voltage SRAM faults are largely hard faults that can be identified using a
BIST (Built-in Self-Test) routine that is run either during post-manufacture
testing or at set intervals during processor lifetime [8, 11]. The following
describes a general approach, applicable to different ECCs, for selecting the
appropriate bit ordering that only generates correctable errors for a physical
fault pattern that has been identified in a cache word.
The first step is to identify the physical fault vector of a cache word at
low supply voltage using BIST. Next, the fault vector is sent to the bit
reordering logic (described in detail in Section 3.3.3), which modifies the
ordering of the bits in the fault vector. The modified fault vector is then
fed into a correctability checker to check whether all possible error patterns
due to the modified fault vector are correctable. The correctability checker
is specific to an ECC. For example, for the segmented Hamming (7,4) ECC,
2Coverages are determined as follows. Let f(t) be the fraction of t-bit error patterns
that are uncorrectable by an ECC scheme; we obtained f(t) for each of the fast ECC
implementations via Monte Carlo simulations. Given that there are n ways to reorder the
logical bits stored in a physical word, a t-bit fault pattern is uncorrectable if the fault
pattern expresses uncorrectable error patterns under all n bit orderings. The probability
that a t-bit fault pattern is expressed as an uncorrectable error pattern under all n bit
orderings is f(t)n, assuming that the n orderings are generated independently from one
another. The fraction of t-bit fault patterns that are correctable given n bit orderings is,
therefore, 1− f(t)n.
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the correctability checker counts the number of ‘1’s in every segment of seven
adjacent bits in the fault vector under test; the checker asserts a fail signal if
any segment contains more than one ‘1’ and asserts a pass signal otherwise.
If the check passes, the tested bit ordering for the cache word is recorded
so that the ordering will be used to access that cache word for all future
accesses. Otherwise, the bit reordering logic checks another bit ordering of
the identified fault vector until one of the bit orderings passes or until all
available bit orderings have been tested; in the latter case, the cache word is
reported as having an uncorrectable fault pattern.
Figure 3.8 summarizes the steps described above. Note that all of the steps
only have to be performed once for each cache word (e.g., once during post-
manufacturing testing). They are not performed during normal operations
and, therefore, do not affect runtime performance. Assuming a 50s BIST
overhead to identify all fault patterns for a 2MB cache [11], our 32KB L1
cache requires 0.78s. Assuming the worst case of 28 OID calculations per word
and two cycles per calculation (one cycle to generate a new bit ordering and
one cycle to check the new ordering), a 32KB L1 cache requires only 131K
cycles. Therefore, selection of OID bits would add a negligible amount of
time to the BIST routine.
3.3.2 Tracking Bit Orderings
To support 2k different bit orderings per cache word, we allocate k bits per
physical cache word to record the chosen bit ordering for each physical cache
word. We call these k bits per cache word the Ordering ID or OID of the
physical cache word. We store the OIDs in the tag array where they are
accessed at the same time as the tags. Similar to prior work [11], a copy
of the OIDs is stored off-chip to allow the OIDs to be used across multiple
switches to low voltage or after the chip is powered down.
3.3.3 Bit Reordering and Order Recovery
Prior to a write to a physical cache word, we reorder the bits in the logical
word to be written according to the recorded OID of the cache word. Con-
versely, after reading from a cache word, the earlier modification to the bit
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Figure 3.8: Selecting the appropriate bit ordering for a cache word. A BIST
circuit generates the fault pattern of a physical word. Logical bit
reorderings are tried until one guarantees that the logical word will be
correctable. In our evaluations, this takes less than two attempts on
average.
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Figure 3.9: Cache access action flow. Since bit reordering is on the critical
path of a cache access, it is critical that it have low latency.
ordering has to be reversed to recover the original logical word. Figure 3.9
details the steps needed for accessing a cache word. During a cache access,
the OID is read at the same time as the tag; however, bit reordering and or-
der recovery are on the critical paths of cache writes and reads, respectively.
It is critical that these two steps are implemented at very low latency.
To provide low latency bit reordering and order recovery, we evenly divide
each logical word into multiple small groups of bits and perform bit reordering
and order recovery on all groups in parallel; bits in each parallel reordering
group (or simply, PRG) can only be moved within the PRG but not across
PRG. Intuitively, the smaller the PRG sizes, the higher the parallelism in the
reordering and order recovery logic, and therefore, the lower the latency of
the bit reordering and order recovery logic. However, the smaller the PRG
sizes, the less flexible bit reordering becomes, which limits the correctable
fault coverage because it reduces the number of correctable error patterns
that can be exploited. As such, the size of the PRGs needs to be selected
based on the underlying ECCs. Section 3.3.4 walks through some examples
of PRG selection and sizing.
A straightforward way to reorder the bits in a PRG is to use a set of
static circuits, each designed to reorder bits within a PRG in a specific way.
However, this can lead to a large area overhead when supporting a large
number of bit orderings per cache word. Instead, we use barrel shifters as
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a more scalable approach to reorder a PRG. A barrel shifter can generate a
different bit ordering within a PRG for a different shift distance input value.
In addition to providing good scalability, the barrel shifters can also reorder
the bits in a PRG at low latency since the PRGs are small (e.g., only 8 to
16 bits per PRG). Synthesis shows (details in Section 3.4.1) only < 0.3 cycle
of barrel shifting latency assuming 20 FO4s per cycle.
Figure 3.10 illustrates the details of how to implement the bit reordering
and order recovery logic using barrel shifters. The barrel shifters in the
bit reordering logic and order recovery logic differ simply by the direction of
rotation so that the actions taken by the former can be reversed by the latter.
The shift distance inputs to the barrel shifters are taken from the OID of a
cache word; this allows a logical word to be reordered/recovered according to
the OID of the cache word that stores the logical word. Note that the number
of bits in the shift distance input to a barrel shifter is a function of the size
of each PRG; this number may or may not be equal to the size of an OID.
As such, each barrel shifter takes as its shift distance input a combination
of bits from the OID. Different barrel shifters take different combinations
of the bits from an input OID to reduce the correlation between different
PRGs since this correlation can reduce the effectiveness of bit reordering by
reducing the movement of the bits in a logical word relative to each other.
For our evaluation in Section 3.5, we choose the combinations of input bits
to the barrel shifters experimentally by picking the set of combinations that
provides the best empirical fault coverage out of ten randomly generated sets
of combinations.
3.3.4 Application Examples
Error pattern transformation (or EPT) is a general technique that can be
applied on top of many prior works on improving on-chip memory reliability.
In this section, we describe how to apply EPT to two different ECCs.
Applying to Segmented ECCs
For segmented ECCs, we construct each PRG using logical bits from different
segments to move errors in segments with more errors into segments with
fewer errors; this PRG composition principle benefits all segmented ECCs.
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Figure 3.10: Bit reordering and order recovery logic. PRG stands for a
Parallel Reordering Group.
Figure 3.11 shows the PRG composition for a 16-bit data word protected by
the segmented Hamming(7,4) ECC; each column of squares represents a PRG
while each row of squares represents a segment. Figure 3.11 also illustrates
how the composition of each PRG from bits in different segments improves
the fault coverage of a segmented ECC.
Applying to Unsegmented ECCs
For unsegmented ECCs, a good PRG composition may be different for dif-
ferent unsegmented ECC implementations. As such, we propose a two-stage
EPT that provides more freedom in bit reordering to better suit the specific
needs of different unsegmented ECCs. During the first stage, each PRG is
composed from bits in the same row so that the bits can be reordered along
the X-axis. During the second stage, each PRG is composed from bits in the
same column so the bits can be reordered along the Y-axis. Figure 3.12 shows
the PRG composition for a 16-bit data word protected by the OLSC(24,16)
ECC.
Section 3.6 provides more examples of application of EPT to prior works
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(a) A bit ordering that can generate
uncorrectable errors for segmented
Hamming(7,4).
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Figure 3.11: PRGs for segmented Hamming(7,4). Each row corresponds to
one segment within the access granularity. Green and blue represent data
and ECC bits, respectively. Red represent bits mapped to faulty SRAM
cells. All rows are accessed at once, are decoded at once, and are combined
to form one word.
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Figure 3.12: PRGs for OLSC(24,16). Green and blue represent data and
ECC bits, respectively. Red grid represents bits mapped to faulty SRAM
cells.
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3.4 Methodology
3.4.1 EPT-Based Cache Resilience Designs
To demonstrate the applicability of EPT to a variety of ECCs that can
be used to protect deeply voltage scaled on-chip memories, we apply EPT
to three different ECCs in the context of a 32KB L1 cache with a word
size of 64 bits - the segmented Hamming(7,4), segmented OLSC(8,4), and
OLSC(128,64). All three ECCs protect at the granularity of a 64-bit data
word, which is the word size of the evaluated L1 cache. For sensitivity anal-
ysis, we evaluate EPT using both 5-bit OIDs and 8-bit OIDs; we refer to
them as 5-bit EPT and 8-bit EPT, respectively. We apply EPT to segmented
Hamming(7,4) and segmented OLSC(8,4) by adding one level of 16-bit bar-
rel shifters and apply EPT to OLSC(128,64) by adding two levels of 16-bit
barrel shifters.
To accurately characterize the latency and area overheads of EPT, we
implemented these ECCs, both by themselves and with EPT, in RTL and
synthesize them using Synopsys Design Compiler [41] and the TSMC 65GP
standard cell library. Cadence SoC Encounter [42] was used for physical
layout. Area and latency values were verified using Encounter. Table 3.1
shows the latency in cycles and area overheads normalized to the evaluated
32KB cache (see Section 3.4.3); our evaluation assumes the 20 FO4 cycle
commonly used in prior works [8, 25]. Table 3.1 shows that all three ECCs
stay within one cycle of latency, with or without EPT. By itself, each level
of barrel shifters required by EPT only incurs < 0.3 cycle latency and 3%
Table 3.1: Synthesized decoder latency and area. Area overheads is w.r.t. a
0.76mm2 L1 cache.
Cycle Area Gate Count
Segmented
0.22 0.44% 528
Hamming(7,4)
EPT:segmented
0.43 1.53% 2009
Hamming(7,4)
Segmented
0.16 0.40% 573
OLSC(8,4)
EPT:Segmented
0.46 1.60% 2095
OLSC(8,4)
OLSC(128,64) 0.68 8.89% 6394
EPT:OLSC(128,64) 0.98 10.10% 9187
53
Table 3.2: Evaluated EPT overheads.
Baselines
Latency Overhead Usable Cache Decoder Area Metadata Total Area
(Cycles) Size Overhead Overhead Overhead
5-bit EPT+Segmented
1 16KB 3.06% 0% 3.1%
Hamming(7,4)
5-bit EPT+Segmented
1 16KB 3.2% 0% 3.2%
OLSC(8,4)
5-bit EPT+OLSC(128,64) 2 16KB 20.20% 0% 24.2%
8-bit EPT+Segmented
1 16KB 3.06% 4% 7.1%
Hamming(7,4)
Table 3.3: Evaluated baseline overheads.
Baselines
Latency Overhead Usable Cache Decoder Area Metadata Total Area
(Cycles) Size Overhead Overhead Overhead
Oracular BCH(127,64)
2 - 21 (3.2 avg) 100% 70% 0% 70%
(Hi-ECC)
VS-ECC 1-7 (1.9 avg) 16KB 37% 4% 42%
MS-ECC 1 16KB 9.4% 0% 9.4%
SECDED 1 32KB 10.9% 0% 10.9%
8T SRAMs 0 32KB 0% 0% 33.3%
WD–Original 1 16KB <1% 43.2% 44.2%
WD–IsoArea 1 16KB <1% 4% 5%
area overhead. In particular, the two segmented ECCs both stay within 0.5
cycle of latency, with or without EPT. The low-latency overheads justify our
design choices in Section 3.3. In our evaluations, we model the latency
overhead of all of the ECCs in Table 3.1 as one cycle; the one exception
is EPT:OLSC(128,64), which we conservatively model as two cycles of la-
tency. Table 3.2 lists the EPT latency overheads that are used during our
performance and EPT area overheads used during our power evaluations.
3.4.2 Baseline Cache Resilience Designs
To show that the proposed approach can lead to lower on-chip memory volt-
ages than what has been previously possible, we compare against seven base-
lines. We compare against the SECDED (72,64) ECC commonly used in
existing processors [32]. We compare against the primary implementation of
MS-ECC [9], which uses the OLSC(128,64) ECC. We also compare against
the circuit-level technique of using robustified 8T SRAM cells, instead of the
usual 6T SRAM cells.
We compare against an Oracular BCH(127,64) ECC that guarantees cor-
rection of up to 10 bits of error per word. We consider this baseline oracular
because we optimistically assume a BCH decoder that incurs the minimum
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latency for the exact number of errors currently present in a logical word.
The oracular decoder has the low-latency benefit of weaker BCH decoders
that correct fewer errors per word while having the high error coverage ben-
efit of always guaranteeing correction of 10 bits in a word. As such, this
oracular BCH baseline represents the best coverage and latency obtainable
by prior works that propose protecting caches with the BCH ECC, such as
Hi-ECC [16].
We compare against word disable (WD), the best resilience scheme pre-
sented in [8] for L1 caches. WD is previously evaluated in the context of
caches with 512-bit access granularity; in this context, WD combines two
512-bit cache lines into an error-free logical line by dividing the two lines
into 32 chunks and remapping data to fault-free chunks among the 32 avail-
able chunks. When evaluating WD in the context of our L1 cache with a
64-bit word size, we note that dividing two 64-bit words into 32 chunks can
result in a high storage overhead for recording the 32 chunks. As such, we
evaluate two versions of WD, WD–Original and WD–IsoArea; the former
divides two 64-bit words into 32 chunks, while the latter divides the two 64-
bit words into fewer chunks such that the implementation requires the same
number of extra storage bits as an 8-bit OID EPT scheme.
We compare against a VS-ECC [11] implementation where each 64-bit data
word is divided into four 16-bit segments. The 64-bits of ECC are shared as
6-bit ECC chunks between the four segments. Each segment can have up to
four 6-bit ECC chunks allocated to it; each additional 6-bit chunk guarantees
correction of up to an additional error. For this VS-ECC implementation, we
assume that the four segments each have a dedicated decoder that corrects
up to a single error but shares two 4-bit correcting decoders; the single-bit
correcting decoders are sufficient for segments with a single error while the
multi-bit decoders are needed in case multiple errors are present in a segment.
We use two instead of four 4-bit correcting decoders to optimize the decoder
area for VS-ECC since the segments more commonly experience single-bit
errors than multi-bit errors in our evaluation.
We calculate the latency of SECDED according to [19], which conserva-
tively estimates decoder latency in FO4s by ignoring the wire delay. We cal-
culate the decoder area overhead of SECDED(72,64) by counting the number
of gates required according to [19] and assuming that each gate is equal in
area as two SRAM cells; the latter assumption is consistent with prior works
55
[11]. When calculating the latency of Oracular BCH(127,64), we use the
formula in [19] to calculate the latency required to correct t-bit errors and
weight that calculate latency by the probability of encountering t bits of er-
rors in a word. For the decoder area overhead of Oracular BCH(127,64), we
assume it is the same as the area overhead of a constant latency BCH(127,64),
which we calculate according to [19]. We extrapolate the latencies and area
overheads of MS-ECC and WD from their respective papers. We follow the
methodology for the parallel BCH decoder in VS-ECC to calculate the la-
tency and decoder area overheads of our VS-ECC adaptation; we assume
that the latency overhead of VS-ECC when a cache word is accessed is de-
termined by the segment with the most errors among the four segments in
the cache word, since this segment takes the longest to correct.
3.4.3 Experimental Setup
Keeping with the context of this work - energy efficient computing, we evalu-
ate a two-issue in-order core similar to the ARM Cortex-A7 [32]; the detailed
micro-architectural parameters are enumerated in Table 3.4. The baseline
core operating at nominal voltage (1.2V) uses no ECC for L1 accesses.3 For
each design that requires correction, we deepen the pipeline to accommodate
the minimum correction latency of that design. The core uses a common
voltage rail for both its L1 caches and the rest of the core; as such, the L1
caches determine the minimum operating voltage of the entire core, in accor-
dance with many prior works [37, 8, 9, 43]. We only voltage scale the core,
but not the rest of the system, such as the memory system and lower-level
caches, which we assume are on different voltage rails. To model voltage
scaling, we scale frequency and leakage power with respect to voltage using
the detailed 70nm scaling given in [44]; we use the common quadratic scal-
ing to model dynamic power with respect to voltage. We model the SRAM
failure probabilities using data reported in [25]. During low voltage opera-
tions, we account for the added cache access latency due to error correction
by stalling each load instruction by the number of cycles needed to perform
error correction. We simulate seventeen benchmarks from the SPEC2000 [30]
3Without any loss of generality, we can easily assume that some other default ECC is
used at the nominal voltage
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and SPEC2006 [31] benchmark suites4 using gem5 [33]; we fast-forward each
benchmark for 1 billion instructions and execute in detailed timing mode
for 1 billion instructions. We model processor power with McPAT [34] using
simulation outputs from Gem5. We use CACTI [22] to model cache latency
and power.
We choose a simple cache organization that is commonly used by prior
works [8, 9, 43] to evaluate the relative merits of EPT and the various base-
lines. This simple cache organization stores the check bits of a data cache
word (i.e., a cache word assigned to storing data during low voltage oper-
ation) in the same cache word in a different way in the same cache set, as
these two cache words are typically always accessed in parallel in L1 caches
both with or without support for voltage scaling. Unlike an alternative cache
organization that uses one ECC way to protect multiple data ways, this sim-
ple cache organization that allocates a dedicated ECC way for each data way
does not require expensive read-modify-write operations when updating the
ECC cache word. We do not investigate new approaches to store ECC bits
because it is orthogonal to the core idea of EPT. All the evaluated cache
resilience designs have almost equal number of check bits as data bits in
each word, and thus all effectively utilize the available space in the dedicated
ECC way for each data way. The only exception is the SECDED(72,64)
ECC, which only provides 72 − 64 = 8 bits of check bits per 64-bit data
word. Instead of reserving half of the ways as ECC ways, we leave all four
ways as data ways and expand the size of each cache word statically to store
the check bits for SECDED(72,64).
Also similar to prior works [8, 43], the cache organization we evaluate uses
the larger but more reliable 10T cells [25], as the tag array is only a small
fraction of the total cache area.5 Similar to these prior works, we also use
the more reliable tag array to store any metadata needed for the evaluated
cache resilience schemes, such as the OID bits for EPT, the disable bits for
WD, and the bits to identify how many ECC chunks are allocated to each
segment for VS-ECC. Note that since half of the ways in the cache are used to
store ECC bits during low voltage operation, half of the tags in the tag array
are unused during low voltage operation. Therefore, we reuse the unused tag
4We evaluated ammp, applu, apsi, art470, facerec, gromacs, lbm, libquantum, lucas,
mcf 2006, mesa, mgrid, milc, omnetpp, soplex, swim, and wupwise.
5Our reliability calculations also account for the failure probability of the 10T cells.
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Table 3.4: Microarchitectural parameters.
Core Type In-order, 7-Stage
Register File 32 Int, 32 FP
Fetch/Decode/Issue Width 2/2/2
BTB Size 4096 entries
RAS Size 16 entries
Branch Predictor Tournament
ALUs/FPUs/MDUs 2/1/1
Cache Line Size 64B
L1 I$
Nominal (1.2V) 32KB, 4-way, 2-cycle
Vmin 16KB, 2-way, 2-cycle
L1 D$
Nominal (1.2V) 32KB, 4-way, 2-cycle
Vmin 16KB, 2-way, 2-cycle
L2 Unified $ 1MB, 8-way, 20ns latency
Memory Configuration 1066 MHz DDR3
bits to store the metadata during low voltage operation. When the metadata
bits do not completely fit in the unused tags (i.e., more than 5-bit OIDS),
we expand the size of the tag entries in the ECC ways to accommodate the
remaining metadata bits. The area overhead due to expanding the size of
the tag entries are given in Table 3.3 and Table 3.2. We do not study OIDs
smaller than five bits because they do not reduce area and latency overheads,
but reduce coverage.
3.5 Results
In this section, we demonstrate that the proposed technique allows memory
to run at lower voltages than was previously possible for a given yield target.
We also discuss the core-wide power and energy benefits this entails compared
to the different baselines.
3.5.1 Yield
We define cache yield as the fraction of caches where all of the data cache
words in the data ways (i.e., the two data ways in our evaluated four-way set-
associative caches) are functional and error-free, similar to prior works [8, 9].6
6Cache word error rates are calculated analytically where possible (e.g., Oracular
BCH(127,64)). For the rest of the designs, in particular, EPT, word error rates are deter-
mined through Monte Carlo simulations.
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Figure 3.13: Yield for 32KB four-way cache implemented in 6T SRAM
cells. Cache yield vs. voltage for the various cache resilience schemes. The
red line depicts the 99.9% yield.
Figure 3.13 shows the cache yield at low supply voltage for the different cache
resilience designs. Figure 3.13 shows that for a 99.9% yield target, which is
commonly used in prior works [8, 9], 8-bit EPT + Segmented Hamming(7,4)
reduces the latter’s Vmin by 134mV. For the same yield target, 8-bit EPT +
Segmented Hamming(7,4) reduces the Vmin of the two weakest baselines in
terms of Vmin (i.e., SECDED(72,64) and MS-ECC) by 70mV or more.
After 8-bit EPT + Segmented Hamming(7,4), the next closest resilience
design in terms of achieving the lowest Vmin is the 10-bit correcting Oracular
BCH(127,64) ECC (the strongest version of a capacity-efficient code whose
redundant bits fit in the disabled way). While 8-bit EPT + Segmented
Hamming(7,4) achieves only 1mV lower Vmin than Oracular BCH(127,64),
the former’s main advantage over the latter is having lower latency overhead;
the 8-bit EPT + Segmented Hamming(7,4) incurs a constant one cycle la-
tency (see Table 3.1), while the Oracular BCH(127,64) incurs 2 to 21 cycles
of latency overhead per cache access (3.2 cycles, on average). A second ben-
efit of 8-bit EPT + Segmented Hamming(7,4) over Oracular BCH(127,64)
is having much lower decoder area. The area overhead of a BCH decoder
increases rapidly with the word size and the number of errors to correct [19].
The 8-bit EPT + Segmented Hamming(7,4) requires both minimal word size
(i.e., only seven bits per segment) and minimal correction strength(i.e., only
corrects one error per segment), as compared to BCH (127,64) which uses a
word size that is roughly 16X as large and corrects 10X as many errors per
word.
Following after Oracular BCH(127,64), the next closest baseline in Vmin
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is VS-ECC. The 8-bit EPT + Segmented Hamming(7,4) only reduces Vmin
by 13mV compared to VS-ECC. However, the main benefit of 8-bit EPT +
Segmented Hamming(7,4) over VS-ECC is against for having lower latency
overhead; VS-ECC incurs one to seven cycles of latency overhead per cache
access (1.9 cycles, on average). The 8-bit EPT + Segmented Hamming(7,4)
also incurs much lower decoder area overheads, since the latter uses a word
size 8X as large and corrects 4X as many errors per word.
After VS-ECC, the next closest baseline in Vmin is WD–Original. The 8-
bit EPT + Segmented Hamming(7,4) reduces the Vmin of WD–Original by
33mV. However, WD–Original requires 4X as many metadata bits as 8-bit
EPT, which incurs a 43% overhead in total cache area. On the other hand,
the alternative WD–IsoArea implementation we evaluate, which requires the
same number of metadata bits as 8-bit EPT, only provides a Vmin of 769mV,
which is nearly 100mV higher than the best EPT solution.
The next closest baseline in Vmin are caches built using 8T SRAMs. The
8-bit EPT + Segmented Hamming(7,4) reduces Vmin by 38mV and 59mV,
respectively. However, 8T incurs high area (and thus power) overheads of
33%. Figure 3.13 shows that, although 8T SRAM cells provide a reduction
in Vmin, EPT solutions provide lower Vmin (e.g., EPT(8-bit OID) applied to
segmented Hamming(7,4) provides a reduction of 59mV over 8T). However,
8T incurs high area overheads (i.e., 33% [25], respectively).
For sensitivity analysis, we also evaluated three 5-bit EPT design points.
Among these three designs, 5-bit EPT + Segmented Hamming(7,4) pro-
vides the highest yield; it provides higher yield than 5-bit EPT + Segmented
OLSC(8,4) because the former requires fewer check bits than the latter while
correcting the same number of errors per segment as the latter. Having
fewer bits per word reduces the average number of faulty bits per word
and, thereby, improving yield. On the other hand, 5-bit EPT with Seg-
mented OLSC(8,4) provides higher yield than 5-bit EPT + OLSC(128,64);
this is because the fraction of t-bit error patterns that are correctable by
OLSC(128,64) decreases more rapidly with respect to t than the fraction of
t-bit error patterns that are correctable by Segmented OLSC(8,4), as shown
in Figure 3.5. When the fraction of t-bit error patterns that are correctable
is small, it becomes less likely to find a bit ordering that always generates
one of the correctable t-bit error patterns in a logical word given a t-bit fault
pattern in a cache word.
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All of the above results hold irrespective of the core microarchitecture (e.g.,
in-order vs. out-of-order, issue-width, etc.) and workloads. The next section
describes how the improved yield due to EPT translations into improved
power and performance characteristics for the chosen core microarchitecture
and workloads.
3.5.2 Power and Performance
Table 3.5 summarizes the core-wide power and performance of the EPT de-
signs and the baselines. While 8-bit EPT + Segmented Hamming(7,4) oper-
ates at the same Vmin and, therefore, similar power as Oracular BCH(127,64),
the former provides 21% higher IPC than the latter. This performance
improvement is due to having much lower latency overhead than Oracu-
lar BCH(127,64) ECC. This shows that EPT is better than imply using a
stronger ECC due to decoder latency and area overheads. Compared to 8-bit
EPT + Segmented Hamming(7,4), VS-ECC only increases Vmin by 13mV.
However, the higher decoder latency and area overhead of VS-ECC results
in a high EPI overhead. The 8-bit EPT + Segmented Hamming(7,4) reduces
EPI by 40.2% compared to VS-ECC.
WD-Original and WD-IsoArea provide similar IPC as EPT since WD also
only incurs a constant one correction cycle latency. However, the high area
overhead of WD-Original (i.e., 44.2%) results in a high power overhead; the
8-bit EPT + Segmented Hamming(7,4) reduces power by 20.5% compared
to WD-Original. Although WD-IsoArea has similar area overhead as 8-bit
EPT + Segmented Hamming(7,4), it has a much higher Vmin; the 8-bit EPT
+ Segmented Hamming(7,4) reduces power by 31.1% over WD-IsoArea. MS-
ECC also incurs similar latency and area overheads as EPT. However, the
Vmin of MS-ECC is 70mV higher than that of 8-bit EPT + Segmented Ham-
ming(72,64). As a result, 8-bit EPT + Segmented Hamming(72,64) reduces
core-wide power by 25.7% compared to MS-ECC.
Using robustified SRAM cells can provide significant Vmin reduction with-
out incurring any error correction latency overhead since they do not require
error correction; however, robustified SRAM cells incur significant area. Due
to the high area overhead as well as the higher Vmin of 8T cells, 8-bit EPT +
Segmented Hamming(7,4) reduces overall core power by 28.1% compared to
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Table 3.5: Performance, power, and energy normalized to nominal
execution of the baseline design.
Vmin Freq
IPC
Power EPI
(mV) (GHz) (%) (%)
Oracular
671 0.931 1.035 24.3 50.5
BCH(127,64)
VS-ECC 683 0.960 0.854 22.4 54.8
8T SRAMs 729 1.061 1.236 26.6 40.5
WD–IsoArea 769 1.141 1.171 27.7 41.5
WD–Original 703 1.006 1.228 24.0 38.9
SECDED 823 1.256 0.879 34.5 62.6
Segmented Hamming(7,4) 804 1.210 1.147 31.5 45.4
MS-ECC 740 1.083 1.191 25.7 39.8
EPT-Based Designs
5-bit EPT+
697 0.993 0.918 22.0 48.3
OLSC(128,64)
5-bit EPT+
693 0.984 1.229 20.7 34.3
Seg OLSC(8,4)
5-bit EPT+
680 0.953 1.242 19.7 33.2
Seg Ham(7,4)
8-bit EPT+
670 0.929 1.252 19.1 32.8
Seg Ham(7,4)+
using 8T SRAM cells. Due to this power overhead, 8-bit EPT + Segmented
Hamming(7,4) has a 19.1% lower EPI than 8T cells. Note that unlike ar-
chitectural techniques where most of the circuits (e.g., decoders) needed for
low voltage operations can be power gated during nominal voltage opera-
tions, caches with robustified SRAM cells continue to incur high overheads
at nominal operation. For example, caches with the 8T SRAM cells incur a
12.0% core-wide EPI overhead at nominal voltage operation, whereas 8-bit
EPT + Segmented Hamming(7,4) incurs only a 7.8% EPI overhead at nom-
inal voltage (due to the overheads of the added correction pipeline stages).
The above results show that EPT is very effective at reducing the Vmin
and, therefore, power of low latency caches by increasing the coverage of an
ECC-based error resilience scheme. The results also show that EPT does not
have some of the limitations that hamper the efficacy of other comparable
techniques (e.g., high power and area overheads during nominal and low
voltage operation). This makes EPT a promising technique to allow deeply
voltage scaled processors and on-chip memories.
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3.5.3 Additional Sensitivity Analysis
BIST-Undetectable Faults
EPT targets faulty SRAM cells that can be identified during BIST. How-
ever, some SRAM faults, such as soft errors, erratic faults, or aging related
faults, cannot be detected by BIST. EPT does not protect against these
faults because they cause errors to occur randomly in different locations. For
L1 caches, existing processors typically only detect these errors using parity
or protect against these errors using SECDED to guarantee correction of a
single random error per word [32]. One can also guarantee correction of a
single random error per word in caches with EPT by adding an independent
layer of random error correcting code.
As an example, when storing a 64-bit dataword, besides protecting it with
EPT + Segmented Hamming(7,4), one can also protect it using an indepen-
dently calculated single-symbol-correcting (SSC) Reed-Solomon (RS) ECC
with 5-bit symbols; each adjacent four data bits in the 64-bit dataword is
mapped to a symbol in the SSC ECC when calculating the SSC ECC. When
a random error occurs in a cache word, EPT + Segmented Hamming(7,4)
may not be able to correct the segment in which the error resides. How-
ever, since only a single segment and, therefore, a single symbol contains the
random error, the erroneous segment is guaranteed to be correctable via the
SSC ECC if the random error is the only random error in the cache word.
The overhead required by this additional layer random error correction is
small. The RS ECC requires 10 additional ECC bits, which fit within the
64−(7−4) ·16 = 16 unused bits per ECC way of Segmented Hamming(7,4).7
The area overhead of the RS ECC encoder [45] and a ROM-based decoder,
which stores the correctable syndromes and the error pattern corresponding
to each correctable syndrome, is only 1.8% of the L1 cache area. Our eval-
uation shows that including this additional layer of SSC ECC to 8-bit EPT
+ Segmented Hamming(7,4) only increases the latter’s core-wide power by
6.8%. Since random errors only need to incur any correction latency when
an random error occurs [32], which is rare, the energy overhead of adding the
SSC ECC is minimal (i.e., 4.4%). In comparison to VS-ECC, the best prior
7For simplicity, we protect against known bit faults among these 10 bits per cache word
by only using EPT to move the faulty bits away from them but not storing Hamming(7,4)
ECC bits for them.
63
Table 3.6: L2 6T performance, power, and energy normalized to nominal
execution.
Vmin Freq
IPC
Power EPI
(mV) (GHz) (%) (%)
Oracular
BCH(767,512) 701 1.002 0.956 28.0 58.5
MS-ECC 758 1.119 0.996 29.0 52.0
8-bit EPT+
689 0.974 0.983 24.0 50.2
Seg OLSC(128,64)
One ECC way for seven data ways
VS-ECC 754 1.111 0.967 30.8 57.3
8-bit EPT:
742 1.087 0.930 29.0 57.4Seg BCH(80,64)
scheme that can provide built-in soft error protection, EPT + Segmented
Hamming(7,4) provides a 40% energy reduction and a 25% total cache area
reduction. Despite incurring a 4.4% energy overhead and a 2% cache area
overhead from SSC ECC, EPT’s relative benefits remain high.
Note that in our evaluation in Section 3.5.1 and Section 3.5.2, we dedicate
all the error correction resources of all evaluated resilience schemes to pro-
tecting against BIST-detectable faults; in other words, additional overheads
will be required for all the evaluated baselines to guarantee correction of a
single random error per word while maintaining the same strength of protec-
tion against BIST-detectable faults that the baselines enjoy in Section 3.5.1
and Section 3.5.2. As such, although we do not evaluate adding random er-
ror protection for the baselines, we expect the merits of EPT relative to the
various baselines to remain roughly the same as those in Section 3.5.1 and
Section 3.5.2 even in scenarios where protection against random errors are
needed.
L2 Caches
While EPT is primarily a technique to allow deeply voltage scaled on-chip
memories, it can also be viewed as a technique to reduce the latency of
strong error correction since it allows low-latency ECCs to attain the coverage
of high-latency (Section 4.2 and Section 3.3). While latency is less of a
concern for L2 caches, we demonstrate that EPT can still provide some
benefits. Table 3.6 shows the performance, power, and energy evaluations
for several designs where the L2 is co-scaled with L1s and the core. For
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Table 3.7: 28nm/32nm performance, power, and energy at Vmin normalized
to those at nominal voltage (1.2V).
Vmin Freq
IPC
Power EPI
(mV) (GHz) (%) (%)
Oracular
674 0.326 0.977 15.5 44.6
BCH(127,64)
VS-ECC 688 0.344 0.896 14.7 43.5
WD–IsoArea 738 0.415 1.157 17.3 32.9
WD–Original 701 0.361 1.185 15.5 33.0
SECDED 777 0.469 0.851 21.3 48.8
MS-ECC 719 0.388 1.165 15.9 32.3
EPT-Based Designs
5-bit EPT+
696 0.355 0.873 14.2 41.8
OLSC(128,64)
5-bit EPT+
693 0.351 1.186 13.3 29.3
Seg OLSC(8,4)
5-bit EPT+
682 0.336 1.186 12.6 28.9
Seg Ham(7,4)
8-bit EPT+
673 0.324 1.202 12.1 28.5
Seg Ham(7,4)
these designs, the L2 determines the Vmin. The values in the table include
the power consumed by the L2. BCH, MS-ECC, and EPT + Segmented
OLSC(128,64), continue to use an ECC way for each data way, which is
consistent with our evaluation of the L1 cache. Compared against MS-ECC,
8-bit EPT + Segmented OLSC(128,64) reduces combined core and L2 power
by 17%.
Since the capacity overhead requirement may be more stringent at the L2
level, we also demonstrate the benefits of EPT while disabling only one of
8 ways. For this capacity overhead requirement, we compare EPT against
a VS-ECC solution which has the same number of redundant bits as 8-bit
EPT. This VS-ECC solution breaks each cache line into four words each of
which can correct up to four faults. Across these four words, up to eight total
faults may be corrected, requiring 72 bits of redundancy. We do not allocate
any correction resources to BIST-undetectable faults. Results show that the
energy characteristics of EPT and VS-ECC are comparable. However, EPT
may still be preferable since VS-ECC decoders have high area overhead–10%
of the L2 cache area. High decoder area overhead comes from implementing
four 4-bit correcting BCH decoders in a fully combinational manner (i.e.,
lowest latency BCH decoder). The 8-bit EPT + Segmented BCH(80,64), on
the other hand, only incurs a 3.5% total area overhead.
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Figure 3.14: Applying EPT to Archipelago [12]. Left: Two chunks need to
be remapped while the sacrificial line only has room for one chunk. Right:
Only one chunk needs to be remapped after bit reordering.
28nm/32nm Technology Node
The performance, power, and energy benefits provided by fault tolerant
mechanisms for low-Vmin caches are strongly tied to the characteristics of
a particular technology process (i.e., how fault rates, frequency, and power
scale with voltage). In this section, we explore the benefits for a 28nm fault
rate [40]8 and 32nm frequency and power rates [38]. The 8-bit EPT + Seg-
mented Hamming(7,4) has 17.7% lower power and 34.5% lower energy than
VS-ECC (the next lowest power correction technique). The 8-bit EPT + Seg-
mented Hamming(7.4) has 23.9% lower power and 11.8% lower energy than
MS-ECC (the next lowest energy correction technique). These 28nm/32nm
results demonstrate that EPT can provide voltage scaling benefits across
technology nodes.
3.6 Related Work
This section describes several additional related works. Parichute [39] ex-
plores how to protect low-level caches operating at low voltages using Turbo
codes. By themselves, Turbo codes under-utilize cache capacity because they
8We could not find any 28nm or 32nm 8T SRAM fault rates.
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do not increment in size in powers of two. To better utilize cache capacity,
Parichute fills up the ECC ways by constructing additional check bits to
the original Turbo codes and, thereby, improves the strength of the original
Turbo codes as well. However, the latency overheads of Turbo codes are still
significant (e.g., > 4 cycles, on average [39]). In addition, Turbo codes can
correct a different number of errors depending on the error pattern in the
word. As such, EPT can be applied on top of Parichute and is, therefore,
orthogonal to Parichute.
Archipelago [12] avoids accessing faulty bits by remapping groups of logical
bits (called chunks) from one physical cache line to a second cache line,
called a sacrificial line. However, remapping chunks across lines require
significant design complexity. For each remapped chunk, Archipelago records
the original location of the chuck, its corresponding sacrificial line, and the
corresponding position within the sacrificial line; this requires adding two
additional address translation tables to the critical path of cache access [12].
In addition, a complete cache access now has to wait for two cache line
accesses to complete. Since the sacrificial cache line is often not in the same
cache set as the data line, to allow both cache line accesses to complete around
the same time, the number of banks in the cache has to be doubled from what
is needed to meet the fetch and issue width [12]. This not only increases cache
area and latency, but also requires modifying the access scheduling for the
different cache banks to improve synchronization of accesses between different
banks. Cache access scheduling is further complicated because sacrificial line
store chunks from different data cache lines. Therefore, on a write to a data
cache line, Archipelago requires updating the appropriate chunks within the
corresponding sacrificial line using an expensive read-modify-write operation.
EPT only reorders bits within a word, not across words, and, therefore,
avoids all of the above complexities. Finally, EPT can also be applied on top
of Archipelago to improve its effectiveness by aggregating faults in unused
chunks, as illustrated in Figure 3.14. In this way, EPT is orthogonal to
Archipelago.
iPatch [46] protects caches operating at low voltages by reusing unused
spaces in other memory structures, such as the store queue, micro-op cache,
MSHR buffers, etc., to store redundant copies of words in the cache. IPatch
requires modifying a large number of processor components to make them
aware of faulty cache words; this may significantly complicate processor de-
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sign and verification. In addition, these structures can only protect a small
fraction of the cache due to the smaller sizes of these memory structures rel-
ative to a cache; as such, IPatch disables unprotected faulty cache words in
data lines [46]. Disabling a cache word in a data line leads to uncachable log-
ical words, which can significantly impact performance. EPT, on the other
hand, restricts the required modifications to within a cache and does not
require disabling cache words in data lines. In addition, EPT can also be
applied to a cache along with IPatch and is, therefore, orthogonal to IPatch.
EPT bears some resemblance to bit-interleaving, which statically inter-
leaves adjacent physical bits across different segments of a segmented ECC.
For physically adjacent faults, bit-interleaving converts multiple adjacent bits
of errors in one segment into single-bit errors in different segments. Causes
of physically adjacent bit faults include large alpha particle strikes [47] and
complete DRAM chip failures [48]. Faulty SRAM cells at low voltages, how-
ever, are randomly distributed across a cache[8], not typically physically
adjacent to one another. As such, bit-interleaving does not improve the cov-
erage of faulty SRAM cells during low voltage operation, which EPT does by
adaptively modifying the bit ordering in each cache word according to the
identified fault pattern of the cache word.
EPT also bears some resemblance to fault dispersion, which seeks to trans-
fer faults from a line with too many faults to lines with fewer faults, in off-chip
main memories [49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55]. In off-chip main memories, a line
is typically striped across multiple memory chips/cards called a rank, such
that all chips/cards in a rank receive the same memory address input and
operate in lockstep to satisfy a single memory request. Exploiting this ar-
chitecture, prior works perform fault dispersion by physically swapping the
memory chips/cards or by reconfiguring the memory chips/cards in a rank
to access different intra-chip/card locations for the same address presented
to all the chips/cards in the rank. As such, these prior works differ vastly in
implementation from EPT, which targets on-chip memories. Fault dispersion
in the context of L1 caches equates to transferring logical bits between words
in different sets, which requires accessing multiple cache words per access to
a faulty cache word; this can incur high latency overheads for low voltage
SRAM caches, where latencies are low and fault rates are high, unlike off-
chip main memories, where latencies are high and the fault rates are low.
Finally, unlike fault dispersion, EPT does not reduce the number of errors
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in a cache word, but simply transforms the error pattern generated by the
cache word. As such, EPT can also be applied on top of fault dispersion,
and is, therefore, also orthogonal to fault dispersion.
3.7 Summary
In this chapter, we presented error pattern transformation, a general tech-
nique for low cost error correction which enables memory voltages to be
scaled further than prior works on error correction. We observed that al-
though many ECCs only guarantee correction of a small number of errors,
they can actually correct a large number of erroneous bits if these bits are in
the particular error patterns. Since the same physical fault pattern in a cache
word can manifest as different error patterns depending on the ordering of
the logical bits stored in a physical cache word, EPT adaptively rearranges
the logical bit to physical bit mapping per word according to the known
BIST-detectable fault pattern in the physical word. The adaptive logical bit
to physical bit mapping transforms many uncorrectable error patterns in the
logical words into correctable error patterns and, therefore, improves ECC
error coverage and reduces the minimum required voltage of operation. This
reduces the minimum voltage at which memory can run by 70mV over the
best low-latency ECC baseline leading to a 25.7% core-wide power reduction
for an ARM Cortex-A7-like core. Energy per instruction is reduced by 15.7%
compared to the best baseline.
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Chapter 4
A Scalable Approach to Symbolic
Hardware-Software Co-Analysis
Symbolic simulation and symbolic execution techniques have long been used
for verifying designs and testing software. However, as this dissertation
demonstrates in Chapters 5 to 8, symbolic simulation can be effectively
used to reliably reduce power and cost as well as provide security guaran-
tees by characterizing unused hardware resources and tracking information
flows across all possible executions of a specific application running on a
processor. Like other symbolic simulation and execution techniques, such
symbolic hardware-software co-analysis does not scale well to complex ap-
plications, due to an explosion in the number of execution paths that must
be analyzed to characterize all possible executions of an application. Fur-
thermore, since application-specific power optimizations require guaranteed
coverage of all possible execution states of an application, heuristics for in-
creasing the scalability of symbolic simulation cannot be applied, since they
improve scalability by sacrificing coverage. In this chapter, we first propose a
naive symbolic simulation based hardware-software co-analysis and then pro-
pose a technique for performing a symbolic co-analysis that can analyze even
complex applications in a scalable fashion while maintaining the conserva-
tive guarantees required to enable application-specific power optimizations.
Our scalable technique reduces analysis runtime and also enables analysis
to complete for applications that were too complex to be analyzed by naive
techniques.
4.1 Introduction
Based on the application-specific nature of many emerging ultra-low-power
systems, we propose application-specific power and cost reduction techniques
that identify hardware resources (e.g., gates) in a processor that cannot be
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exercised by the application running on the processor and eliminate power
or cost (e.g., area or power supply allocation) required to support those re-
sources. However, such application-specific optimizations can only be safely
applied if an analysis technique can guarantee that the application running
on the processor will never use the resources for any possible execution of
the application, for any inputs. Eliminating power for resources that could
be used by the application could lead to incorrect execution of the appli-
cation. For example, power gating a gate that was incorrectly identified as
“unused” but is actually exercised by an application can result in the applica-
tion producing incorrect outputs or crashing. Given the need for guarantees
and the inability to achieve such guarantees through input-based application
profiling, our proposed application-specific power and cost reduction tech-
niques rely on a symbolic simulation [56] of the application on the processor
hardware to identify hardware resources that are guaranteed to not be used
across all possible executions of an application. By propagating symbols that
represent unknown logic values for all inputs to an application, it is possible
to determine all possible hardware resources that could be used by the ap-
plication in an input-independent fashion. The input-independent activity
profiles generated by such a symbolic simulation of an application running
on a processor can be leveraged to identify worst-case timing, power, and
energy characteristics for a low-power system and to eliminate power used
by resources that the system’s captive application is guaranteed to never use.
The symbolic simulation used for application-specific power management
differs from prior work on symbolic simulation in two fundamental ways.
First, it is application-specific, meaning that the hardware design is simu-
lated in the context of a particular application binary to identify application-
specific power management opportunities that can be exploited indepen-
dently of how the application is executed. Second, rather than trying to
synthesize hardware test vectors to exercise the entire design, it attempts to
analyze which gates can possibly be exercised by an application. Symbolic
hardware-software co-analysis is also related to symbolic execution [57]; how-
ever, it differs in that it considers every possible execution of a given appli-
cation for all possible inputs, rather than determining a specific set of inputs
that will test the application. Also, prior works on symbolic execution do
not consider the application-specific effects of software on hardware.
Since the symbolic hardware-software co-analysis used by emerging application-
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specific power management techniques must explore all possible execution
states of an application on a processor, it suffers from the same scalability
limitations characteristic of symbolic simulation and symbolic execution –
namely, the state-space explodes for applications with complex control struc-
tures, due to a large number of possible execution paths. Many heuristics
have been proposed to tame the scalability problems of symbolic simulation
and execution [58, 59, 60, 57, 61]; however, existing heuristics for scalable
symbolic simulation and symbolic execution cannot be applied to the sym-
bolic co-analysis used for application-specific power management, since ex-
isting heuristics sacrifice perfect coverage to improve scalability. Therefore,
existing techniques cannot guarantee that all possible inputs and execution
states of an application on a processor are considered, and consequently,
cannot guarantee that all possible hardware resources (e.g., gates) that an
application can exercise in a processor will be identified. As a result, these
techniques cannot be used to enable application-specific power management
techniques.
So, while this naive symbolic co-analysis for application-specific power
management can provide guaranteed coverage of all possible execution states
for an application, it cannot scale to analyze applications with complex con-
trol structures. While this may not be a problem for many applications used
in ultra-low-power systems, since they tend to be simple, more complex con-
trol structures that cannot be analyzed by the existing approach to symbolic
co-analysis [62] (e.g., input-dependent loops) can be found even in simple
embedded applications (see Section 4.5). Analysis of applications with more
complex control structures requires a scalable symbolic co-analysis technique
that can (a) characterize application behavior for all possible inputs and ex-
ecution states, (b) allow analysis of applications with arbitrarily complex
control flow, and (c) guarantee that all hardware resources that can possibly
be exercised by an application will be identified.
In this chapter, we propose a symbolic hardware-software co-analysis tech-
nique that can analyze an application with arbitrarily complex control flow
and guarantee that no gate marked as untoggled can ever be toggled by
any execution of the application. Our technique is based on the observation
that many branches within the execution tree have similar state and toggling
behavior. Analysis of any branch of the execution tree corresponding to a
state that has been previously simulated can be terminated. In addition,
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similar states for a branch can be merged into a conservative state, where
differing state variables are assumed to have unknown logic values. Analysis
can also be terminated for a state that has already been covered by a more
conservative version of the state (see example in Section 4.2).
This chapter makes the following contributions:
• We propose a scalable symbolic hardware-software co-analysis technique
that enables input-independent analysis for complex applications, even ap-
plications with complex control structures such as input-dependent control
structures and infinite control structures that cannot be analyzed by exist-
ing techniques. The proposed technique guarantees that all gates that can
possibly be exercised by an application will be identified.
• We show that the proposed analysis technique significantly reduces anal-
ysis time for complex applications, and can even reduce analysis time for
applications without complex control flow. Compared to existing techniques,
analysis time is reduced by up to 97.2%, and by 41.7% on average.
•We demonstrate that even though our technique is more conservative than
previous approaches when analyzing complex applications, the additional
gates identified as toggled is small—less than 2.5%.
4.2 Background and Motivating Insight
Since the gates in a processor that are toggled by an application may vary sig-
nificantly for different inputs, application-specific identification of exercisable
gates in a processor must consider all possible inputs to guarantee that all
exercisable gates are identified. We propose a co-analysis that achieves this
guarantee through symbolic simulation of the application on the processor
netlist, where inputs (and uninitialized values) are represented as unknown
logic values (Xs), as described in Algorithm 1. To perform co-analysis, all
memory cells and gate values are initialized to X, the application binary
is loaded into the program memory, and the reset signal is toggled. This
starting state of the processor is pushed onto a stack of states that must be
simulated, and symbolic simulation begins by popping the initial state off
the stack and simulating from that state. Any time an input is read, its bits
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are represented by all Xs.1 Simulation values are propagated as normal, and
each simulation state is annotated with a list of exercisable gates observed in
that state. If an X ever propagates to the PC, indicating input-dependent
control flow, a branch is created in the symbolic execution tree, and states
corresponding to all possible next PC values are pushed onto the stack so
that all possible paths through the application are analyzed. A depth-first
simulation of the application’s control flow graph continues until all execution
paths have been explored.
Algorithm 1 Naive Symbolic Co-analysis
1. Procedure GateActivityAnalysis(app binary, design netlist)
2. Initialize all memory cells and all gates in design netlist to X
3. Load app binary into program memory
4. Propagate reset toggle signal
5. s← State at start of app binary
6. Symbolic Execution Tree T .set root(s)
7. Unprocessed execution points stack, U .push(s)
8. while U != ∅ do
9. e← U .pop()
10. while e.nextPC != X and !e.END do
11. e.setInputsX() // set all peripheral port inputs to Xs
12. e′ ← propagateGateValues(e) // perform simulation for this cycle
13. e.annotateGateActivity(e,e′) // annotate tree point with activity
14. e.addNextState(e′) // add to execution tree
15. e← e′ // process next cycle
16. end while
17. if e.nextPC == X then
18. for all a ∈ possibleNextPCVals(e) do
19. e′ ← e.updateNextPC(a)
20. U .push(e′)
21. T .insert(e′)
22. end for
23. end if
24. end while
Unfortunately, the co-analysis technique used in prior work cannot analyze
applications with complex control flow or infinite loops. Figure 4.1 shows
such an application, where an unconditional branch jumps from the end
basic block back to the begin basic block, resulting in an infinite loop. Each
time the branch (jl) instruction on line 6 is encountered, the else block will
be pushed onto the stack (lines 17 and 18 in Algorithm 1), while simulation
continues down the then block. However, since the end of the application is
never reached, the stack will never be popped, and symbolic simulation will
1Any data or signals that can be written by external events (e.g., interrupt signals or
DMA writes) are also considered unknown values (Xs) during our analysis. Firmware
components of interrupt handling, e.g., the jump table and interrupt service handling
routine, are considered to be part of the application binary (i.e., known values) during
symbolic simulation. If an interrupt is enabled during an instruction’s execution, then
that instruction is considered as possibly modifying the PC.
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1.mov #0, r6; 
begin: 
2.mov #0, r4;  
3.mov #0, r5; 
4.mov &0x0020, r15;  
5.cmp r15, #10000; 
6.jl else 
then: 
7.mov #1, r4 
8.jmp end 
else:  
9.mov #1, r5 
end: 
10.sub r4, r5, r6; 
11.jmp begin  end: 10.sub r4, r5, r6; 
11.jmp begin  
then: 
7.mov #1, r4 
8.jmp end 
begin: 
2.mov #0, r4;  
3.mov #0, r5; 
4.mov &0x0020, r15;  
5.cmp r15, #10000; 
6.jl else 
else:  
9.mov #1, r5 
Applica'on	Binary:	
!X	
Gate-level	ac'vity	for	
en're	execu'on	tree	
1.mov #0, r6; 
Figure 4.1: Symbolic hardware-software co-analysis involves using unknown
logic values for application inputs to characterize application-induced
processor behavior for all possible executions of an application.
never finish.
A closer look at the application in Figure 4.1 reveals an insight. The pro-
gram consists of a loop that reads an input, sets the value of either register
r4 or r5, depending on the input value, then subtracts the two registers. Al-
though the loop iterates infinitely, only two possible simulation states exist
at instruction 10 (i.e., 〈r4, r5, r6〉 is either 〈1, 0, 1〉 or 〈0, 1,−1〉). These two
states only differ in a small fraction of the processor’s state (i.e., r6 and one
bit each of r4 and r5). Thus, a conservative state formed by merging the
two states such that differing state variables are set to unknown values (Xs)
can represent both states with little loss of toggling information. After sim-
ulating a conservative state that represents both possible states, any future
simulation of execution paths at line 10 can safely be terminated, since they
will not identify any new toggling behavior. In this way, even an application
with an infinite execution tree can be analyzed, while still guaranteeing that
the maximal set of gates that an application can toggle will be identified.
4.3 Scalable Symbolic Co-Analysis
The symbolic co-analysis technique proposed in prior work on application-
specific power management [62] is not scalable for applications with complex
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control flow, because it attempts to evaluate gate-level activity for all possible
execution paths through an application. In some cases (e.g., infinite loops),
evaluation of all possible execution paths is not even possible. The goal of our
proposed scalable symbolic co-analysis technique is to conservatively avoid
the exploration of paths (states) for which the worst-case toggle behavior
has already been simulated and to reduce the number of states that must
be explored by forming and simulating conservative states that cover many
possible execution paths.
Algorithm 2 Scalable Symbolic Co-analysis
1. Procedure GateActivityAnalysis(app binary, design netlist)
2. Initialize all memory cells and all gates in design netlist to X
3. Load app binary into program memory
4. Propagate reset toggle signal
5. s← State at start of app binary
6. Symbolic Execution Tree T .set root(s)
7. Unprocessed execution points stack, U .push(s)
8. Conservative system state map, C.init()
9. while U != ∅ do
10. e← U .pop()
11. if e.altersPC() and e.PC ∈ C then
12. a← C.getState(e.PC)
13. if e.isConservativeSubstateOf(a) then
14. continue
15. else
16. e← buildConservativeState(a, e)
17. C ← C.update(e.PC, e)
18. end if
19. else
20. C ← C.add(e.PC, e)
21. end if
22. while e.nextPC != X and !e.END do
23. e.setInputsX() // set all peripheral port inputs to Xs
24. e′ ← propagateGateValues(e) // perform simulation for this cycle
25. e.annotateGateActivity(e,e′) // annotate tree point with activity
26. e.addNextState(e′) // add to execution tree
27. e← e′ // process next cycle
28. end while
29. if e.nextPC == X then
30. for all a ∈ possibleNextPCVals(e) do
31. e′ ← e.updateNextPC(a)
32. U .push(e′)
33. T .insert(e′)
34. end for
35. end if
36. end while
Algorithm 2 describes the proposed scalable symbolic co-analysis tech-
nique. The analysis initializes the symbolic simulation in the same way as
Algorithm 1 (i.e., all nets and memory cells are initialized to X, the PC
is loaded with the application’s first address, and reset is toggled), with
one addition – Algorithm 2 also initializes a conservative system state map.
This map holds the conservative simulation values for each net and memory
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location in the design at any instruction that alters the PC (besides incre-
menting). Only the states at PC-altering instructions (e.g., branch, jump,
etc.) are stored, since they are the instructions that can cause path explo-
sion due to input-dependent or infinite control structures. Each map entry’s
key is the PC value of the PC-altering instruction (e.g., a branch’s address
in program memory). The conservative value stored in the map for a state
variable is assumed to be unknown (X) for any net that has been observed to
have different values (i.e., ‘0’ and ‘1’) in a state with the same PC. Assigning
a value of X to a net carries the assumption that the net can be toggled by
the application for some input assignment.
Once initialization is complete, simulation begins, continuing until all
paths have been explored or have been determined to be covered by a pre-
viously simulated state. During each visit to a PC-altering instruction, the
current state is compared with the conservative state stored for that instruc-
tion (PC). If the current state is a substate of the stored state (i.e., the states
are identical OR the stored state has Xs in all state variables where the states
differ), then all paths through the current state have already been analyzed
in a previous portion of the symbolic simulation, and the current execution
path can be safely terminated. If the current state is not a substate of the
stored state, a new conservative symbolic state is generated by assigning any
nets that differ in value between the current state and the stored conservative
state to Xs.2 This new conservative state is loaded as the processor state
before continuing symbolic simulation and is also stored into the conservative
state map in place of the previous stored state. Symbolic simulation must
continue to explore this execution path from the new conservative state, be-
cause it includes new toggled gates, and therefore, the worst-case toggling
activity may not have been observed yet. Symbolic simulation then continues
as described by Algorithm 2.
Figure 4.2 shows an example of the proposed technique analyzing an ap-
plication (from Figure 4.1) that Algorithm 1 is unable to analyze. The ap-
plication contains an infinite loop of four basic blocks; the execution of two
of the basic blocks is dependent on the input value read on line 4. Algo-
rithm 1 would attempt to explore the entire infinite execution tree (including
grayed-out blocks and beyond). However, inspecting the code, it is clear that
2The reason an X produces the worst-case toggling behavior is that even if a net has
an X value in two consecutive cycles, the analysis tool considers it a possible toggle.
77
1.mov #0, r6; 
begin: 
2.mov #0, r4;  
3.mov #0, r5; 
4.mov &0x0020, r15;  
5.cmp r15, #10000; 
6.jl else 
then: 
7.mov #1, r4 
8.jmp end 
else:  
9.mov #1, r5 
end: 
10.sub r4, r5, r6; 
11.jmp begin  
Applica'on	Binary:	 Execu'on	Tree:	
State	 PC	 r4	 r5	 r6	 r15	
S0	 6	 0…00	 0…00	 0…00	 X…X	
S1	 8	 0…01	 0…00	 0…00	 X…X	
S2	 11	 0…01	 0…00	 0…01	 X…X	
S3	 6	 0…00	 0…00	 0…0X	 X…X	
S4	 8	 0…01	 0…00	 0…0X	 X…X	
S5	 11	 0…0X	 0…0X	 X…X1	 X…X	
S6	 6	 0…00	 0…00	 X…XX	 X…X	
S7	 8	 0…01	 0…00	 X…XX	 X…X	
Conserva've	States:	
S0	S1	
S2	
S3	
S4	
S2	 S5	
S5	 S5	
S5	
S6	
S7	
Figure 4.2: The proposed scalable symbolic co-analysis can analyze
applications with infinite loops and input-dependent branches by simulating
conservative states that capture the activity of multiple possible states.
there are two possible system states at the end of one iteration of the loop
– 〈r4, r5, r6〉 is either 〈1, 0, 1〉 or 〈0, 1,−1〉. Therefore, continuing to explore
the execution tree after these two states have been observed will not uncover
any new toggling behavior.
During scalable symbolic co-analysis, when the conditional branch instruc-
tion at line 6 is first reached, state S0 is added to the conservative system
state map with a key of 6 (the branch’s PC). At this point r4, r5, and r6
are 0, while r15 is all Xs (because its value is read from an input). As sym-
bolic simulation continues down the then path, entries S1 and S2 are added
for the branches at lines 8 and 11, respectively. When symbolic simulation
reaches the branch at line 6 again, r6 has a value of 1, which requires a new
conservative state, S3, to replace S0, where r6’s value is 0...0X, because the
least significant bit of r6 was observed once as a 0 and once as a 1 during the
branch instruction at line 6. Continuing, state S1 must be replaced by state
S4, because the simulation value of r6 is 0...0X during the next simulation of
the branch at line 8. Since the value of r6 is then overwritten to be 1 again
prior to line 11, this execution path observes state S2 for a second time, in-
dicating that no further exploration is required, and the path is terminated.
Next, the last else block is popped off the execution points stack. For this
path, r6 becomes -1 (i.e., 1...11), which is not a substate of the latest con-
servative state stored for the branch at line 11 – S2. Thus, a new state, S5,
replaces S2. At the end of the next iteration of the main loop, the current
state is a substate of S5, so exploration is halted for that path and the top
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of the execution points stack is popped. After this, all states encountered
are substates of previously explored states stored in the conservative system
state map. In this example, our scalable symbolic co-analysis technique only
simulates 35 dynamic instructions, rather than the infinite number the previ-
ous co-analysis technique would attempt to simulate. The proposed scalable
symbolic co-analysis technique captures the worst-case toggling activity of
an application with O(n2 ∗ m) complexity, where n is the number of basic
blocks in the application and m is the number of gates in the processor’s
netlist.
One drawback of the proposed scalable technique is the inaccuracy in-
troduced by being conservative when recording toggling activity. Consider
Figure 4.3. Assume that states S0 and S1 are two different states observed
for the same PC, arrived at sequentially by the baseline co-analysis. In the
proposed scalable technique, when simulation arrives at state S1 after having
previously observed S0 for the same PC, a new conservative state, ConsS1,
will be created and stored as the current conservative state for this PC.
ConsS1 is then used to continue symbolic simulation instead of S1. There-
fore, the scalable approach must conservatively assume that both gates a and
b are toggling, when the baseline co-analysis may show them to not toggle.
Since usually only a small number of state values differ between executions of
the same static instruction, the difference between the scalable and baseline
symbolic co-analysis approaches is expected to be small. Our evaluations
in Section 4.5 confirm that this is the case. Also, note that the inaccuracy
introduced by our scalable technique will only make analysis more conser-
vative. This means that application-specific power management techniques
enabled by symbolic co-analysis may have somewhat lower benefits but will
always guarantee correctness.
4.4 Methodology
We perform evaluations on a silicon-proven processor – openMSP430 [63]
– synthesized, placed and routed in TSMC 65GP (65nm) technology using
Synopsys Design Compiler and Cadence EDI System. The processor was
implemented for an operating point of 1V and 100MHz. We implemented
scalable symbolic co-analysis in a custom gate-level simulator that was built
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AB	
C	
D
a	
b	
State	 A	 B	 C	 tmp	 D	
S0	 1	 0	 0	 0	 0	
S1	 0	 1	 0	 0	 0	
Cons	S1	 X	 X	 0	 X	 X	
tmp	
Figure 4.3: Simulating from a conservative state in our scalable symbolic
co-analysis technique may identify some gates as possibly exercisable that
would not be reported as such by the baseline symbolic co-analysis
approach. The conservative nature of our approach allows analysis of
applications with complex control structures while maintaining the
guarantee that all exercisable gates will be identified.
Table 4.1: Benchmarks.
Embedded Sensor Benchmarks [64]
mult, binSearch, tea8, intFilt, div, inSort, rle, tHold, intAVG
EEMBC Embedded Benchmarks [65]
Autocorr, ConvEn, FFT, Viterbi
Recursive Benchmark
MergeSort
in-house. We show results for all benchmarks from [64], all EEMBC bench-
marks that fit in the program memory of our processor, as well as a recursive
benchmark designed to stress-test the scalability of our symbolic hardware-
software co-analysis technique with a complex control structure not found
in the rest of our benchmarks (Table 4.1). Experiments are performed on
a server housing two Intel Xeon E-2640 processors (eight cores each, 2GHz
operating frequency, 64GB RAM).
4.5 Results
To illustrate the benefits of our scalable technique for symbolic co-analysis,
we compare the runtime of the baseline symbolic co-analysis technique (Al-
gorithm 1) against our scalable technique (Algorithm 2). Table 4.2 presents
a comparison of analysis times for the benchmark applications. Due to com-
plex or infinite control structures, the baseline technique did not finish for
some of the benchmarks (div, inSort, intAVG, rle, Viterbi), even after 15
hours of simulation. For these benchmarks, we show the analysis time as
∞. To supplement our analysis, we implemented smaller versions of these
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Table 4.2: Scalable symbolic co-analysis reduces analysis time compared to
baseline symbolic co-analysis and enables analysis of applications with
complex control structures.3
Benchmark
Analysis Time (s)
Baseline Proposed %Reduction
binSearch 715 23 97%
div ∞ 7 ∞
inSort ∞ 25 ∞
inSort small 459 13 97%
intAVG ∞ 116 ∞
intFilt 1378 1365 1%
mult 3 3 0%
rle ∞ 20 ∞
rle small 187 6 97%
tHold 7 7 0%
tea8 20 20 0%
FFT 10542 10498 0.4%
AutoCorr 91 90 1%
convEn 1722 1401 19%
Viterbi ∞ 443 ∞
MergeSort 3112 3007 3%
benchmarks (denoted by small) that either read fewer inputs or read input
values that are bounded by a small value. Even the smaller versions of div
and intAVG did not finish after simulating for 15 hours. This is because
div performs an XOR of an input with itself to determine the number of
iterations required to finish the division operation. Thus, even a single X
in the input can propagate to the computed iteration bound, leading to an
infinite loop. Since intAVG uses a division operation in its computation, it
suffers the same fate. The inSort and rle applications do not suffer from this
issue, and their smaller versions shrink the execution tree such that the base-
line can complete analysis; however, scalable symbolic co-analysis achieves
significant speedups for these benchmarks, even in their smaller versions, by
eliminating redundant analysis of previously explored states.
For some benchmarks, our technique provides little or no benefit over the
baseline (e.g., mult, intFilt, tea8, FFT, AutoCorr, convEn). This is because
these applications, like many applications for ultra-low-power systems, have
simple control flow (e.g., no input-dependent branches or infinite loops), and
hence, our scalability techniques are not invoked. While tHold has input-
dependent branches, its simple CFG did not present enough opportunities
for our technique to have an advantage over the baseline.
For most benchmarks with input-dependent branches (e.g., binSearch,
3∞ means that the analysis did not complete in 15 hours. small indicates a benchmark
run with a smaller configuration so that the baseline analysis can complete.
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Table 4.3: Use of conservative states to improve scalability identifies more
gates as possibly exercisable; however, the difference between baseline and
scalable symbolic co-analysis is small.
Benchmark
Percentage Gates Toggled
Baseline Proposed % Increase
binSearch 73.17 73.80 0.86%
div 73.56 74.45 1.20%
inSort 73.81 74.03 0.29%
inSort small 72.72 72.72 0.00%
intAVG 73.87 74.68 1.09%
intFilt 79.27 79.27 0.00%
mult 78.24 78.24 0.00%
rle 74.82 75.63 1.08%
rle small 73.71 73.74 0.04%
tHold 72.18 72.19 0.01%
tea8 74.88 74.88 0.00%
FFT 80.35 80.35 0.00%
AutoCorr 80.13 80.13 0.00%
convEn 74.95 74.95 0.00%
Viterbi 73.98 74.91 1.01%
MergeSort 50.36 51.61 2.48%
div, inSort, inSort small, intAVG, rle, rle small), the benefits of scalable
co-analysis are significant. In fact, the proposed technique is not only sig-
nificantly faster than the baseline for these benchmarks, but it also makes
analysis possible for benchmarks that could not be analyzed by the baseline
technique. For the subset of benchmarks that can be analyzed by the base-
line, our scalable technique reduces analysis time by up to 97.2%, and by
41.7% on average.
As discussed in Section 4.3, our technique performs faster analysis than
the baseline for benchmarks that contain complex control flow, because every
time we visit a branch in the control flow graph, we build a conservative
state of the system that covers all observed states during visits to the same
branch. If, during a visit, the state is a substate of a previously explored
state, execution down that branch path can be terminated. Since the new
state at a branch always includes all the previously visited states and is
bounded by the state where the entire system is marked with Xs,4 we are
guaranteed to reach a simulation state in which simulation from the branch
is no longer necessary.
Although it improves the scalability of symbolic co-analysis, our technique
may introduce inaccuracies, since a conservative state may encompass one
or more states that an application cannot actually exercise. This can result
4A common example is a loop counter turning to all Xs, which takes at most 16 visits
for the openMSP430.
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in our technique conservatively identifying more gates as exercisable, com-
pared to the baseline. To compare the accuracy of our co-analysis technique
against the baseline, we determine the fraction of gates in the design identi-
fied as exercisable by a symbolic co-analysis technique (this metric is used to
characterize the number of gates that our scalable but conservative analysis
marks as exercisable that are not actually exercisable by the application).
Table 4.3 shows the fraction of gates in the design that are identified
as exercisable by each symbolic co-analysis technique. For benchmarks for
which the baseline did not finish (div, inSort, intAVG, rle, Viterbi), the table
presents the fraction of gates that were toggled until the simulator timed out.
For several benchmarks (e.g., intFilt, mult, tHold, tea8, inSort small), our
conservative technique toggles the same number of gates as the baseline. This
can be expected for applications like intFilt, mult, and tea8, since they do
not have input-dependent branches. In the case of tHold, we observed that
the only bits that change during every visit to an input-dependent branch
corresponded to the loop counter and the output variable that represents a
count of the number of input values that are above a threshold. Since these
states, and hence their corresponding gates, would eventually be exercised
by the full simulation of the application anyway, the number of toggled gates
did not change for tHold. In the case of inSort small, we shrank the input
vector (to be sorted) to eight entries. Since the loop iterator’s maximum
value of 7 (111 in binary) is the largest state reachable in three bits, the
baseline can toggle all the exercisable bits during the full execution of the
application, and hence, setting the three least significant bits of the iterator
to Xs did not introduce any unreachable states. However, we notice that
for the actual benchmark inSort, the scalable technique actually marks more
gates as exercisable than the baseline. This can be attributed to two fac-
tors – (1) the baseline symbolic simulation was unable to finish analyzing
the application, and (2) we used an input vector of size 17 (binary represen-
tation 10001), which means that the iterator’s conservative representation
(XXXXX) encompasses several unreachable states (10010-11111). However,
the percentage of extra gates that were identified as exercisable is still small
for inSort.
Intuitively, it makes sense that our conservative analysis only increases
the number of gates identified as exercisable by a small amount, because
even though there are many new potentially infeasible execution paths to
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analyze, they are explored on the same piece of hardware, and hence the
majority of the gates being exercised during exploration of these paths are
expected to be the same. This also applies to several other benchmarks, such
as binSearch, div, inSort, and rle, which have input-dependent branches. For
these benchmarks, our scalable technique identifies more exercisable gates
than the baseline, since it introduces infeasible states, but the number of
additional gates is small, for the same reason as explained above.
For the benchmarks where inaccuracy is introduced by conservative states,
the maximum inaccuracy in the number of toggled gates from our scalable
technique is 1.2%. Considering all the benchmarks, the average percentage
degradation in accuracy is 0.5%.
Since the goal of our approach to symbolic hardware-software co-analysis
is to enable scalable analysis for applications with arbitrarily complex con-
trol structures, in addition to evaluating domain-relevant applications for
ultra-low-power embedded systems, we also evaluated a recursive application
intended to stress-test the scalability of our symbolic co-analysis technique
for a complex control structure. The MergeSort application uses recursion,
which can be a stress test for our symbolic co-analysis technique, since the
depth of recursion for an application is often input-dependent. Thus, con-
servative state is invoked to cover the possible execution states of a recursive
application. Also, as conservative states are evaluated, the stack used to
support recursive function calls becomes more conservative, since multiple
calls to the same recursive function would likely push different states onto
the stack at the same branch in the control flow graph. Thus, we evalu-
ate MergeSort to verify that (a) our scalable symbolic co-analysis technique
can handle recursion and (b) our conservative symbolic co-analysis approach
does not introduce too much pessimism due to the interaction of conservative
states in a recursive control flow graph.
The results in Table 4.2 show that our scalable symbolic co-analysis tech-
nique is able to handle recursion, even generating a slight speedup over
the baseline technique. The real test, however, is whether recursion can
be handled without introducing too much pessimism. Table 4.3 shows that
the pessimism introduced by using conservative state to analyze recursion
is negligible. Compared to the baseline, scalable symbolic co-analysis only
identifies 2% additional gates as exercisable. Thus, our scalable co-analysis
technique is able to analyze an application containing recursion without sig-
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Table 4.4: Microarchitectural features in recent embedded processors.
Processor Branch Predictor Cache
ARM Cortex-M0 no no
ARM Cortex-M3 yes no
Atmel ATxmega128A4 no no
Freescale/NXP MC13224v no no
Intel Quark-D1000 yes yes
Jennic/NXP JN5169 no no
SiLab Si2012 no no
TI MSP430 no no
nificantly degrading the potential for application-specific power savings en-
abled by symbolic hardware-software co-analysis.
4.6 Generality and Limitations
We target our co-analysis for applications with ultra-low power constraints.
Low-power processors are already the most widely used type of processor
and are also expected to power a large number of emerging applications [66,
67, 68, 69, 70]. Such processors also tend to be simple, run relatively simple
applications, and do not support non-determinism (no branch prediction and
caching; for example, see Table 4.4). This makes our symbolic simulation-
based technique a good fit for such processors. Below, we discuss how our
technique may scale for complex processors and applications, if necessary.
More complex processors contain more performance-enhancing features
such as large caches, prediction or speculation mechanisms, and out-of-order
execution, that introduce non-determinism into the instruction stream. Co-
analysis is capable of handling this added non-determinism at the expense
of analysis tool runtime or accuracy (i.e., becoming more conservative). For
example, by injecting an X as the result of a tag check, both the cache hit
and miss paths will be explored in the memory hierarchy. Similarly, since
co-analysis already explores taken and not-taken paths for input-dependent
branches, it can be adapted to handle branch prediction. In an out-of-order
processor, instruction ordering is based on the dependence pattern between
instructions. While instructions may execute in different orders depending
on the state of pipelines and schedulers, a processor that starts from a known
reset state and executes the same piece of code will transition through the
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same sequence of states each time. Thus, modifying input-independent CFG
exploration to perform input-independent exploration of the data flow graph
(DFG) may allow analysis to be extended to out-of-order execution.
For complex applications, CFG complexity increases. This may not be an
issue for simple in-order processors (e.g., the ultra-low-power processors stud-
ied in this chapter), since the maximum length of instruction sequences (CFG
paths) that must be considered is limited based on the number of instructions
that can be resident in the processor pipeline at once. However, for complex
applications running on complex processors, heuristic techniques may have
to be used to improve scalability. While heuristics have been applied to im-
prove scalability in other contexts (e.g., verification) [71, 72], heuristics for
our hardware-software co-analysis must be conservative to guarantee that no
gate is marked as untoggled when it could be toggled.
In a multi-programmed setting (including systems that support dynamic
linking), we take the union of the toggle activities of all applications (caller,
callee, and the relevant OS code in case of dynamic linking) to get a con-
servative toggling activity. For optimizations which require specific timing
information, all possible interleavings of such programs must be considered.
For self-modifying code, all possible modifications are considered (i.e., all
possible executions of the self-modifying code). In the case of fine-grained
multi-threading, any state that is not maintained as part of a thread’s con-
text is assumed to have a value of X when symbolic execution is performed
for an instruction belonging to the thread. This leads to a safe guarantee
of toggling activity for the thread, irrespective of the behavior of the other
threads.
Our technique naturally handles state machines that run synchronously
with the microcontroller. For state machines that run asynchronously (e.g.,
ADCs, DACs, bus controllers), we assume the source of non-determinism
(e.g., external initialization of a DMA) is an X at all times. This produces
the worst-case toggling activity throughout the execution of the software on
the processor. Asynchronous state machines are generally much smaller than
the actual processor, allowing us to not be overly conservative.
A similar approach can be used to handle interrupts. The effect of an
asynchronous interrupt can be characterized by forcing the interrupt pin to
always read an X. Since this can potentially cause the PC to be updated with
anX if the interrupt is enabled, we must also consider each instruction to be a
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point at which the PC can be modified and add the interrupt’s service routine
to the set of next possible program addresses. Interrupt service routines
(ISRs) are regular software routines and can be analyzed with the rest of the
code.
Our evaluations in this chapter have been performed in the context of bare-
metal design (no OS). While many low-power microprocessors and a large
segment of embedded systems are bare-metal systems (application running
on the processor without an operating system (OS)) [73, 74, 75, 76], use of an
OS is common in several embedded application domains, as well as in more
complex systems. In such systems, system code must be analyzed in addition
to application code to identify power gating opportunities. Our symbolic
analysis has been applied to OSes such as FreeRTOS [77] (see Chapters 6
and 8).
4.7 Related Work
Our work on scalable symbolic hardware-software co-analysis is related to
work on symbolic execution and symbolic simulation. Symbolic execution
involves running a program using symbolic inputs instead of regular inputs,
for program analysis and test generation, while symbolic simulation involves
simulating a hardware design using symbolic inputs for design analysis, ver-
ification, and test generation.
Symbolic execution has been studied extensively in the software commu-
nity [57]. Since the goal of symbolic execution is to either analyze an appli-
cation or generate test inputs, the search space is the entire execution tree
of the application, which can be exponentially large or even infinite. Hence,
several heuristics have been developed to deal with the path explosion prob-
lem [57, 61]. However, these techniques are only applicable at the software
level and do not allow analysis of the behavior of a processor running the
application. They also cannot be used when conservative guarantees are
required, since they sacrifice coverage to improve scalability.
Symbolic simulation is a technique used in the hardware community to an-
alyze a hardware design for logic and timing verification and sequential test
generation [56]. Similar to the path explosion problem of symbolic execu-
tion, symbolic simulation techniques suffer from the state explosion problem
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for which several BDD-based and SAT-based techniques have been devel-
oped [58, 59, 60]. Since the goal of symbolic simulation techniques is to
analyze a hardware design for verification and test generation, the search
space is the entire state space of the processor.
Symbolic simulation has been applied in other contexts, such as worst-
case execution time analysis [78, 79] and worst-case energy analysis [80].
These techniques scale symbolic simulation for their respective domains. No
technique exists that scales symbolic analysis of an application binary on the
netlist of a processor.
4.8 Summary
Symbolic simulation of an application binary on the gate-level netlist of a
processor can be used for application-specific power, energy, area, and secu-
rity optimizations, if the simulation can guarantee that all possible execution
states of the application are explored. Unfortunately, symbolic simulation
that must explore all possible execution states does not scale well for com-
plex applications, and existing heuristic for improving scalability void cover-
age guarantees. In this chapter, we proposed a scalable symbolic hardware-
software co-analysis technique that guarantees that all possible gates that an
application can exercise in a processor will be identified. We showed that our
technique can reduce application analysis time and can even enable analysis
of applications with complex control structures that cannot be analyzed by
naive techniques.
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Chapter 5
Enabling Effective Module-Oblivious Power
Gating for Embedded Processors
The increasingly stringent power and energy requirements of emerging IoT
applications have led to a strong recent interest in aggressive power gating
techniques. Conventional techniques for aggressive power gating perform
module-based power gating in processors, where power domains correspond
to RTL modules. In this chapter, we observe that there can be significant
power benefits from module-oblivious power gating, where power domains
can include an arbitrary set of gates, possibly from multiple RTL modules.
However, since it is not possible to infer the activity of module-oblivious
power domains from software alone, conventional software-based power man-
agement techniques cannot be applied for module-oblivious power gating in
processors. Also, since module-oblivious domains are not encapsulated with
a well-defined port list and functionality like RTL modules, hardware-based
management of module-oblivious domains is prohibitively expensive. We
present a technique for low-cost management of module-oblivious power do-
mains in embedded processors. The technique uses the symbolic simulation-
based co-analysis of a processor’s hardware design and a software binary
from the previous chapter to automatically derive profitable and safe power
gating decisions for a given set of module-oblivious domains when the soft-
ware binary is run on the processor. We demonstrate that module-oblivious
power gating based on our technique reduces leakage energy by 2× with re-
spect to state-of-the-art aggressive module-based power gating for a common
embedded processor.
5.1 Introduction
A large number of existing and emerging computing applications require
ultra-low-power operation and extreme energy efficiency [68, 66, 70, 69, 67,
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81]. Notable among these are the Internet of Things, sensor networks, wear-
ables, and health monitors. The 2015 ITRS report projects power and energy
constraints of these systems to be even tighter in the future [82]. Unsurpris-
ingly, these applications rely on low-power microcontrollers and microproces-
sors that have become the most widely used type of processor in production
today [2, 3, 4].
The ultra-low power and energy requirements of emerging applications,
along with the increasing leakage energy dissipation that has accompanied
CMOS scaling [83], have fueled interest in aggressive power gating tech-
niques. Conventional aggressive power gating techniques perform module-
based power gating, i.e., power gating of RTL modules during periods of
inactivity [84, 85, 86]. An RTL module is encapsulated with a well-defined
port list, making it relatively easy to determine when a module is inactive
based on input signals in the port list.
While RTL modules form convenient boundaries for defining power do-
mains, module-based domains may not be the best option for supporting
aggressive power gating. Logic is grouped into a module based on common
functionality, not necessarily based on correlated activity. In several cases,
activity of logic in the same module can have uncorrelated activity (e.g., dif-
ferent registers in the register file may not be used by the same instruction
or even the same application), while logic in different modules can often be
correlated (e.g., when one module feeds data or control signals to another).
In this chapter, we make a case for aggressive power gating based on
module-oblivious power domains. A module-oblivious power domain is an ar-
bitrary set of gates that have correlated activity. Module-oblivious power do-
mains may contain only a subset of gates in a module, may contain gates from
multiple modules, and may also consist of logic from non-microarchitectural
modules (e.g., uncore, debug logic, peripherals, etc.). The goal of group-
ing logic into module-oblivious power domains based on correlated activity
rather than module membership is to enable larger segments of logic to
be power gated for longer periods of time, thus saving more energy.
While module-oblivious power domains may provide more opportunities
to reduce power, conventional hardware and software-based power manage-
ment techniques cannot manage these unconventional domains. A hardware
or software-based power gating management technique must be able to guar-
antee that a domain is idle before it is powered off and that an idle domain is
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powered on before it will be used. Since the activity of an arbitrary collection
of gates that may constitute portions of multiple modules cannot be inferred
based on software alone, module-oblivious domains cannot be managed in
software using conventional techniques. Hardware-based power management
detects when a domain is idle, then powers off the domain. Since a module-
oblivious domain is not encapsulated with a well-defined port list and does
not have a well-defined function but instead consists of an arbitrary collec-
tion of gates that can contribute to many different functionalities, detecting
when the domain is idle requires monitoring of all input nets to the gates in
the domain. The high overhead of monitoring the activity of so many signals
easily outweighs the benefits of power gating. Any viable technique for man-
aging module-oblivious power domains must be able to infer the gate-level
activity induced by software, so that the prohibitive overheads associated
with hardware monitoring of an arbitrary set of gates can be avoided.
In this chapter, we propose a technique that generates safe, aggressive
power gating management decisions for module-oblivious power domains.
The gate-level activity profile of an application is captured through a sym-
bolic simulation of the application’s binary that characterizes domain activity
for all possible application inputs. Safe power gating decisions are then gen-
erated such that each domain is guaranteed to be powered on by the time
it is used, and domains are aggressively powered off whenever profitable.
Power gating decisions are then embedded into the application binary. This
software-based power management approach avoids the prohibitive overheads
of managing module-oblivious domains in hardware.
Our proposed technique is automated, requires no programmer interven-
tion, and incurs low management overhead. Also, while the technique is
general, it is best suited for embedded systems. Embedded system designers
routinely perform hardware/software co-design [87, 88] or license hardware
IP [89, 90], so they often have access to both RTL and software binary – the
inputs needed by our power gating framework.1 Also, embedded processors
and applications tend to be simple, so our symbolic simulation-based analysis
scales well in such settings.
This chapter makes the following contributions.
1Power gating binary annotation can be offered as a cloud compilation service by the
hardware system vendor in non-embedded settings, where the application developer does
not have access to the processor description [91, 92, 93].
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Table 5.1: Power domains in recent processors.
Processor #domains
TI MSP430 Wolverine “many” [94]
ARM Cortex-A9 14 [95]
ARM Cortex-A15 8 [96]
Atmel SAML21 5 [97]
Intel Atom E6 15+ [98, 99]
• We make a case for module-oblivious power gating. We show that mod-
ule-oblivious power gating can result in 2× higher leakage energy savings
compared to state-of-the-art module-based power gating.
• To enable module-oblivious power gating, we present a fully automated
technique that performs co-analysis of an embedded system’s processor netlist
and application binary to make safe, aggressive power gating decisions.2 To
the best of our knowledge, this is the first technique for module-oblivious
power gating.
• We fully implement module-oblivious and module-based power gating in
openMSP430 using an industry-standard UPF methodology that accounts
for all power gating overheads. We demonstrate that module-oblivious power
gating can achieve 2× higher leakage energy savings compared to module-
based power gating. We show that module-oblivious gating based on our
techniques achieves leakage energy savings that are within 8% of optimal.
• Finally, we show that our technique for managing module-oblivious do-
mains is effective even at managing conventional module-based domains. It
saves 12% more energy than an idealized implementation of Idle Count – a
hardware-based domain management technique for module-based domains.
Our benefits are within 6% of optimal for module-based domains.
5.2 Related Work
While a large body of work exists on processor- and core-level power gat-
ing [84, 85, 100, 101, 102, 103], emerging power- and energy-constrained
applications have fueled recent work on aggressive module-based power gat-
ing techniques [86, 102, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114].
2Our automated co-analysis tool for module-oblivious power gating is available for
download at the following link: http://www.removed.for.blind.review
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These techniques, including those that adaptively re-size microarchitecural
structures [86, 85], and techniques that target uncore components (e.g., on-
chip routers [115, 116, 117]), focus on power gating of RTL modules. Since
module-based domains are smaller and more homogeneous, they may pro-
vide more frequent opportunities for aggressive power gating than processor-
or core-level solutions. Table 5.1 shows the number of power domains sup-
ported in some recent microprocessors / microcontrollers. As can be seen,
power gating is already being performed aggressively; many processors have
a large number of power domains.
In this chapter, we make a case that aggressive power gating may save even
more leakage energy when power domains are module-oblivious rather than
module-based. Primarily, this is because logic in an RTL module is grouped
together based on common functionality, not necessarily a correlated activity
profile, whereas logic in a module-oblivious domain is grouped together based
on common periods of inactivity that allow power gating to be performed.
To best of our knowledge, this is the first work on module-oblivious power
gating.
In terms of power domain management, prior works have used software-
or hardware-based management. Software-based domain management tech-
niques [118, 86] infer when power domains will be inactive by analyzing
an application binary. This requires the functionality of managed power
domains to be software-visible. Prior techniques for software-based power
domain management cannot be used for module-oblivious power domains,
because such domains may contain logic that belongs to many modules and
contributes to many fine-grained functionalities, making it impossible to infer
activity of module-oblivious domains from software alone.
Hardware-based domain management techniques use hardware monitors to
detect when power domains are inactive [100, 85, 101, 114, 108, 109]. Such
an approach is feasible for prior works on aggressive module-based power
gating, because an RTL module is encapsulated with a well-defined interface
(port list) and function. Thus, it is possible to infer domain activity from
a relatively small number of signals. Hardware monitoring is infeasible for
module-oblivious domains, however, because they do not have a well-defined
interface or functionality. As such, the number of signals that must be mon-
itored to infer domain activity is prohibitively large.
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5.3 Motivation
5.3.1 A Case for Module-Oblivious Power Domains for
Microprocessors
There are several reasons why module-oblivious power domains may provide
significantly more opportunities for power gating than module-based domains
in microprocessors. One reason is that logic in microarchitectural modules is
grouped together largely based on functionality or position in the processor
pipeline, which does not necessarily imply correlation in terms of activity.
It may often be the case that different logic partitions within the same mi-
croarchitectural module have very different activity profiles. For example,
many microarchitectural modules support “one-hot” logic. This implies that
each logical state is mutually exclusive of all other states. Similarly, each
instruction selects and executes on one execution unit. This leaves all other
execution units idle. Furthermore, it is common for several modules to have
parts that are nearly always active and other parts that are nearly always idle.
This weak or anti-correlation between the activity profiles of different parts
within a module limits the effectiveness of power gating for module-based
domains. Figure 5.1a shows activity profiles for the frontend and execution
unit modules of an openMSP430 processor [63] running an encryption appli-
cation (tea8), where each module has been divided into two sub-modules. In
the figure, a high/low value indicates that a sub-module is active/idle. Since
both the frontend and the execution unit have at least one part active during
nearly every instant of this time period, there is no opportunity to power gate
either module. Stated differently, fndA and exuA prevent the frontend and
execution unit from being power gated, even though fndB and exuB are al-
most completely inactive. If, however, fndA and exuA were combined to form
one power domain and fndB and exuB formed a second domain, the second
domain could be power gated during this time period. Uncorrelated activity
within modules and correlated activity across modules indicates that there
may be significant opportunities to perform more aggressive power gating
with module-oblivious power domains.
Another reason for correlated activity across module boundaries is that
logic in one module often drives logic in another module. Although the entire
modules are unlikely to have correlated activity, the driving and driven parts
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0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Cycle
fndA
fndB
exuA
exuB
fndA+exuA
exuA+exuB
fndA+fndB
fndB+exuB
(a) Uncorrelated activity within a module can prevent power gating
of module-based domains, whereas module-oblivious domains allow
more aggressive power gating.
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Cycle
mbbB
mulA+mulB
mulB+mbbA
mulA+mbbB
mbbA+mbbB
mulA
mulB
mbbA
(b) When one module drives another, the driving and driven logic belong to different
modules but have highly correlated activity, whereas logic within the same module may
have completely uncorrelated activity.
Figure 5.1: Activity profiles for different module partitions suggests that
module-oblivious domains may provide significantly more opportunities for
power gating than module-based domains.
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of the modules do have highly correlated activity. Also, such logical com-
ponents are typically in close proximity in a chip layout, making them good
candidates to be placed in the same domain for power gating. Figure 5.1b
illustrates this behavior with an example for an application that performs
multiplication, where the multiplier and memory backbone modules of the
openMSP430 processor have each been divided into two sub-modules. Sub-
module mbbA contains the peripheral data input bus that feeds input data
to the multiplier (since the multiplier is one of the peripherals). The activity
of this sub-module is highly correlated to that of mulB, which contains the
input side of the multiplier. When domain wakeup overhead is considered,
module-based power domains do not allow any power gating of these mod-
ules (blue activity profiles). However, when module-oblivious domains are
formed (red activity profiles), both module-oblivious domains can be power
gated for significant portions of this time period.
Figure 5.2 is a correlation matrix that shows the correlation between each
pair of sub-modules in the openMSP430 processor, where each module has
been partitioned into four sub-modules and correlation equals the fraction of
cycles in which two sub-modules exhibit the same activity (active or idle).
The dashed boxes along the main diagonal encircle correlation scores for
sub-modules that belong to the same module. It can be observed that not
all parts of a module have correlated activity, and in many cases, differ-
ent parts of the same module have highly uncorrelated activity. Tracing
down a row corresponding to a given sub-module, it can be observed that
there always exist one or more sub-modules from different modules that have
more correlated activity profiles than a sub-module from the same module.
For example, in the row showing correlations for the last sub-module in the
frontend, we have encircled all the (10) sub-modules from different modules
that are more strongly correlated to this frontend sub-module than any of
the other frontend sub-modules. These observations suggest that module-
based power domains may often miss opportunities to power gate idle logic,
whereas module-oblivious power domains may provide significantly more op-
portunities to power gate larger areas of logic for longer periods of time. In
Section 5.6, we show that a full-fledged UPF implementation of openMSP430
with module-oblivious domains achieves up to 2× more leakage savings than
an implementation with module-based domains.
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Figure 5.2: Different parts of the same module can have uncorrelated
activity profiles. For nearly all sub-modules, a sub-module from a different
module has more correlated activity than a sub-module from the same
module.
5.3.2 A Case for a Novel Management Technique for
Module-Oblivious Domains
Reaping the power benefits enabled by module-oblivious domains requires
a power domain management technique that can determine when domains
are idle / active and power them off / on accordingly. Unfortunately, ex-
isting techniques that manage module-based domains through software or
hardware cannot be used for module-oblivious domains. Consider existing
software-based management techniques. Software-based management is pos-
sible when domain activity can be inferred from software, as is the case for
many module-based domains [84]. In the example code listing in Figure 5.3,
domain D0 is a module-based domain corresponding to the adder in the exe-
cution unit. Since the adder module has a well-defined architectural function,
it is possible to infer when the domain must be powered on. For example,
instructions 4 (compare) and 9 (subtraction) use the adder, so domain D0
must be powered on when those instructions reach the execution stage. The
adder can potentially be powered off for other instructions, since they do not
use the adder.
For a module-oblivious domain, however, it is not possible to infer domain
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1.mov #0, r4; 
2.mov #0, r5;
3.mov &0x0020, r15; 
4.cmp r15, #10000;
5.jl else
then:
6.mov #1000, r4
7.jmp end
else: 
8.mov #1000, r5
end:
9.sub r4, r5, r6; 
OFF ?
OFF ?
OFF ?
ON ?
OFF ?
OFF ?
OFF ?
OFF ?
ON ?
D0			D3
 
 
D0/adder
D3/glue
D3/clk−module
D3/dbg
D3/eu−other
D3/eu−alu
D3/eu−reg−file
D3/frontend
D3/mbb
D3/mult
D3/sfr
Figure 5.3: It is possible to infer the activity of a module-based domain
(e.g., D0 – the adder in the execution unit) based on software alone. It is
not possible to infer the activity of a module oblivious domain (e.g., D3
from Figure 5.4c) based on software alone.
activity from software alone. A module-oblivious domain does not have a
well-defined architectural function. It is a collection of gates with correlated
activity profiles that may belong to many modules and contribute to many
functionalities. For example, domain D3 in Figure 5.3 corresponds to the
module-oblivious domain in Figure 5.4c (see Section 5.5.1 for details of how
module-oblivious domains are constructed). The domain contains gates from
ten different modules, including glue logic, the memory backbone, and clock
generation logic for which activity cannot be inferred based on software.
Similarly, existing hardware-based domain management techniques are in-
feasible for module-oblivious domains. Hardware-based domain management
dynamically determines when a power domain is idle / active based on proces-
sor control signals. This can be relatively straightforward for module-based
designs, since RTL modules are encapsulated, with a well-defined interface
(port list) and functional description. For example, consider D0 in Figure 5.3
– the adder module. To determine if this domain will be active, hardware-
based management logic only needs to detect if a decoded opcode corresponds
to one of the instructions that uses the adder. Figure 5.5a shows the verilog
statements that can be added to the decode stage to infer the activity of the
adder. Synthesized, this logic corresponds to only six gates.
On the other hand, domain management logic for a module-oblivious do-
main is not simple. Since module-oblivious domains are not nicely encapsu-
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(a) Domain 1 (b) Domain 2 (c) Domain 3 (d) Domain 4
frontend clock_module register_file
alu execution_unit sfr
dbg multiplier watchdog
mem_backbone glue
Figure 5.4: Breakdown of domain composition for each module-oblivious
power domain. All four domains have gates from at least eight
microarchitectural modules.
module domain_activity_detector_D0 (
inst_type , // from decode
wkup_adder);
input [11:0] inst_type;
output wkup_adder;
wire wkup_adder = {inst_type[‘ADD] |
inst_type[‘SUB] | inst_type[‘ADDC] |
inst_type[‘SUBC] | inst_type[‘CMP] |
inst_type[‘REL_JMP] | inst_type[‘RETI ]};
endmodule
(a) Verilog statements for inferring the activity of the execution unit adder
module – synthesizes to 6 gates.
module domain_activity_detector_D3 (
in, // domain inputs
ff_d , // domain ff D-pins
ff_q , // domain ff Q-pins
clk , wake_up_domain );
input [704:0] in; input [648:0] ff_d;
input [648:0] ff_q; input clk;
output wake_up_domain; reg [704:0] in_delay;
always @ (posedge clk)
begin
in_delay <= in;
end
wire [704:0] in_toggled = in ^ in_delay;
wire [648:0] ff_toggled = ff_d ^ ff_q;
wire any_input_toggled = {| in_toggled };
wire any_ff_toggled = {| ff_toggled };
wire wake_up_domain = {any_input_toggled | any_ff_toggled };
endmodule
(b) Verilog statements for inferring the activity of the module-oblivious domain
from Figure 5.4c – synthesizes to 4010 gates.
Figure 5.5: Hardware-based domain management logic for a module-based
domain can be relatively simple, whereas domain management logic for a
module-oblivious domain is prohibitively expensive.
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Table 5.2: Overheads for hardware-based management of module-oblivious
power domains in openMSP430.
Domains
Gate FF Domain Area Static Power
Count Count Inputs Overhead Overhead
2
6695 784
947 143.36% 136.44%
3 1203 159.38% 151.30%
4 1450 183.52% 173.69%
lated with a well-defined interface and function, the only way to infer their
activity in hardware is to monitor activity on all input nets that cross the
domain boundary. Additionally, state elements (flip-flops) inside the domain
must be monitored for activity, since a state machine inside the domain could
be active even without triggering any activity at the domain boundary. Fig-
ure 5.5b shows the verilog statements that infer the activity of the module-
oblivious domain D3 from Figure 5.4c. Synthesized, this logic corresponds
to 4010 gates.
The overhead of managing module-oblivious domains in hardware becomes
prohibitive when the full processor is considered. Table 5.2 shows the area
overhead incurred by hardware-based domain management logic in open-
MSP430 for two-, three-, and four-domain designs. The overheads preclude
any possible benefits from aggressive power gating, prohibiting the use of
hardware-based domain management for module-oblivious power gating.
Any viable technique for managing module-oblivious power domains must
be based on inferring their gate-level activity from software, such that the
prohibitive overheads associated with hardware-based monitoring of an ar-
bitrary set of gates can be avoided. In the next section, we describe a low-
overhead technique based on hardware-software co-analysis that can infer the
activity of module-oblivious domains to enable aggressive module-oblivious
power gating.
5.4 A Co-Analysis Based Approach for
Module-Oblivious Power Gating
A power domain management technique must infer domain activity to deter-
mine when domains can be powered off, while guaranteeing that they will be
powered on when active. Since a module-oblivious domain may contain an
arbitrary set of gates, inferring domain activity requires gate-level analysis
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of software execution on a processor. Activity analysis cannot be based on
profiling (i.e., observing activity for several benchmark runs with different
input sets), since profiling is input-specific and may result in incorrect man-
agement decisions when in-field inputs are different than the inputs charac-
terized during profiling. An incorrect management decision is unacceptable,
since it may lead to incorrect program execution (e.g., when a domain needed
by the program is turned off). Below, we describe a novel approach that
uses symbolic simulation to characterize the gate-level activity of an applica-
tion on a processor to generate power gating decisions for module-oblivious
power domains. The symbolic simulation uses unknown logic values (Xs)
for all inputs so that the generated activity profile characterizes all possible
executions of the application for all possible inputs. We use the results of
input-independent activity analysis to generate instruction-level power do-
main management decisions that achieve near-optimal power benefits while
guaranteeing that all domains are powered on whenever needed. Figure 5.6
provides an overview of our module-oblivious power gating technique.
5.4.1 Gate Activity Analysis
The first stage of our module-oblivious domain management technique infers
the activity of power domains during an application’s execution. Normally,
a gate-level simulation could infer the activity of all processor gates for only
one input set. However, our scalable hardware-software co-analysis presented
in Chapter 4 uses a form of symbolic simulation that propagates Xs for
all application inputs, allowing us to infer the activity of all gates for all
possible input sets. Combined with the domain mapping that specifies which
gates belong to each domain, we can infer domain activity for all possible
executions of an application on a processor. Specifically, during the symbolic
simulation, the simulator captures the activity of each gate at each point in
the execution tree. A gate is considered active in a particular cycle if its value
changes or if it has an unknown value (X) and is driven by an active gate;
otherwise, the gate is idle. The resulting annotated symbolic execution tree
describes all possible instances in which a gate could possibly toggle (and
by extension, all instances in which each domain could possibly be active)
for all possible executions of the application. As such, it also describes when
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Figure 5.6: Our analysis generates input-independent power gating
decisions for module-oblivious domains.
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power domains (even module-oblivious domains) can be safely powered down
and when they must be powered up. The next section describes how inferred
domain activity information is translated into domain management decisions.
5.4.2 Gating Binary Annotation
Gating binary annotation (GBA) takes as input the annotated symbolic exe-
cution tree from gate activity analysis, gate-to-domain mapping information,
and domain wakeup overheads, and produces a binary in which each static
instruction is annotated with power gating decisions for all domains in the
processor. Algorithm 3 describes GBA. GBA considers each path through
the symbolic execution tree.3 During each cycle of a path’s execution, GBA
determines which domains can have active gates and thus must be powered
on. To ensure safety, GBA also marks a domain as active during the N cycles
leading up to a period of activity, where N is the wakeup latency required to
power up the domain. These cycle-level power gating decisions are mapped
to all the static instructions that have dynamic instances in the pipeline
during the wakeup cycles or the current cycle.
Algorithm 3 Gating Binary Annotation for Power Gating Control
Procedure Annotate Binary with PG Decisions(annotated symbolic execution tree, domain mapping,
domain wakeup overhead)
1. PSET ← enumerate all paths in annotated symbolic execution tree
2. Mark all domains as idle for all instructions/addresses in the binary
3. foreach path p ∈ PSET do
4. foreach cycle c ∈ p do
5. foreach gate g ∈ Processor do
6. if g is toggled then
7. D ← domain mapping.get domain(g)
8. wo← domain wakeup overhead.get(D)
9. I ← get instructions being executed(p, c, wo)
10. foreach i ∈ I do
11. Mark domain D as active at instruction i in binary
12. end for
13. end if
14. end for
15. end for
16. end for
Once GBA has considered each execution path through an execution bi-
nary, each static instruction has an annotation specifying which domains
must be powered on when the instruction is in the decode stage. This anno-
tation guarantees safety, because each possible dynamic instance of a static
3For our benchmarks, GBA takes 11.71 seconds, on average, and a maximum of 35.44
seconds for our largest benchmark.
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1.mov #0, r4; 
2.mov #0, r5;
3.mov &0x0020, r15; 
4.cmp r15, #10000;
5.jl else
then:
6.mov #1000, r4
7.jmp end
else: 
8.mov #1000, r5
end:
9.sub r4, r5, r6; end:
9.sub r4, r5, r6; 
then:
6.mov #1000, r4
7.jmp end
1.mov #0, r4; 
2.mov #0, r5;
3.mov &0x0020, r15; 
4.cmp r15, #10000;
5.jl else
else: 
8.mov #1000, r5
end:
9.sub r4, r5, r6; 
ON OFF
ON OFF
ON OFF
ON OFF
ON OFF
ON OFF
ON OFF
ON OFF
ON OFF ON ON
ON OFF
ON OFF
ON OFF
ON OFF
ON OFF
ON OFF
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Static Instruction Stream 
(Binary)
Dynamic Instruction Stream 
(Execution Tree)
D1   D2
D1   D2
D1   D2
D1   D2
D1   D2 D1   D2
Figure 5.7: Illustration of gating binary annotation for an example code (an
if-else block). For simplicity, this example only shows domain-level activity,
assumes that each instruction takes a single cycle, and assumes a wakeup
latency of zero cycles.
instruction is considered by GBA. If a domain is marked as being powered
on for any dynamic instance of a static instruction, the static instruction is
annotated with an “ON” decision for the domain. This is conservative to en-
sure safety, but it works well for embedded applications, which tend to have
simple control flow. If a domain is not active for any dynamic instance of
a particular instruction (even considering wakeup overheads), the domain is
powered off. The annotated binary containing domain management decisions
can be used to manage power domains using one of the several techniques
described in Section 5.4.4.
5.4.3 Illustrative Example
This section illustrates the procedures for managing module-oblivious do-
mains, described in Sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.2, with an example. Figure 5.7
revisits the example code from Figure 5.3 to demonstrate that our technique
based on hardware-software co-analysis can infer the activity of module-
oblivious domains, which was impossible to infer from software alone.
Figure 5.7 shows the annotated symbolic execution tree generated by gate
activity analysis (GAA). GAA simulates the application starting at instruc-
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tion 1. When an input value is read in instruction 3, instead of storing the
input bits, unknown logic values (Xs) are stored in r15. During instruction
5, an X propagates to the PC inputs, since the result of the comparison in
instruction 4 is unknown (X). At this point, a branch is created, and the
simulation state is stored in a stack for later analysis with the address of
instruction 8 (else:) in the PC inputs. Simulation continues through the
left (then:) control flow path to completion, starting with instruction 6.
After finishing instruction 9, the stored simulation state is popped off the
stack and the right control flow path is simulated to completion, starting
with instruction 8.
During simulation, GAA annotates each dynamic instruction with domain
activity for each domain (D1 and D2 in Figure 5.7). ON means that at
least one gate in the domain might be active during that instruction; OFF
means that all of the domain’s gates are guaranteed to be inactive for that
instruction. Next, Gating binary annotation (GBA) maps the domain states
(ON/OFF states) from the symbolic execution tree to the static instructions
in the application binary. Consider static instruction 1 (mov #0, r4). There
is only one dynamic instance of the instruction in the symbolic execution
tree, and for this instance, domain D1 is ON and D2 is OFF. Therefore,
GBA annotates the corresponding static instruction with the information
that D1 is ON and D2 is OFF.
Now consider static instruction 9 (sub, r4, r5, r6). There are two dy-
namic instances of the instruction in the symbolic execution tree. The activ-
ity of D1 is consistent across the two instances (D1 is ON for both); therefore,
GBA annotates the static instruction with the information that D1 is ON.
The activity of D2, however, is not consistent across the two dynamic in-
stances of instruction 9; D2 is OFF in one and ON in the other. In this
case, GBA conservatively resolves the conflict by marking D2 as ON in the
static instruction annotation. This ensures safety for all possible application
executions.
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5.4.4 Microarchitecture Support for Software-Based Power
Gating
Sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.2 describe a technique that can infer the activity of
module-oblivious domains without costly hardware-based monitoring and use
inferred domain activity to make safe and profitable domain management de-
cisions. This section describes microarchitectural support for communicating
domain management decisions to the control logic that powers the domains
off and on.
Power Gating Instructions:
A straightforward way to generate power gating control signals is to insert
instructions in the binary that direct power domains when to turn off and
on. To ensure that a power domain is powered on before it is used, the
wakeup instruction for a domain must arrive wakeup-latency cycles before
an instruction, IA, that will activate the domain. For an in-order processor,
we insert the wakeup instruction wakeup-latency instructions ahead of IA.
This guarantees that the domain will be powered up even if instructions
have variable latencies. A power down instruction for a domain is inserted
immediately after the last instruction that specifies that the domain must
be powered on. Since GBA marks domains as active (ON) during their
entire wakeup and activity period, the wakeup instruction is simply inserted
before the first instruction that marks a domain as ON, and the power down
instruction is inserted after the last instruction that marks a domain as ON.
For example, in Figure 5.7 an instruction that turns D1 ON and D2 OFF is
inserted before instruction 1, while an instruction to turn D2 ON is inserted
before instruction 9. Note that a similar support mechanism has been used in
prior work on software-based power gating of functional units for embedded
processors [118].
Reserved Instruction Bits:
Another option for indicating when domains should be powered on and off
is to modify the ISA of the processor to reserve some bits in the instruction
to indicate the ON/OFF state of each domain. The number of bits required
is equal to the number of domains. The main benefit of this technique is
that it does not require extra instructions to be inserted in the binary. How-
ever, since the number of bits that can be reserved in the instruction for
power gating would likely be small, this technique can only support a small
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number of power domains. Also, reserving instruction bits for power-gating
decisions may increase code size if the instruction length must be increased
to accommodate the bits.
PC Monitoring:
Another alternative is to maintain a software-populated table that holds the
addresses of annotated instructions, along with corresponding information
about which domains should be turned ON or OFF when that instruction’s
address enters the PC. Every N instructions, the application populates the
table with the addresses of annotated instructions in the next window of
N instructions. When the PC matches one of the addresses in the table,
the power domain control signals stored in that table entry are sent to the
respective power domains to switch them on or off. This technique requires
some software overhead to re-populate the table and hardware overhead to
implement the table as a CAM.
5.4.5 Ensuring Correctness
The proposed approach guarantees correct execution of the application at
three levels.
1. Guaranteeing that domains turn on when needed: Our co-analysis
approach characterizes domain activity for all possible executions of an ap-
plication for all possible inputs to the application. A power domain is only
turned off if it is not used by an instruction in all execution paths through
the code (Section 5.4.2).
2. Guaranteeing that analysis is input-independent: We perform a
symbolic simulation in which all application inputs are replaced by Xs. This
ensures full characterization of application-induced activity on the processor
for all possible application inputs (Section 5.4.1).
3. Guaranteeing that hardware implementation is correct: We use
an automated industry-standard UPF flow to fully implement power gating
designs and accurately account for all implementation overheads of power
gating (Section 5.5.3).
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Figure 5.8: Domain composition of module-based power domains. Each
module belongs to only one domain.
5.5 Methodology
In this section, we first describe how we construct module-based domains
and module-oblivious domains for our study. We then describe the different
techniques we evaluate for managing power domains. Finally, we discuss
other methodological details of our evaluations.
5.5.1 Constructing Power Domains
Module-Based Domains: We construct module-based domains follow-
ing the conventional approach for aggressive power gating, in which power
domains are formed to encompass microarchitectural modules. When the
number of modules is greater than the number of allowable power domains,
modules are grouped together into domains using hierarchical agglomerative
clustering [119]. This clustering technique combines a set of N clusters into
N-1 clusters, based on an optimization objective. In this case, the objective
function uses activity profiles for the clusters (obtained from benchmark pro-
filing) to determine which combination of modules maximizes the potential
energy savings achieved by power gating the resulting domains. Potential en-
ergy savings are measured in gated cycles, where one gated cycle corresponds
to power gating one gate in the gate-level netlist for one cycle. Figure 5.8
shows the domain composition for four module-based domains that maximize
leakage energy savings for module-based power gating.
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Module-Oblivious Domains: We use the same clustering technique as
for module-based domains, with two key differences. First, whereas module-
based domain construction begins with all processor modules in separate
clusters and combines clusters using hierarchical agglomerative clustering to
form the desired number of domains, module-oblivious domain construction
begins with every gate in a separate cluster and combines clusters to form the
desired number of domains. Since a gate may end up in a cluster containing
gates from other modules, the resulting domains are module-oblivious.
Second, since an application’s in-field inputs may not always match the
inputs used during profiling, we use activity profiles produced by input-
independent gate activity analysis (Section 5.4.1) to identify correlated gates
and generate power domains, instead of profiles captured assuming specific
inputs.We treat an X in an activity profile as a toggle, since it indicates that
a net could toggle for some possible input. Input-independent domain forma-
tion ensures robustness of domains across variations in an application’s input
set. We form domains using the activity profiles for only three randomly se-
lected applications in our benchmark set (tea8, binSearch, Autocorr), and
use these domains to perform evaluations for all thirteen benchmarks in Ta-
ble 5.3. In practice, we envision that domains will be formed using activity
profiles that are representative of a system’s target workloads (similar to how
benchmarks are used to determine microarchitectural parameters). The ac-
tual workloads that the processor will run in the field may be different and
many more than the number of benchmarks used for domain formation. As
such, we chose a small number of benchmarks for domain formation relative
to the total number of applications used for evaluation. Nevertheless, our
evaluations show significant benefits even for the ten benchmarks that were
not used for domain formation (Section 5.6). This is because the correlated
activity among gates in different modules is often ISA and microarchitec-
tural implementation-dependent, so only a small number of benchmarks are
needed to determine which gates have correlated activity profiles and form
domains accordingly.
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5.5.2 Power Domain Management
Idle Count [120] is a hardware-based power gating management technique
that uses a counter per domain to count the number of cycles a domain has
been idle. The counter is reset every cycle its domain is active. When the
counter reaches a threshold, k, the domain is powered down. We perform
evaluations for k = 5, 10, and 100. Although [120] only proposes power gating
of functional units, we optimistically evaluate it for any arbitrary processor
modules, even software-invisible modules. We only evaluate Idle Count for
module-based domains, since activity monitoring is prohibitively expensive
for module-oblivious domains (Section 5.3.2). To make this baseline even
more optimistic, we do not consider the overhead of implementing hardware-
based domain monitoring logic for software-invisible module-based domains.
Oracular Management assumes perfect knowledge of an application’s in-
puts to determine exactly when every power domain should be powered on
or off to maximize energy savings. Each domain is woken up just in time so
that the domain is fully powered on by the first cycle that any of its gates
become active (i.e., toggle). Oracular management powers down a domain
immediately whenever profitable, i.e., when all gates in the domain will be
idle for at least the number of cycles it takes the domain to wake up. The
benefits of oracular management represent the upper bound on the benefits
that can be achieved by any power gating technique.
Our approach, software-hardware co-analysis uses input-independent sym-
bolic simulation to annotate instructions in the application binary with power
gating decisions for each domain, as described in Section 5.4.
5.5.3 Simulation Infrastructure and Benchmarks
We verify our approach on a silicon-proven general-purpose processor – open-
MSP430 [63].4 Since MSP430 supports aggressive module-based power gat-
ing [94], it is a suitable testbed for comparison of module-based and module-
oblivious power gating. The processor is synthesized, placed and routed
in TSMC 65GP (65nm) technology at an operating point of 1V and 100
MHz using Synopsys Design Compiler [122] and Cadence EDI System [123].
Gate-level simulations are performed by running full benchmark applica-
4MSP430 is one of the most popular processors used in low-power systems [94, 121].
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Table 5.3: Benchmarks
Embedded Sensor Benchmarks [64]
mult, binSearch, tea8, intFilt,
div, inSort, rle, tHold, intAVG
EEMBC Embedded Benchmarks [65]
Autocorr, ConvEnc, FFT, Viterbi
Table 5.4: Overheads of implementing power gating (Isolation + Retention)
Domain Type Module-oblivious Module-based
Domain Count 2 3 4 2 3 4
Static Power (%) 1.95 2.48 2.98 0.32 0.73 1.58
Dynamic Power (%) 1.46 3.90 6.00 0.85 1.47 1.58
Area (%) 14.92 18.12 22.15 8.30 8.70 9.70
Wiring (%) 5.1 6.5 11.8 3.4 5.2 3.9
Delay (%) 0 0 0 0 0 0
tions on the placed and routed processor using a custom gate-level simulator
to efficiently traverse the control flow graph of an application and capture
input-independent activity profiles (Section 5.4.1). We show results for all
benchmarks from [64] and all EEMBC benchmarks that fit in the program
memory of the processor. These benchmarks are chosen to be representative
of emerging ultra-low-power application domains such as wearables, Internet
of Things (IoT), and sensor networks [64]. Power domains are specified us-
ing the Unified Power Format (UPF) [124], and isolation gates and retention
cells are inserted using Synopsys Power Compiler [125] to create a processor
implementations that fully support and account for all overheads of power
gating. Power analysis is performed using Synopsys Primetime-PX [126].
Experiments were performed on a server housing two Intel Xeon E-2640 pro-
cessors (eight cores each, 2GHz operating frequency, 64GB RAM).
5.5.4 Power Gating Implementation Overheads
Table 5.4 quantifies the overheads of implementing power gating with module-
oblivious and module-based domains. Implementation overheads result from
insertion of isolation and retention cells. Module-oblivious domains use more
isolation cells than module-based domains and thus have higher overhead in
terms of power (static and dynamic) and area. Also, module-oblivious do-
mains increase wire length (e.g., for domain control logic), since cells in the
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same domain may be spread out more across a chip. Despite having higher
overhead, module-oblivious domains afford significantly higher power and
energy reductions than module-based domains (Section 5.6). Furthermore,
area and wiring overheads did not result in any change in cycle time, as the
place and route tool was able to optimize the design for the same timing
target. This is not surprising, considering that embedded processors are op-
timized for low power rather than high performance. Note that area and
wiring overheads for module-oblivious domains can be reduced with domain-
aware placement and routing optimizations that group cells that belong to
the same domain [127]. Such optimizations are beyond the scope of current
work.
5.6 Results
In this section, we evaluate and analyze the power benefits of module-oblivious
power gating compared to aggressive module-based power gating. Note that
results for module-based power gating are optimistic, since we allow even
software-invisible modules to be power gated. We also do not account for
any overhead for hardware-based monitoring logic for module-based power
gating. Figure 5.9 compares the leakage energy savings provided by different
power gating techniques. The stacked bars in the figure correspond to three
different scenarios. The overall height of a stack shows the potential benefits
of the technique when no implementation or instrumentation overheads are
considered, i.e., the maximum potential benefits. The next level in a stacked
bar shows benefits after static and dynamic overheads of domain isolation and
state retention are accounted for, and the lowest level in a stack shows ben-
efits when accounting for isolation, retention, and software instrumentation
overheads. Note that we use the industry-standard UPF format to accu-
rately account for the implementation overheads of power gating. Note also
that for our instrumentation overheads, we have conservatively assumed the
software approach with the highest overhead – binary instrumentation with
dedicated power gating instructions (Section 5.4.4) – and have accounted for
both static and dynamic energy overheads.
Module-Oblivious vs. Module-Based Domains:
Figure 5.9 shows that power gating module-oblivious domains can provide
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Figure 5.9: Comparison of leakage energy savings provided by different
domain management and formation techniques for different numbers of
power domains. Results in each stack (from top to bottom) correspond to
maximum potential benefits of the technique, benefits after accounting for
isolation and retention overheads, and benefits after accounting for
isolation, retention, and instrumentation overheads.
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Figure 5.10: These “cool” maps compare the potential for power gating
between module-based and module-oblivious domains. Cooler colors
represent that the logic in a domain is idle together and has more potential
to be power gated.
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Figure 5.11: Most of the energy savings provided by module-oblivious
domains are contributed by only a small number of mostly-idle domains.
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significant benefits over conventional module-based domains. On average,
power gating on module-oblivious domains provides 1.4× more leakage sav-
ings than the maximum savings that can be achieved with module-based do-
mains (Oracle (Module-based)) and 2× more savings than hardware-based
management of module-based domains.5 Figure 5.10 provides a visualization
that explains why module-oblivious domains provide more opportunities for
power gating than module-based domains. The figure is a type of correlation
matrix that shows the power gating correlation between different sub-module
pairs (sub-module1, sub-module2) in the processor,
6 where power gating cor-
relation is defined as the fraction of cycles that the two sub-modules, sub-
module1 and sub-module2, are both idle at the same time. We have defined
the color scale such that cooler colors mean that the sub-modules are more
frequently idle at the same time and therefore can be power gated together.
Figure 5.10a shows the power gating correlation for module-based domains,
and Figure 5.10b is for module-oblivious domains. The different sub-modules
in the two matrices are arranged such that sub-modules belonging to the
same domain form adjacent rows and columns. The dashed boxes along
the main diagonal encircle all the power gating correlation scores for pairs
of sub-modules that belong to the same power domain (Figure 5.4 shows
the composition of each module-oblivious domain, and Figure 5.8 shows the
composition of each module-based domain).
Module-based domains do not account for the fact that different parts of
the same microarchitectural modules may have uncorrelated activity profiles;
as a result, they provide fewer opportunities for power gating. A single sub-
module (even a single gate!) with high activity or uncorrelated idle times
can sabotage power gating opportunities for an entire domain. For exam-
ple, even though large portions of the domains in Figure 5.10a are “cool”,
the small number of “hot” cells in each domain prevent many power gat-
ing opportunities for the domains. Figure 5.10a shows that in many cases,
moving a small number of gates to a different domain could provide more
opportunities for power gating larger areas of logic for longer periods of time.
This explains the significant improvement in benefits seen in Figure 5.9 for
5Note that these results correspond to full-fledged UPF implementations of power gat-
ing that account for all implementation overheads.
6Each sub-module corresponds to one of the module partitions represented as pie sec-
tions in Figure 5.4.
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module-oblivious power gating over module-based power gating. By forming
domains that contain logic from different modules with similar activity pro-
files, module-oblivious domains do not allow more active logic to ruin power
gating opportunities for less active logic in the same module.
Managing Module-Oblivious Domains:
While module-oblivious domains provide significant potential for power ben-
efits, they cannot be managed by conventional software- or hardware-based
management techniques (Section 5.3). Figure 5.9 compares the benefits of
the proposed software-hardware co-analysis technique for managing module-
oblivious domains, which we refer to hereafter as co-analysis, against oracular
management. Oracular management assumes perfect knowledge of inputs to
make optimal management decisions that exploit every possible cycle of prof-
itable power gating. Co-analysis, on the other hand, uses Xs for inputs to
guarantee that power gating decisions will be safe for all possible inputs, since
actual inputs are not known at compile time, when co-analysis is performed.
Also, since inputs can affect the control paths taken through a program, co-
analysis only decides to power gate at a specific point (static instruction) in
a program when a domain will not be activated by any possible control path
flowing through that point. This ensures safety under all scenarios, even
input-dependent data and control. In spite of this conservative approach,
results show that co-analysis is a very effective management technique for
module-oblivious domains, as its power benefits are within 8% of optimal
(oracle) management of module-oblivious domains.
Co-analysis can be used to generate domain management decisions for
any set of power domains, no matter how they are formed. We evalu-
ate co-analysis also for module-based domains and compare the benefits
achieved against those achieved by state-of-the-art hardware-based manage-
ment (Idle Count). Figure 5.9 shows that co-analysis can save (12%) more
energy than hardware-based domain management for module-based domains,
even though we assume no hardware overhead for implementing Idle Count.
In fact, the benefits of co-analysis are within 6% of optimal (oracle) for
module-based domains. Co-analysis has an advantage over hardware-based
domain management even for module-based domains, since co-analysis uses
application information to create a tailored power gating strategy for each
application, whereas a hardware-based technique necessarily uses the same
hard-wired power gating strategy for all applications. Since hardware-based
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management techniques must apply the same strategy to different applica-
tions or application phases that may have different patterns of activity and
idleness, they may miss opportunities when power gating is applied too con-
servatively or incur overheads when power gating is applied too aggressively.
For example, a domain managed by Idle Count necessarily spends a fraction
of a profitable idle period powered up, as it counts idle cycles before decid-
ing to power down. Also, if a power domain goes to sleep but is needed by
an application in fewer cycles than its wakeup latency, the energy penalty
for wakeup can cause negative energy savings. In short, the hardware con-
troller for Idle Count must guess the length of idle periods without knowing
whether they will be longer than the break-even point. Co-analysis, on the
other hand, makes application-aware annotation decisions that account for
the break-even point, so it can apply power gating aggressively without ever
causing negative energy savings. Finally, note that our implementation is
for 65nm technology (Section 5.5), where the leakage power is only 29% of
total power. The benefits of our technique are expected to increase for lower
(planar) technology nodes, where the problem of leakage power increases
significantly [82, 83].
Sensitivity Analysis:
We also compare the power gating techniques across different numbers of
power domains and different domain wakeup latencies. The sub-figures of
Figure 5.9 compare the leakage reduction benefits of different power gating
techniques for different numbers of domains. Since more domains imply in-
creased specialization of each domain and better adaptation to the activity
profile of an application, the potential benefits of power gating generally in-
crease as the number of domains increases.However, our analysis shows that
benefits vary by only a few percent for two, three, or four domains. The rea-
son for this behavior is that most of the benefits provided by power gating
come from powering down logic with long, correlated idle periods. As illus-
trated in Figure 5.10, module-oblivious domains enhance such power gating
opportunities by relocating logic that would sabotage power gating oppor-
tunities for a domain to a different domain with more correlated behavior.
This has the effect of collecting logic from different modules into one or more
domains that are almost always off. Since only two domains are needed to di-
vide logic into mostly off and mostly on domains, only two module-oblivious
domains are needed to achieve most of the benefits that they can provide.
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Table 5.5: Performance overhead (%) introduced by different power domain
management techniques.
Domains Wakeup IC 5 IC 10 IC 100 Co-analysis
2
1 2.43 2.26 0.23 3.90
3 4.86 4.52 0.47 3.62
10 13.38 12.40 1.31 3.40
3
1 3.19 2.35 0.23 6.37
3 6.39 4.71 0.47 4.67
10 17.59 12.96 1.31 3.78
4
1 9.18 2.35 0.23 6.59
3 18.36 4.71 0.47 4.87
10 50.49 12.96 1.31 3.95
Figure 5.11 illustrates this point by showing the percentage of energy savings
that each module-oblivious domain contributes to the total. For two, three,
and four domains, only one of the domains contributes the majority (96%) of
savings (the coolest domain in Figure 5.10b). This motivates a design with
only two domains, since domain isolation and management costs are lower
for fewer domains. Module-based domains show similar behavior; however,
the presence of logic with uncorrelated activity within some modules limits
the length of idle periods and consequently the benefits that can be achieved
with module-based domains.
The different clusters of bars within each sub-figure of Figure 5.9 compare
the leakage reduction benefits of different power gating approaches for dif-
ferent wakeup latencies (1, 3, and 10 cycles).7As a result, potential benefits
decrease with longer wakeup latencies.
Shorter wakeup latencies allow power gating to be applied aggressively
for shorter idle periods, but this may increase instrumentation overhead due
to frequent powering down and up of domains. Our application-aware co-
analysis approach accounts for instrumentation overhead and wakeup latency
during binary annotation to ensure that a power domain is only powered
down when the net effect reduces energy. On average, the time between con-
7The domain wakeup latency of 1 cycle is the most realistic for our small embedded
processor [128, 101]. We also evaluated 100- and 1000-cycle wakeup latencies in our sen-
sitivity analysis; however, we omitted the results since they showed the same trend as
10-cycle results. Since, it is only profitable to power down a domain if it will be idle
for longer than the wakeup latency, wakeup latency has the effect of a low-pass filter on
domain power-down/up decisions during analysis. I.e., a given wakeup latency filters out
idle periods that are shorter than the wakeup latency.
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secutive power gating decisions is 98 cycles, while the minimum and max-
imum times between decisions are 5 and 8127 cycles, respectively, demon-
strating that correlated activity across gates in different modules often exists
at a coarse time granularity. Table 5.5 characterizes the performance impact
of instrumentation overhead for different numbers of domains and different
wakeup latencies, and compares against the performance overheads intro-
duced by hardware-based domain management (Idle Count). In the table,
we present the overhead of our most costly binary instrumentation technique
(inserting power gating instructions) under the column titled “Co-analysis”.
Since inserting power gating instructions increases runtime, the column rep-
resents both performance and energy overhead. Results show that co-analysis
has lower performance overhead than Idle Count for low idle count thresholds.
While Idle Count has slightly lower performance overhead than co-analysis
for a large idle count threshold (100), it loses 100 cycles of potential power
gating opportunity for each idle period. In any case, the leakage savings
of co-analysis significantly outweigh those of Idle Count (Figure 5.9), since
the hardware-based technique cannot be used to manage module-oblivious
domains without incurring prohibitively large implementation overheads.
5.7 Summary
In this chapter, we showed that module-oblivious power gating can provide
significantly more leakage savings than state-of-the-art aggressive module-
based power gating by allowing larger areas of a processor to be powered down
for longer periods of time. Since conventional software- and hardware-based
management techniques cannot be applied for module-oblivious power gating,
we presented a novel technique for low-cost management of module-oblivious
power domains in embedded processors, based on input-independent hardware-
software co-analysis. Our technique is automated, does not require program-
mer intervention, and incurs low management overhead. We demonstrated
that module-oblivious power gating based on our technique reduces leakage
energy by 2× with respect to state-of-the-art aggressive module-based power
gating for a common embedded processor. Our technique for management
of module-oblivious power domains achieves leakage energy savings that are
within 8% of those achieved by optimal oracular management. Finally, our
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technique for managing module-oblivious domains is effective even at man-
aging conventional module-based domains. It saves 12% more energy than
an idealized implementation of Idle Count – a hardware-based domain man-
agement technique for module-based domains. Our benefits are within 6%
of optimal for module-based domains.
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Chapter 6
Bespoke Processors for Applications with
Ultra-Low Area and Power Constraints
IoT applications not only require low power, but also require low cost—easy
development of new applications and low area to fit on new substrates. For
design and development cost reasons, these applications rely on ultra-low-
power general-purpose microcontrollers and microprocessors, making such
processors the most abundant type produced and used today. While general-
purpose processors have several advantages, such as amortized development
cost across many applications, they are significantly over-provisioned for
many area- and power-constrained systems, which tend to run only one or
a small number of applications over their lifetime. In this chapter, we make
a case for bespoke processor design, an automated approach that tailors a
general-purpose processor IP to a target application by removing all gates
from the design that can never be used by the application. Since removed
gates are never used by an application, bespoke processors can achieve signif-
icantly lower area and power than their general-purpose counterparts with-
out any performance degradation. Also, gate removal can expose additional
timing slack that can be exploited to increase area and power savings or per-
formance of a bespoke design. Bespoke processor design reduces area and
power by 62% and 50%, on average, while exploiting exposed timing slack
improves average power savings to 65%.
6.1 Introduction
A large class of emerging applications is characterized by severe area and
power constraints. For example, wearables [66, 70] and implantables [129,
130] are extremely area- and power-constrained. Several IoT applications,
such as stick-on electronic labels [131], RFIDs [132], and sensors [67, 81], are
also extremely area- and power-constrained. Area constraints are expected
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to be severe also for printed plastic [133] and organic [134] applications.
Cost concerns drive many of the above applications to use general-purpose
microprocessors and microcontrollers instead of much more area- and power-
efficient ASICs, since, among other benefits, development cost of micropro-
cessor IP cores can be amortized by the IP core licensor over a large number
of chip makers and licensees. In fact, ultra-low-area- and power-constrained
microprocessors and microcontrollers powering these applications are already
the most widely used type of processing hardware in terms of production and
usage [2, 3, 4], in spite of their well-known inefficiency compared to ASIC
and FPGA-based solutions [135]. Given this mismatch between the extreme
area and power constraints of emerging applications and the relative inef-
ficiency of general-purpose microprocessors and microcontrollers compared
to their ASIC counterparts, there exists a considerable opportunity to make
microprocessor-based solutions for these applications much more area- and
power-efficient.
One big source of area inefficiency in a microprocessor is that a general-
purpose microprocessor is designed to target an arbitrary application and
thus contains many more gates than what a specific application needs (Sec-
tion 6.2). Also, these unused gates continue to consume power, resulting in
significant power inefficiency. While adaptive power management techniques
(e.g., power gating [136, 102]) help to reduce power consumed by unused
gates, the effectiveness of such techniques is limited due to the coarse gran-
ularity at which they must be applied, as well as significant implementation
overheads such as domain isolation and state retention (Section 6.6). These
techniques also worsen area inefficiency.
One approach to significantly increase the area and power efficiency of a
microprocessor for a given application is to eliminate all logic in the micro-
processor IP core that will not be used by the application. Eliminating logic
that is guaranteed to not be used by an application can produce a design tai-
lored to the application – a bespoke processor – that has significantly lower
area and power than the original microprocessor IP that targets an arbitrary
application. As long as the approach to create a bespoke processor is au-
tomated, the resulting design retains the cost benefits of a microprocessor
IP, since no additional hardware or software needs to be developed. Also,
since no logic used by the application is eliminated, area and power benefits
come at no performance cost. The resulting bespoke processor does not re-
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Figure 6.1: General purpose processors are overdesigned for a specific
application (top). A bespoke processor design methodology allows a
microprocessor IP licensor or licensee to target different applications
efficiently without additional software or hardware development cost
(bottom).
quire programmer intervention or hardware support either, since the software
application can still run, unmodified, on the bespoke processor.
In this chapter, we present a methodology to automatically generate a
bespoke processor for an application out of a general-purpose processor /
microcontroller IP core. Our methodology relies on gate-level symbolic sim-
ulation to identify gates in the microprocessor IP that cannot be toggled
by the application, irrespective of the application inputs, and automatically
eliminates them from the design to produce a significantly smaller and lower
power design with the same performance. In many cases, reduction in the
number of gates also introduces timing slack that can be exploited to im-
prove performance or further reduce power and area. Since the original de-
sign is pruned at the granularity of gates, the resulting methodology is much
more effective than any approach that relies on coarse-grained application-
specific customization. The proposed methodology can be used either by IP
licensors or IP licensees to produce bespoke designs for the application of
interest (Figure 6.1). Simple extensions to our methodology can be used to
generate bespoke processors that can support multiple applications or differ-
ent degrees of in-field software programmability, debuggability, and updates
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(Section 6.3.5).
This chapter makes the following contributions:
• We propose bespoke processors – a novel approach to reducing area and
power by tailoring a processor to an application, such that a processor con-
sists of only those gates that the application needs for any possible execution
with any possible inputs. A bespoke processor still runs the unmodified
application binary without any performance degradation.
• We present an automated methodology for generating bespoke processors.
Our symbolic gate-level simulation-based methodology takes the original mi-
croprocessor IP and application binary as input to produce a design that is
functionally equivalent to the original processor from the perspective of the
target application while consisting of the minimum number of gates needed
for execution.
•We quantify the area and power benefits of bespoke processors for a suite of
sensor and embedded benchmarks. Area reductions are up to 92% (46% min-
imum, 62% on average) and power reductions are up to 74% (37% minimum,
50% on average) compared to a general-purpose microprocessor. When tim-
ing slack resulting from gate removal is exploited, power reductions increase
to up to 91% (50% minimum, 65% on average).
• Finally, we present and analyze design approaches that can be used to
support bespoke processors throughout the product life-cycle. These design
approaches include procedures for verifying bespoke processors, techniques
to design bespoke processors that support multiple known applications, and
strategies to allow in-field updates in bespoke processors.
6.2 Motivation
Area- and power-constrained microprocessors and microcontrollers are the
most abundant type of processor produced and used today, with projected
deployment growing exponentially in the near future [2, 3, 4, 137]. This
explosive growth is fueled by emerging area- and power-constrained appli-
cations, such as the internet-of-things (IoT), wearables, implantables, and
sensor networks. The microprocessors and microcontrollers used in these ap-
plications are designed to include a wide variety of functionalities in order to
support a large number of diverse applications with different requirements.
125
bi
nS
ea
rc
h di
v
in
So
rt
in
tA
VG
in
tF
ilt
m
ul
t
rle
tH
ol
d
te
a8 FF
T
Vi
te
rb
i
co
nv
En
au
to
co
rr irq db
g
20
30
40
50
60
Un
us
ed
 g
at
es
 (%
)
Figure 6.2: A significant fraction of gates in an openMSP430 processor are
not toggled when an application executes on the processor. Each bar
represents gates not toggled by any input for an application; the interval
shows the range of unexercised gates for different inputs.
On the other hand, the embedded systems designed for these applications
typically consist of one application or a small number of applications, run-
ning over and over on a general-purpose processor for the lifetime of the
system [138]. Given that a particular application may only use a small sub-
set of the functionalities provided by a general-purpose processor, there may
be a considerable amount of logic in a general-purpose processor that is not
used by an application. Figure 6.2 illustrates this point, showing the frac-
tion of gates in an openMSP430 [63] processor that are not toggled when a
variety of applications (Table 6.1) are executed on the processor with many
different input sets. The bar in the figure shows the intersection of all gates
that were not exercised (toggled) by the application for any input, and the
interval shows the range in fraction of unexercised gates across different in-
puts. For each application, a significant fraction (around 30% - 60%) of the
processor’s gates were not toggled during any execution of the application.
These results indicate that there may be an opportunity to reduce area and
power significantly in area- and power-constrained systems by removing logic
from the processor that cannot be exercised by the application(s) running on
the processor, if it can be guaranteed that removed logic will never be needed
for any possible execution of the application(s).
However, identifying all the logic that is guaranteed to never be used by
an application is not straightforward. One possible approach is profiling,
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wherein an application is executed for many inputs and the set of gates that
were never exercised is recorded, as in Figure 6.2. However, profiling cannot
guarantee that the set of gates used by an application will not be different for
a different input set. Indeed, profiling results in Figure 6.2 show considerable
variations in exercised gates (up to 13%) for different executions of the same
application with different inputs. Thus, an application might require different
gates and execute incorrectly for an unprofiled input.
Static application analysis represents another approach for determining
unusable logic for an application. However, application analysis may not
identify the maximum amount of logic that can be removed, since unused
logic does not correspond only to software-visible architectural functional-
ities (e.g., arithmetic units), but also to fine-grained and software-invisible
microarchitectural functionalities (e.g., pipeline registers). For example, con-
sider two different applications – FFT and binSearch. Figure 6.3 shows the
gates in the processor that were not exercised during any profiling execution
of the applications. Since the applications use different subsets of the func-
tionalities provided by the processor, the parts of the processor that they do
not exercise are different. However, a closer look reveals that while some of
the differences correspond to coarse-grained software-visible functionalities
(e.g., the multiplier is used by FFT but not by binSearch), other differences
are fine-grained, software-invisible, and cannot be determined through appli-
cation analysis (e.g., different gate-level activity profiles in modules like the
processor frontend). As another example, Figure 6.4 shows the breakdown
of instructions used by intFilt and scrambled-intFilt. The two applica-
tions use exactly the same instructions (scrambled-intFilt is a synthetic
benchmark generated by scrambling instructions in intFilt); however, the
die graphs in Figure 6.4 show that the sets of unexercised gates for the
applications are different. This is due to the fact that even the sequence of
instructions executed by an application can influence which logic the applica-
tion can exercise in a processor depending on the microarchitectural details.
Such interactions cannot be determined simply through application analysis.
Given that the fraction of logic in a processor that is not used by a given
application can be substantial, and many area- and power-constrained sys-
tems only execute one or few applications for their entire lifetime, it may be
possible to significantly reduce area and power in such systems by removing
logic from the processor that cannot be used by the application(s). How-
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Figure 6.3: Gates not toggled by two applications – (a) FFT and (b)
binSearch – for profiling inputs. Gray gates are not toggled by either
application. Red gates are unique untoggled gates for each application.
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Figure 6.4: Gates not toggled by (a) intFilt and (b) scrambled intFilt
for the same input set. Gray gates are not toggled by either application.
Red gates are unique untoggled gates for each application. Even though the
applications use the same set of instructions and control flow, the gates
that they exercise are different.
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ever, since different applications can exercise substantially different parts
of a processor, and simply profiling or statically analyzing an application
cannot guarantee which parts of the processor can and cannot be used by
an application, tailoring a processor to an application requires a technique
that can identify all the logic in a processor that is guaranteed to never be
used by the application and remove unusable logic in a way that leaves the
functionality of the processor unchanged for the application. In the next
section, we describe a methodology that meets these requirements. We call
general-purpose processors that have been tailored to an individual applica-
tion bespoke processors, reminiscent of bespoke clothing, in which a generic
clothing item is tailored for an individual person.
6.3 Tailoring a Bespoke Processor
A bespoke processor, tailored to a target application, must be functionally
equivalent to the original processor when executing the application. As such,
the bespoke implementation of a processor design should retain all the gates
from the original processor design that might be needed to execute the appli-
cation. Any gate that could be toggled by the application and propagate its
toggle to a state element or output port performs a necessary function and
must be retained to maintain functional equivalence. Conversely, any gate
that can never be toggled by the application can safely be removed, as long as
each fanout location for the gate is fed with the gate’s constant output value
for the application. Removing constant (untoggled) gates for an application
could result in significant area and power savings and, unlike conventional
energy saving techniques, will introduce no performance degradation (indeed,
no change at all in application behavior).
Figure 6.5 shows our process for tailoring a bespoke processor to a tar-
get application. The first step – input-independent gate activity analysis –
performs a type of symbolic simulation, where unknown input values are
represented as Xs, and gate-level activity of the processor is characterized
for all possible executions of the application, for any possible inputs to the
application. The second phase of our bespoke processor design technique
– gate cutting and stitching – uses gate-level activity information gathered
during gate activity analysis to prune away unnecessary gates and reconnect
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Figure 6.5: Our technique performs input-independent gate activity
analysis to determine which gates of a processor cannot be toggled in any
execution of the application. These gates are then cut from the design to
form a custom, bespoke processor with reduced area and power.
the cut connections between gates to maintain functional equivalence to the
original design for the target application.
6.3.1 Input-Independent Gate Activity Analysis
The set of gates that an application toggles during execution can vary de-
pending on application inputs. This is because inputs can change the control
flow of execution through the code as well as the data paths exercised by the
instructions. Since exhaustive profiling for all possible inputs is infeasible,
and limited profiling may not identify all exercisable gates in a processor, we
the symbolic simulation-based co-analysis technique described in Chapter 4.
This analysis is able to characterize the gate-level activity of a processor ex-
ecuting an application for all possible inputs with a single gate-level simula-
tion. During this simulation, inputs are represented as unknown logic values
(Xs), which are treated as both 1s and 0s when recording possible toggled
gates. After each cycle is simulated, the toggled gates are removed from the
list of unexercisable gates. Gates where an X propagated are considered as
toggled, since some input assignment could cause the gates to toggle. The
result of input-independent gate activity analysis for an application is a list
of all gates that cannot be toggled in any execution of the application, along
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Figure 6.6: Tool flow for cutting and stitching.
with their constant values. Since the logic functions performed by these gates
are not necessary for the correct execution of the binary for any input, they
may safely be cut from the netlist, as long as their constant output values
are preserved. The following section describes how unusable gates can be
cut from the processor without affecting the functionality of the processor
for the target application.
6.3.2 Cutting and Stitching
Once gates that the target application cannot toggle have been identified,
they are cut from the processor netlist for the bespoke design. After cutting
out a gate, the netlist must be stitched back together to generate the final
netlist and laid-out design for the bespoke processor. Figure 6.6 shows our
method for cutting and stitching a bespoke processor. First, each gate on
the list of unusable (untoggled) gates is removed from the gate-level netlist.
After removing a gate, all fanout locations that were connected to the output
net of the removed gate are tied to a static voltage (‘1’ or ‘0’) corresponding
to the constant output value of the gate observed during simulation. Since
the logical structure of the netlist has changed, the netlist is re-synthesized
after cutting all unusable gates to allow additional optimizations that reduce
area and power. Since some gates have constant inputs after cutting and
stitching, they can be replaced by simpler gates. Also, toggled gates left with
floating outputs after cutting can be removed, since their outputs can never
propagate to a state element or output port. Since cutting can reduce the
depth of logic paths, some paths may have extra timing slack after cutting,
allowing faster, higher power cells to be replaced with smaller, lower power
versions of the cells. Finally, the re-synthesized netlist is placed and routed
to produce the bespoke processor layout, as well as a final gate-level netlist
with necessary buffers, etc. introduced to meet timing constraints.
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Figure 6.7: An example of gate activity analysis and cutting and stitching.
6.3.3 Illustrative Example
This section illustrates how bespoke processor design tailors a processor de-
sign to a particular application, as described in Sections 6.3.1 and 6.3.2.
Figure 6.7 illustrates the bespoke design process. The left part of Figure 6.7
shows input-independent gate activity analysis for a simple example circuit
(top right). During symbolic simulation of the target application, logical 1s,
0s, and unknown symbols (Xs) are propagated throughout the netlist. In
cycle 0, A and B have known values that are propagated through gates a and
b, driving tmp0 and tmp1 to ‘0’. The controlling value at gate c drives tmp2
to ‘1’, despite input C being an unknown value (X). Inputs A and B are
not changed by the simulation of the binary until after cycle 2, when an X
was propagated to the PC (not shown) that requires two different execution
paths to be explored. In the left path, input B becomes X in cycle 3, causing
tmp1 to become X as well. However, since input C is a ‘0’, tmp2 is still a ‘1’.
In the right execution path, inputs A and B both have Xs and logic values
that may toggle tmp1 in cycles 5-7, but for each of these cycles, input C is
a ‘0’, keeping tmp2 constant at ‘1’. Since tmp2 is never toggled during any
of the possible executions of the application, gate c is marked for cutting,
and its constant output value (‘1’) is stored for stitching. Although gate d
is never toggled in cycles 0-2 or down the left execution path, it does toggle
in the right execution path and thus cannot be marked for cutting. Gates a
and b also toggle and thus are not marked for cutting.
Once gate activity analysis has generated a list of cuttable gates and their
constant values, cutting and stitching begins. Since gate c was marked for
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cutting, it is removed from the netlist, leaving the input to its fanout (d)
unconnected. During stitching, d’s floating input is connected to c’s known
constant output value for the application (‘1’). After stitching, the gate-
level netlist is re-synthesized. Synthesis removes gates that are not driving
any other gates (gates a and b), even though they toggled during symbolic
simulation, since their work does not affect the state or output function of
the processor for the application. Synthesis also performs optimizations, such
as constant propagation, which replaces gate d with an inverter, since the
constant controlling input of ‘1’ to the XOR gate makes it function as an
inverter. Finally, place and route produces a fully laid-out bespoke design.
6.3.4 Correctness
In this section, we show that the transformations we perform to create a be-
spoke processor implementation produce a design that is functionally equiv-
alent to the original processor design for the target application. I.e., the
bespoke design implements the same function and produces the same output
as the original design for all possible executions of the application.
Theorem : A bespoke processor implementation BA of processor P tai-
lored to an application A is functionally equivalent to processor P with re-
spect to application A; BA produces the same output as P for any possible
execution of A.
Proof : The first step in creating BA – input-independent gate activity
analysis (Section 6.3.1) – identifies the subset E of all gates in the processor
that can possibly be exercised by A, for all possible inputs. The analysis
also identifies the constant output values for all gates U that can never be
exercised by A. It follows that E ∩ U = ∅ and E ∪ U = G, where G is the
set of all gates in P . Cutting and stitching (Section 6.3.2) removes all gates
in the set U and ties their output nets to their known constant values, such
that the functionality of all gates in U is maintained in BA. All gates in E
remain in the bespoke design, so all gates in E have the same functionality
and produce the same outputs in BA and P . Since E ∪U = G, it follows that
BA is functionally equivalent to P for A and produces the same output as P
for all possible inputs to A. 
We also verified correctness through input-independent gate activity anal-
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ysis and input-based simulations on both the original and bespoke processor
for every application (Section 6.5.1), confirming that outputs of both proces-
sors were the same in each case.1
6.3.5 Supporting Multiple Applications
While bespoke processor design involves tailoring a general-purpose proces-
sor into an application-specific processor implementation, bespoke proces-
sors, which are descended from general-purpose processors, still retain some
programmability. In this section, we describe several approaches for creating
bespoke processors that support multiple applications.
The first and most straightforward case is when the multiple target ap-
plications are known a priori at design time. For example, a licensor or
licensee (see Figure 6.1) that wants to amortize the expense of designing and
manufacturing a chip may choose to tailor a bespoke processor to support
multiple applications. In this case, the bespoke processor design methodol-
ogy (Figure 6.5) is simply expanded to support multiple target applications,
as shown in Figure 6.8. Given a known set of binaries that need to be sup-
ported, gate activity analysis is performed for each application, and cutting
and stitching is performed for the intersection of unused gates for the appli-
cations. The intersection of unused gates represents all the gates that are
not used by any of the target applications. The resulting bespoke processor
contains all the gates necessary to run any of the target applications. While
there may be some area and power cost compared to a bespoke design for a
single application due to having more gates, Section 6.5 shows that a bespoke
processor supporting multiple applications still affords significant area and
power benefits.
There may also be cases where it is desirable for a bespoke processor to
support an application that is not known at design time. For example, one
advantage of using a programmable processor is the ability to update the
target application in the field to roll out a new software version or to fix a
software bug. Tailoring a bespoke processor to a specific application invari-
1Industrial equivalence checking tools (e.g., Formality [139]) check static equivalence
(i.e., their analysis is application-independent); however, the bespoke and original designs
are only equivalent for the target application, not in general. Therefore, we rely on gate-
level analysis and input-based simulations for verification.
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Figure 6.8: To support multiple programs, our bespoke design technique
performs input-independent gate activity analysis on each program.
Cutting and stitching is performed using the intersection of the untoggled
gates lists from all supported programs.
ably reduces its ability to support in-field updates. However, even in the
case when an application was unknown at design time, it may be possible
for a bespoke processor to support the application. For instance, it is always
possible to check whether a new software version can be supported by a be-
spoke processor by checking whether the gates required by the new software
version are a subset of the gates in the bespoke processor. It may be possible
to increase coverage for in-field updates by anticipating them and explicitly
designing the processor to support them. As an example, this may be used
to support common bug fixes by automatically creating mutants of the origi-
nal software by injecting common bugs [140], then creating a bespoke design
that supports all the mutant versions of the program. This approach may
increase the probability that a debugged version of the software is supported
by the bespoke design.
Sometimes an in-field update represents a significant change that is beyond
the scope of a simple code mutation. To support such updates, a bespoke pro-
cessor may need to provide support for a small number of ISA features that
can be used to implement arbitrary computations - e.g., a Turing-complete
instruction (or set of instructions), in addition to the target application(s).
Consider adding support for subneg, an example Turing-complete instruc-
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PC Instruction
0 sub &a &b
1 XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX
2 XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX
3 jn X XXXX X010
4 sub &a &b
5 xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
6 xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
7 jn x xxxx x010
Functionality
Mem[b] = Mem[b] - Mem[a];
if (Mem[b] < 0) goto c
a
b
c
Implementation
Figure 6.9: Functionality and MSP430 implementation of Turing-complete
subneg pseudo-instruction.
tion [141]. Figure 6.9 shows the functionality and code implementation of a
subneg pseudo-instruction created for MSP430. Since the memory operand
addresses and the branch target are assumed to be unknown values (Xs), a
binary that characterizes the behavior of subneg can be co-analyzed with the
target application binary to tailor a Turing-complete bespoke processor that
supports the target application natively and can handle arbitrary updates,
possibly with some area, power, and performance overhead.
6.4 Methodology
6.4.1 Simulation Infrastructure and Benchmarks
We verify our technique on a silicon-proven processor – openMSP430 [63],
an open-source version of one of the most popular ULP processors [121, 94].
The processor is synthesized, placed, and routed in TSMC 65GP technology
(65nm) for an operating point of 1V and 100 MHz using Synopsys Design
Compiler [122] and Cadence EDI System [123]. Gate-level simulations are
performed by running full benchmark applications on the placed and routed
processor using a custom gate-level simulator that efficiently traverses the
control flow graph of an application and captures input-independent activ-
ity profiles (Section 6.3.1). Table 6.1 lists our benchmark applications. We
show results for all benchmarks from [64] and all EEMBC benchmarks [65]
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Table 6.1: Benchmarks
Benchmark Description
Max
Execution
Length
(cycles)
E
m
b
ed
d
ed
S
en
so
rs
binSearch Binary search 2037
div Unsigned integer division 402
inSort In-place insertion sort 4781
intAVG Signed integer average 14512
intFilt 4-tap signed FIR filter 113791
mult Unsigned multiplication 210
rle Run-length encoder 8283
tHold Digital threshold detector 18511
tea8 TEA encryption algorithm 2228
E
E
M
B
C FFT Fast Fourier transform 406006
Viterbi Viterbi decoder 1167298
convEn Convolutional encoder 117789
autocorr Autocorrelation 8092
U
n
it irq Interrupt test 210
dbg Debug interface 14166
that fit in the program memory of the processor. We also added unit test
benchmarks [63] corresponding to some functionalities in the processor that
were not exercised by the other benchmarks. In addition to evaluating a
bare-metal environment common in area- and power-constrained embedded
systems [73, 74, 75, 76], we also evaluate bespoke processors that support
our applications running on the processor with an operating system (FreeR-
TOS [77]). Benchmarks are chosen to be representative of emerging ultra-
low-power application domains such as wearables, internet of things, and
sensor networks [64]. Also, benchmarks were selected to represent a range of
complexity in terms of control flow and execution length. Power analysis is
performed using Synopsys Primetime [126]. Experiments were performed on
a server housing two Intel Xeon E-2640 processors (eight cores each, 2GHz
operating frequency, 64GB RAM).
6.4.2 Baselines
For evaluations, we compare bespoke designs against two baseline processors.
The first baseline is the openMSP430 processor, optimized to minimize area
and power for operation at 100 MHz and 1V. For the second baseline, we
create aggressively optimized application-specific versions of openMSP430 for
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Figure 6.10: The height of a bar represents the fraction of gates that can be
toggled by a benchmark. Components within each bar represent each
module’s contribution to the fraction of gates toggled by the benchmark.
each benchmark application by rewriting the RTL to remove modules that
are unused by the benchmark, before performing synthesis, placement, and
routing. Such an approach is representative of an Xtensa-like approach [142],
where the processor configuration is customized for a particular application.
Note, however, that our baseline is significantly more aggressive than an
Xtensa-like approach, since it requires our input-independent gate activity
analysis technique (Section 6.3.1) to identify the modules that cannot be used
by an application. Such module identification may not be possible through
static analysis of application code alone.
6.5 Results
In this section, we evaluate bespoke processors. We first consider area and
power benefits of tailoring a processor to an application, then evaluate de-
sign approaches that can be used to support bespoke processors throughout
the product life-cycle, including procedures for verifying bespoke processors,
techniques to design bespoke processors that support multiple known appli-
cations, and strategies to allow in-field updates in bespoke processors.
Figure 6.10 shows the fraction of gates in the original processor design
that could be toggled by each benchmark.2 The components within each
bar represent each module’s contribution to the fraction of gates that can
be toggled by the benchmark. The first bar in the figure shows each mod-
ule’s contribution to the total gates in the baseline design. We observe that
each benchmark can toggle only a relatively small fraction of the gates in
2Unlike Figure 6.2, which presents results from profiling, Figure 6.10 shows results from
input-independent gate analysis.
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Figure 6.11: Reduction (%) in gate count, area, and power for a bespoke
design, compared to the baseline processor.
the baseline design. At most, 57% of the gates in the baseline design can be
toggled, and 11 benchmarks toggle less than half the gates. Even though a
large fraction of the gates of the baseline processor cannot be toggled by each
benchmark, each benchmark can toggle a different set of gates. For example,
autocorr1, which uses the largest fraction of the gates in the baseline pro-
cessor, does not exercise the clock module, while tHold, which toggles the
smallest fraction of the baseline gates, does exercise gates in the clock mod-
ule.
Some modules, such as the multiplier, are used by some benchmarks and
not others. However, module usage differs by application. For example,
intFilt can never toggle about half of the multiplier gates due to constraints
the binary places on filter coefficients, whereas mult toggles almost all the
gates in the multiplier. Other modules, such as the frontend, are toggled by
all applications, but each application can toggle a different subset of frontend
gates. While these results show that a bespoke processor can have a signifi-
cantly lower gate count than the general-purpose processor it is derived from,
they also confirm that hardware-software co-analysis is necessary to identify
all the gates that can be eliminated in a bespoke design. Elimination of
gates based on techniques such as profiling or static analysis will either fail
to guarantee correctness or will miss opportunities to eliminate gates that an
application can never use.
Bespoke processors have fewer gates, lower area, and lower power than
their general-purpose counterparts. Figure 6.11 shows the reduction in gates,
area, and power afforded by bespoke processors tailored to each benchmark.
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Figure 6.12: Reduction (%) in gate count, area, and power for bespoke
designs, compared to application-specific coarse-grained module-level
bespoke design.
FFT, which has the smallest gate count reduction (44%),3 still reduces area
by 47% and power by 37%, relative to the baseline design. Area savings are
up to 92% (dbg), while power savings are up to 74% (dbg).
Figure 6.10 shows that some modules could be wholly removed for spe-
cific benchmarks (e.g., the multiplier can be removed for binSearch, since
it cannot use any gates in the multiplier). For such modules, it is possible
to use an Xtensa-like approach [142], enabled by our input-independent gate
activity analysis, where modules in which no gates are usable by an applica-
tion are removed from the design. Figure 6.12 shows the benefits of bespoke
processors relative to coarse-grained bespoke designs in which wholly unus-
able modules have been removed from the processor. Note that compared
to an Xtensa-like approach, a coarse-grained bespoke design does not need
any knowledge of the microarchitecture, as the unusable gates are identified
automatically by hardware-software co-analysis. The results show that the
fine-grained gate-level bespoke design can provide up to 75% power reduction
(22% minimum, 35% on average) over coarse-grained module-level bespoke
design.
Additional power savings may be possible when cutting, stitching, and
re-synthesis removes gates from critical paths, exposing additional timing
slack that can be exploited for energy savings. Table 6.2 shows timing slack
3Note that gate count reduction reported in Figure 6.11 is different than fraction of
toggled gates in Figure 6.10, since bespoke design also removes some toggled gates that
cannot propagate their toggles to state elements or output ports.
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Table 6.2: Benefits of exploiting timing slack created by cutting, stitching,
and re-synthesis.
Benchmark
Tim-
ing
Slack
(%)
Vmin
(V)
Addl.
Power
Savings
from
Slack
(%)
To-
tal
Power
Sav-
ings
(%)
binSearch 24.30 0.81 36.86 72.1
div 24.51 0.82 34.53 69.9
inSort 22.24 0.83 33.25 67.6
intAVG 23.37 0.83 33.35 67.7
intFilt 23.23 0.84 31.31 58.5
mult 20.45 0.91 20.33 59.3
rle 22.10 0.83 33.31 66.8
tHold 24.07 0.81 36.90 73.5
tea8 23.55 0.83 33.23 65.7
FFT 21.74 0.90 20.13 50.0
Viterbi 23.48 0.83 33.18 64.9
convEn 23.96 0.83 33.03 63.9
autocorr1 18.48 0.91 18.31 50.3
irq 17.91 0.92 16.24 57.7
dbg 45.70 0.60 67.73 91.5
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exposed during bespoke processor tailoring for each benchmark. Exposed
timing slack can be used to reduce the operating voltage of the processor
without reducing the frequency.4 Table 6.2 also shows the minimum safe
operating voltage for each bespoke design (assuming worst-case PVT vari-
ations), the additional power savings afforded by exploiting timing slack in
bespoke designs, and the total power savings achieved with respect to the
baseline design from eliminating unusable logic and exploiting exposed timing
slack for voltage reduction.
6.5.1 Verification
We followed a two-pronged approach to verify our bespoke processor designs.
First, we performed input-independent gate activity analysis on the bespoke
processor design and compared the processor state between the original and
bespoke processors in each cycle. At the end of activity analysis, we compared
the contents of the data memory with that of the original design to ensure
that both designs produced the same outputs. There were no discrepancies
for any of the bespoke processors, indicating that the bespoke processors
traverse the same states as the original processor and produce the same
outputs for each benchmark. While this verification efficiently5 checks for
functional correctness considering all possible inputs, it does not explicitly
guarantee that the data memory contents of a bespoke processor are correct
for any specific inputs. For an explicit proof of the correctness of bespoke
processors, see Section 6.3.4.
The second method we used to verify bespoke processors involves per-
forming input-based simulations on the original and bespoke processors to
confirm that they produce the same outputs. Outputs produced during sim-
ulation are recorded, and the outputs and data memory from the original
and bespoke processors are compared for equivalence. Since it is infeasible
to simulate the application with all possible inputs, we used KLEE LLVM
Execution Engine (KLEE) [143] to generate inputs that exercise as many
control paths through the application as possible. Table 6.3 lists the number
of inputs simulated for each benchmark and the corresponding coverage of
4Exposed timing slack could also be used to increase operating frequency (performance)
of a bespoke design. On average, frequency can be increased by 13% in the bespoke designs.
5Table 6.3 shows that the runtime of X-based simulations is within an order of magni-
tude of a single input-based simulation.
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Table 6.3: Verification runtime and coverage.
Benchmark
Sim. Time (s) Input-Based Coverage
X- per Num Line Br. Br. Gate
Based Input Paths % % Dir. % %
binSearch 23 3 83 100 100 93 87
div 7 22 1 100 - - 93
inSort 25 156 718 100 100 100 93
intAVG 116 79 1 100 100 100 82
intFilt 1365 625 1 100 100 100 28
mult 20 20 1 100 - - 64
rle 20 32 1 74 100 75 92
tHold 7 27 6239 100 100 100 88
tea8 21 32 1 100 100 100 93
FFT 10498 5669 1 100 100 100 47
Viterbi 433 3637 8 100 100 100 86
convEn 1401 168 1 100 100 100 89
autocorr 90 13 1 38 14 14 71
the code. For most benchmarks, all lines and branch directions are covered.
Where coverage is not 100%, the portion of the code that was not covered
was not executable. The table also reports the fraction of gates in the be-
spoke designs that were exercised during the input-based simulations. We
see that a majority of the gates (78%, on average) were toggled during the
simulations, indicating that the majority of gates in a bespoke design are
necessary.6 Table 6.3 also shows the aggregate runtime of the input-based
simulations, providing some quantification of verification effort.7
6.5.2 Supporting Multiple Programs
Bespoke processors are able to support multiple programs by including the
union of gates needed to support all of the programs. Figure 6.13 shows
gate count, power, and area for bespoke processors tailored to N programs,
normalized to the baseline processor. For each value of N , the bars show
the ranges of these metrics across bespoke processors tailored to all combi-
nations of N programs. For many combinations of programs, even for up
to ten programs, only 60% or less of the gates are needed. In fact, despite
6Note that gate coverage is not expected to be 100%, since KLEE aims to cover lines
of code and execution paths, not gates. In particular, benchmarks that use the multiplier
(intFilt, mult, FFT, and autocorr) see low gate coverage since the multiplier is a significant
fraction of bespoke designs for such benchmarks and KLEE does not try to form inputs
to the multiplier to increase datapath coverage.
7Note that simulations for multiple inputs can easily be parallelized to reduce the
verification time significantly.
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Figure 6.13: Normalized gate count, area, and power ranges for all possible
bespoke processor supporting multiple applications.
supporting ten programs, the area and power of a bespoke processor can be
reduced by up to 41% and 20%, respectively. However, supporting multiple
programs can limit the extent of gate cutting and the resulting area and
power benefits when the applications exercise significantly different portions
of the processor. For example, the two-program bespoke processor with the
largest gate count is one tailored to dbg and irq. Each application uses com-
ponents of the processor that are not exercised by the other program; dbg
exercises the debug module, while irq exercises the interrupt handling logic.
The resulting gate reduction of 18% still produces area and power benefits of
26% and 19%, respectively. Although supporting multiple programs reduces
gate count, area, and power reduction benefits, the area and power will never
increase with respect to the baseline design. In the worst case, the baseline
processor can run any combination of program binaries.
6.5.3 Supporting In-Field Updates
We consider two approaches to designing bespoke processors that can be
updated in the field. First, we evaluate a method that allows a bespoke
processor to handle common, minor programming bugs. Second, we evaluate
a method that allows a bespoke processor to handle infrequent, arbitrary
software updates.
In-field updates may often be deployed to fix minor correctness bugs (e.g.,
off-by-one errors, etc.) [144]. To emulate in-field updates to fix bugs, we use
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Table 6.4: MILU produces three types of mutants. Type I: Logical
conditional operator mutants. Type II: Computation operator mutants.
Type III: Loop conditional operator mutants.
Benchmark Type I Type II Type III Total
binSearch 0 0 15 15
inSort 8 0 15 23
rle 0 20 25 45
tea8 48 24 10 82
Viterbi 24 24 35 83
autocorr 12 0 10 22
Table 6.5: Percentage of mutants (in-field updates) of different types that
are supported by the bespoke design for the base software implementation.
“-” denotes that a given benchmark did not have any mutants of that type.
Benchmark
Type I Type II Type III Total
% % % %
binSearch - - 73 73
inSort 25 - 27 26
rle - 100 84 91
tea8 58 75 100 68
Viterbi 92 83 80 84
autocorr 50 - 40 45
the MILU mutation testing tool [140] to generate “updates” corresponding
to bug fixes. Table 6.4 lists the breakdown of mutants by type generated
by MILU for the six benchmarks with the most mutants. If a benchmark
has zero mutants for a particular type, no mutation sites of that type were
found in that benchmark by MILU. Type I mutants are conditional operator
mutants (e.g., A||B → A&&B). Type II mutants are computation operator
mutants (e.g., A + B → A × B). Type III mutants are loop conditional
operator mutants (e.g., i < 32→ i 6= 32).
Table 6.5 lists the percentage of mutants (i.e., in-field updates to fix bugs)
that are supported by the original bespoke design (generated for a “buggy”
application). Many minor bug fixes can be covered by a bespoke processor
designed for the original application without any modification. I.e., the mu-
tants representing many in-field updates only use a subset of the gates in
the original bespoke processor. This means that these mutants will execute
correctly on the original bespoke processor tailored to the original “buggy”
application. We see that between 25% and 100% of various mutants are
covered, and 70% of all mutants are covered. This shows that a bespoke pro-
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Figure 6.14: Normalized gate count, area, and power vs the baseline design
for designs supporting all mutants (in-field updates).
cessor will maintain some of the original general-purpose processor’s ability to
support in-field updates. If a higher coverage of possible bugs is desired, the
automatically generated mutants can be considered as independent programs
while tailoring the bespoke processor for the application (see Section 6.3.5).
Figure 6.14 shows the increase in gate count, area, and power required to
tailor a bespoke processor to the six benchmarks with the most mutants
by including all possible mutants (i.e., bug fixes) generated by MILU dur-
ing bespoke design. Providing support for simple in-field updates incurs a
gate count overhead of between 1% and 40%. Despite this increase in gate
count, total area benefits for the bespoke processors are between 23% and
66%, while total power benefits are between 13% and 53%. Therefore, simple
in-field updates can be supported while still achieving substantial area and
power benefits.
A bespoke processor tailored to a specific application can be designed
to support arbitrary software updates by designing it to support a Turing-
complete instruction (e.g., subneg) or set of instructions, in addition to other
programs it supports (Section 6.3.5). For our single-application bespoke pro-
cessors, the average area and power overheads to support subneg are 8% and
10%, respectively. Average area and power benefits for subneg-enhanced
bespoke processors are 56% and 43%, respectively.
Note that an instruction in a bespoke processor’s target application is not
guaranteed to be supported in a different application (e.g., an update), since
the processor eliminates gates that are not needed to support the possible
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instruction sequences in the target application’s execution tree; a different
sequence of the same instructions may need those gates for execution. For
example, if all operands to add instructions in a bespoke processor’s target
binary have had their least significant eight bits masked to 0 by a preceding
and instruction, gates corresponding to the least significant bits of the ALUs
adder may be removed in the bespoke processor. Therefore, the same bespoke
processor may not support a different program where the add instruction is
not preceded by the masking and. While full support for instructions is not
guaranteed in general by bespoke processors, we are able to guarantee support
for Turing-complete instructions / instruction sequences (e.g., subneg), since
a software routine written using a Turing-complete instruction / instruction
sequence consists entirely of multiple instances of the same instruction /
instruction sequence.
6.5.4 System Code
The evaluations above were performed for a bare-metal system (application
running on the processor without an operating system (OS)). While this
setting is representative of ultra-low-power processors and a large segment
of embedded systems [73, 74],8 use of an OS is common in several embedded
application domains, as well as in more complex systems. Thus, we also
evaluated bespoke design for our applications running on the processor with
an OS (FreeRTOS [77]). Application analysis of system code for FreeRTOS
reveals that 57% of gates are not exercisable by the OS, including the entire
hardware multiplier. When our benchmarks are evaluated individually with
FreeRTOS, 37% of gates are unused in the worst case, 49% on average. When
running FreeRTOS together with all 15 benchmarks, 27% of gates are unused.
6.6 Related Work
6.6.1 Power Gating
In this chapter, we propose a method to reduce the area and power of ap-
plications running on a processor by removing unusable gates. Another
8Many embedded processors provide bare-metal development toolchains [75, 76].
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Figure 6.15: Power savings achieved by oracular power gating with no
overheads are significantly lower than those achieved by bespoke processors
for the same applications, even when each module is allowed a separate
power domain and a wakeup latency of 0 is assumed.
method to reduce power of unused gates is power gating. Prior work on
aggressive power gating applies power gating at the granularity of RTL mod-
ules [86, 102, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114]. Some
power gating techniques can even power down unused uncore modules (e.g.,
on-chip routers [115, 116, 117]) or dynamically re-size microarchitectural
structures to better suit an application [86, 85]. However, module-based
power gating can only reduce power when an entire architectural or well-
understood microarchitectural module is inactive, unlike our method for re-
moving unusable gates, which can remove gates at a fine granularity. Solu-
tions for fine-grained power gating also exist, that allow power gating to be
performed at the gate or sub-module level. Unfortunately, fine-grained power
gating incurs considerable area and power overheads (e.g., 40-50% [136]) for
isolation gates, retention cells, and power switches. Therefore, fine-grained
power gating is not a good fit for emerging area- and power-constrained ap-
plications.
We evaluated the effectiveness of aggressive module-based power gating
for the same processor and benchmarks evaluated in Section 6.5. Figure 6.15
shows the maximum total power savings for an oracular, zero-overhead,
module-based power gating technique, in which a module is assumed to dissi-
pate no power in any cycle when none of the module’s gates are toggled. Ad-
ditionally, no wakeup latency or energy is considered. Despite not including
any of the overheads of power gating, the maximum power reduction for any
application is less than 13% – significantly lower than the minimum power re-
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duction provided by any of the bespoke processors for the same applications
(37%). An actual power gating implementation would incur an area overhead
for isolation cells, retention cells, and power switches. It would also incur
latency overhead to wakeup modules when they are needed, which trans-
lates into a reduction in power savings and possibly reduced performance. In
comparison, bespoke processors reduce power much more significantly than
module-based power gating while incurring no performance overhead and
also reducing design area.
Finally, it is worth noting that power gating and bespoke processor design
are orthogonal and can be used together. For example, if a power gating
technique is already applied to the baseline processor, our gate activity anal-
ysis will treat the power gating control logic and isolation cells like any other
gates. If any do not toggle, the power gating control logic and isolation cells
can be removed and replaced by the appropriate constant values. Power
switch cells can be removed either if their control input is always constant or
if their entire domain is cut. In this manner, bespoke design can be applied
in conjunction with power gating to further reduce power.
6.6.2 High-Level Synthesis
High-Level Synthesis (HLS) tools such as Cadence Stratus [145] and Mentor
Catapult [146] also aim to generate hardware for a given application. How-
ever, unlike bespoke processor design, HLS involves additional development
cost since (a) a new high-level specification of application behavior needs
to be defined, and (b) the high-level specification itself needs to be veri-
fied. Besides, while HLS tools can transform many C programs into efficient
ASICs, there are well-known limitations that further increase development
costs. Dynamic memory allocation, pointer ambiguity, extracting memory
parallelism, and creating efficient schedules for arbitrary C programs are all
challenges for HLS. In fact, most commercial tools limit the use of pointers
and dynamic memory allocation, requiring additional hardware-aware design
development to create a working ASIC from a C program. In contrast, our
bespoke processor tool flow automatically creates a bespoke processor from
the original, already-verified gate-level netlist and application binary without
further design work. Also, unlike HLS, our bespoke tool flow can generate a
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design that supports multiple applications on the same hardware (including
full-fledged OS) and can support in-field updates. In these ways, a bespoke
processor design flow can decrease design and verification effort and allow
increased programmability compared with HLS tool flows.
6.6.3 Application- and Domain-Specific Cores
Recent work has studied the design of application- and domain-specific pro-
cessors that improve energy-efficiency and increase performance by adding
specialized hardware. Statically specialized cores, such as conservation cores
[147], QsCores [148], and GreenDroid [149] automatically develop hardware
implementations that are connected to a general-purpose processor at the
data cache and target hotspots within an application code. Such cores in-
crease energy efficiency at the expense of increasing the total area of a design,
and thus may not be a good fit for area-constrained applications. Reconfig-
urable architectures, such as DySER [150], can also increase energy efficiency
by mapping frequently executed code segments onto tightly coupled reconfig-
urable execution units. However, increased energy efficiency comes with an
increase in area and power for the additional reconfigurable units. Extensible
processors, such as Xtensa [142], allow a designer to specify configurations
including structure sizing, optional modules (e.g., debug and exceptions),
and custom application-specific functional units. Such extensible processors
are limited in the extent to which they can reduce area and power, since they
are applied primarily at the module level. Furthermore, the process is not
fully automated and requires additional hardware design effort. Compared
with extensible application-specific processors, bespoke processors can reduce
power further, since they can remove gates within modules (see Section 6.5)
and require less manual design effort.
Chip generators [151] can be used to generate families of chips from the
ground up for a particular application domain by allowing domain expert
hardware designers to encode domain-specific knowledge into tools that de-
sign application-specific chips within the same domain. Like HLS, this ap-
proach still requires a domain expert to design the overarching hardware in
an HLS-like manner and then specify functions that allow arbitrary elabora-
tion of the hardware design (e.g., encoding optimization functions for deter-
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mining lower-level parameters such as cache associativity). Chip generators,
therefore, require a change to the design process, while tailoring bespoke pro-
cessors to applications can be completely automated from a program binary
and processor netlist.
Simulate and eliminate [152] attempts to create a design tailored to an
application by simulating the target application with a user-provided set of
inputs on multiple base designs. Logic and interconnect components that
are not used by the application are removed. Simulate and eliminate differs
from bespoke processors in three fundamental ways – level of automation,
scope of elimination, and correctness guarantees. First, simulate and elimi-
nate requires significant user input to guide the selection of core parameters,
selection of bit widths, and definition of optimizations. Bespoke processors
require no user intervention. Second, simulate and eliminate only considers
high-level, manually identified components when determining what is used
by a processor, and consequently will not achieve as large of area and power
reductions as fine-grained bespoke processor tailoring (Figure 6.12). Third,
simulate and eliminate relies on user-specified inputs to determine the com-
ponents that are never used by an application. This means that simulate and
eliminate cannot guarantee safe optimization for applications where inputs
affect control flow. Additionally, simulate and eliminate cannot determine if
an unsafe elimination is performed. Bespoke processor tailoring guarantees
correctness by considering all possible application inputs when determining
which gates to remove.
6.7 Summary
In this chapter, we made a case for bespoke processors – processors that are
tailored to a target application, such that they contain only the gates nec-
essary to execute the application. We presented an automated methodology
that takes a microprocessor IP and application as input and produces a be-
spoke processor with significantly lower area and power that is guaranteed to
execute the application correctly for all possible executions and for all possi-
ble inputs. We showed that bespoke processors can have significantly lower
area and power than their general-purpose counterparts, while maintaining
support for multiple applications, as well as varying degrees of in-field pro-
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grammability and debuggability. Average area and power reductions from
bespoke processor design are 62% and 50%, respectively, while exploiting
timing slack exposed by bespoke design improves average power savings to
65%.
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Chapter 7
Determining Application-Specific Peak Power
and Energy Requirements for Ultra-Low
Power Processors
In the ultra-low-power embedded systems used by IoT applications, peak
power and energy requirements are the primary factors that determine criti-
cal system cost characteristics, such as size, weight, cost, and lifetime. While
the power and energy requirements of these systems tend to be application-
specific, conventional techniques for rating peak power and energy cannot ac-
curately bound the power and energy requirements of an application running
on a processor, leading to over-provisioning that increases system size and
weight. In this chapter, we present an automated technique that performs
hardware-software co-analysis of the application and ultra-low-power pro-
cessor in an embedded system to determine application-specific peak power
and energy requirements. Our technique provides more accurate, tighter
bounds than conventional techniques for determining peak power and energy
requirements, reporting 15% lower peak power and 17% lower peak energy,
on average, than a conventional approach based on profiling and guardband-
ing. Compared to an aggressive stressmark-based approach, our technique
reports power and energy bounds that are both 26% lower, on average. Also,
unlike conventional approaches, our technique reports guaranteed bounds on
peak power and energy independent of an application’s input set. Tighter
bounds on peak power and energy can be exploited to reduce system size,
weight, and cost.
7.1 Introduction
Ultra-low-power (ULP) processors have rapidly become the most abundant
type of processor in production today. New and emerging power- and energy-
constrained applications such as the internet-of-things (IoT), wearables, im-
plantables, and sensor networks have already caused production of ULP pro-
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cessors to exceed that of personal computers and mobile processors [2]. The
2015 ITRS report projects that these applications will continue to rely on
simple single-core ultra-low-power processors in the future, will be powered
by batteries and energy harvesting, and will have even tighter peak power
and energy constraints than the power- and energy-constrained ULP systems
of today [82]. Unsurprisingly, low-power microcontrollers and microproces-
sors are projected to continue being the most widely used type of processor
in the future [2, 3, 4, 137].
ULP systems can be classified into three types based on the way they are
powered [153]. As illustrated in Figure 7.1, some ULP systems are pow-
ered directly by energy harvesting (Type 1), while some are battery-powered
(Type 3). Another variant is powered by a battery and uses energy harvesting
to charge the battery (Type 2).
Figure 7.1: ULP systems are commonly powered by energy harvesting,
battery, or a combination of the two, where harvesters are used to charge
the battery.
For each of the above classes, the size of energy harvesting and/or storage
components determine the form factor, size, and weight. Consider, for ex-
ample, the wireless sensor node shown in Figure 7.2 [154]. The two largest
system components that predominantly determine the overall system size
and weight are the energy harvester (solar cell) and the battery.
Going one step further, since the energy harvesting and storage require-
ments of a ULP system are determined by its power and energy requirements,
the peak power and energy requirements of a ULP system are the primary
factors that determine critical system characteristics such as size, weight,
cost, and lifetime [153]. In Type 1 systems, peak power is the primary con-
straint that determines system size, since the power delivered by harvesters
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is proportional to their size. In these systems, harvesters must be sized to
provide enough power, even under peak load conditions. In Type 3 systems,
peak power largely determines battery life, since it determines the effective
battery capacity [155]. As the rate of discharge increases, effective battery
capacity drops [155, 156]. This effect is particularly pronounced in ULP sys-
tems, where near-peak power is consumed for a short period of time, followed
by a much longer period of low-power sleep, since pulsed loads with high peak
current reduce effective capacity even more drastically than sustained current
draw [156].
Figure 7.2: In most ULP systems, like this wireless sensor node, the size of
the battery and/or energy harvester dominates the total system size.
In Type 2 and 3 systems, the peak energy requirement matters as well.
For example, energy harvesters in Type 2 systems must be able to harvest
more energy than the system consumes, on average. Similarly, battery life
and effective capacity are dependent on energy consumption (i.e., average
power) [156]. Figure 7.3 summarizes how peak power and energy require-
ments impact sizing parameters for the different classes of ULP systems.
Finally, Tables 7.1 and 7.2 list the energy and power densities for different
types of batteries and energy harvesters, respectively. These data provide
a rough sense of how size and weight of a ULP system scale based on peak
energy and power requirements. A tighter bound on the peak power and
energy requirements of a ULP system can result in a roughly proportional
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Figure 7.3: Harvester and battery size calculations for Type 1, 2, and 3
ULP systems depend on peak power and energy requirements.
reduction in size and weight.
How Are Peak Power and Energy Determined Today?
There are several possible approaches to determine the peak power and en-
ergy requirements of a ULP processor (Figure 7.4).1 The most conservative
approach involves using the processor design specifications provided in data
sheets. These specifications characterize the peak power that can be con-
sumed by the hardware at a given operating point and can be directly trans-
lated into a bound on peak power. This bound is conservative because it
1Peak power and energy are sometimes referred to as worst-case power and energy.
Table 7.1: Specific energy and energy density for different battery
types [157].
Battery Specific Energy Energy Density
Type [J/g] [MJ/L]
Li-ion 460 1.152
Alkaline 400 0.331
Carbon-zinc 130 1.080
Ni-MH 340 0.504
Ni-cad 140 0.828
Lead-acid 146 0.360
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Table 7.2: Power density for different types of energy harvesters [158].
Harvester type Power Density
Photovoltaic (sun) 100 mW/cm2
Photovoltaic (indoor) 100 µW/cm2
Thermoelectric 60 µW/cm2
Ambient airflow 1 mW/cm2
Figure 7.4: The conventional methodology for sizing energy harvesting and
storage components involves determining peak power and energy
requirements for a processor and selecting components that will provide
enough power and energy to satisfy the requirements over the lifetime of
the system.
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is not application-specific; however, it is safe for any application that might
be executed on the hardware. A more aggressive technique for determining
peak power or energy requirements is to use a peak power or energy stress-
mark. A stressmark is an application that attempts to activate the hardware
in a way that maximizes peak power or energy. A stressmark may be less
conservative than a design specification, since it may not be possible for an
application to exercise all parts of the hardware at once. The most aggres-
sive conventional technique for determining peak power or energy of a ULP
processor is to perform application profiling on the processor by measuring
power consumption while running the target application on the hardware.
However, since profiling is performed with specific input sets under specific
operating conditions, peak power or energy bounds determined by profiling
might be exceeded during operation if application inputs or system operating
conditions are different than during profiling. To ensure that the processor
operates within its peak power and energy bounds, a guardband is applied
to profiling-based results.
Our Proposal: Determining Application-Specific Peak Power and
Energy Requirements
Most ULP embedded systems run the same application or computation over
and over in a compute / sleep cycle for the entire lifetime of the system [65].
As such, the power and energy requirements of embedded ULP processors
tend to be application-specific. This is not surprising, considering that dif-
ferent applications exercise different hardware components at different times,
generating different application-specific loads and power profiles. For exam-
ple, Figures 7.5a and 7.5b show the active (toggling) gates for two different
applications (tHold and PI – see Table 7.3) during the cycles in which peak
power is expended for each application. These figures were generated by
running gate-level simulations of the applications on openMSP430 [63] and
marking all gates that toggled in the cycle in which each benchmark expended
its peak power. The figures show that PI exercises a larger fraction of the
processor than tHold at its peak, leading to higher peak power. However,
while the peak power and energy requirements of ULP processors tend to
be application-specific, many conventional techniques for determining peak
power and energy requirements for a processor are not application-specific
(e.g., design-based and stressmark-based techniques). Even in the case of
a profiling-based technique, guardbands must be used to inflate the peak
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Figure 7.5: Different applications can have different activity profiles,
resulting in peak power and energy requirements that are
application-specific.
power requirements observed during profiling, since it is not possible to gen-
erate bounds that are guaranteed for all possible input sets. These limita-
tions prevent existing techniques from accurately bounding the power and
energy requirements of an application running on a processor, leading to
over-provisioning that increases system size and weight.
In this chapter, we present a novel technique that determines application-
specific peak power and energy requirements based on hardware-software
co-analysis of the application and ultra-low-power processor in an embedded
system. Our technique performs a symbolic simulation of an application on
the processor netlist in which unknown logic values (Xs) are propagated for
application inputs.2 This allows us to identify gates that are guaranteed to
not be exercised by the application for any input. This, in turn, allows us to
bound the peak power and energy requirements for the application. The peak
power and energy requirements generated by our technique are guaranteed
to be safe for all possible inputs and operating conditions. Our technique
is fully automated and provides more accurate, tighter bounds than conven-
tional techniques for determining peak power and energy requirements. This
chapter makes the following contributions:
• We present an automated technique based on symbolic simulation that
takes an embedded system’s application software and processor netlist as in-
2Peak power and energy analyses can be offered as a cloud compilation service by the
hardware system vendor in settings where the application developer does not have access
to the processor description [91, 92, 93].
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puts and determines application-specific peak power and energy requirements
for the processor that are guaranteed to be valid for all possible application
inputs and operating conditions. This is the first approach to use symbolic
simulation to determine peak power and energy requirements for an applica-
tion running on a processor.
•We show that the application-specific peak power and energy requirements
determined by our technique are more accurate, and therefore less conser-
vative, than those determined by conventional techniques. On average, the
peak power requirements generated by our technique are 27%, 26%, and 15%
lower than those generated based on design specifications, a stressmark, and
profiling, respectively, and the peak energy requirements generated by our
technique are 47%, 26%, and 17% lower. Reduction in the peak power and
energy requirements of a ULP processor can be leveraged to improve critical
system metrics such as size and weight.
• Our technique can be used to guide optimizations that target and reduce
the peak power of a processor. Optimizations suggested by our technique
reduce peak power by up to 10% for a set of embedded applications.
7.2 A Case for Application-Specific Input-Independent
Peak Power and Energy Requirements
We measured peak power consumption for a sample set of ULP benchmark
applications (see Table 7.3) running on an MSP430F1610 processor.3 Bench-
mark applications were run repeatedly with different inputs at an operating
frequency of 8 MHz while sampling the voltage and current of the processor
at a rate of 10 MHz using an InfiniiVision DSO-X 2024A oscilloscope, to
ensure at least one sample per cycle. Power is calculated as the product of
voltage and current. Figure 7.6 shows our test setup.
Figure 7.7a compares the peak power observed for different applications.
The results show that peak power can be different for different applications.
Thus, peak power bounds that are not application-specific will overestimate
the peak power requirements of applications, leading to over-provisioning
of energy harvesting and storage components that determine system size
and weight. Figure 7.7a also shows that the peak power requirements of
3MSP430 is one of the most popular processors used in ULP systems [94, 121].
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Figure 7.6: The test setup used to measure peak and average power on a
ULP processor (MSP430).
applications are significantly lower than the rated peak power of the chip (4.8
mW), so using design specifications to determine peak power requirements
can lead to significant over-provisioning and inefficiency. The figure also
confirms that peak power of an application depends on application inputs
and can vary significantly for different inputs. This means that profiling
cannot be relied on to accurately determine the peak power requirement
for a processor, since not all input combinations can be profiled, and the
peak power for an unprofiled input could be significantly higher than the
peak power observed during profiling. Since input-induced variations change
peak power by over 25% for these applications (Figure 7.7a), a profiling-based
approach for determining peak power requirements should apply a guardband
of at least 25% to the peak power observed during profiling.
For energy-constrained ULP systems, like those powered by batteries (Types
2 and 3), peak energy as well as peak power determines the size of energy
harvesting and storage components (Section 7.1). Thus, it is also impor-
tant to determine an accurate bound on the peak energy requirements of
a ULP processor. Figure 7.8 shows the instantaneous power profile for an
application (mult), demonstrating that on average, instantaneous power can
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Figure 7.7: The peak power and normalized peak energy (normalized to an
application’s runtime in cycles) of a ULP processor are different for
different applications and different inputs. The bars represent average
across all inputs; error bars show the range of input-induced peak and
average power variations. Measured variation between multiple runs of the
same application and same input is less than 2%.
be significantly lower than peak power. Therefore, we can more accurately
determine the optimal sizing of components in an energy-constrained system
by generating an accurate bound on peak energy, rather than conservatively
multiplying peak power by execution time.
Figure 7.7b characterizes the peak energy, normalized to application run-
time in cycles, for different applications and input sets, showing that the max-
imum rate at which an application can consume energy is also application-
and input-dependent. Therefore, conventional techniques for determining the
peak energy requirements of a ULP processor have the same limitations as
conventional techniques for determining peak power requirements. In both
cases, the limitations of conventional techniques require over-provisioning
that can substantially increase system size and weight.
In the next section, we describe a novel technique for determining the peak
power and peak energy requirements of a ULP processor that is application-
specific yet also input-independent.
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Figure 7.8: Measured instantaneous power of MSP430F1610 for the mult
benchmark is significantly lower, on average, than both the rated and
observed peak power for the application.
7.3 Determining Application-Specific
Input-Independent Peak Power and Energy
Figure 7.9 provides an overview of our technique for determining application-
specific peak power and energy requirements that are input-independent.
The inputs to our technique are the application binary that runs on a ULP
processor and the gate-level netlist of the ULP processor. The first phase
of our technique, described in Section 7.3.1, is an activity analysis that uses
symbolic simulation to efficiently characterize all possible gates that can be
exercised for all possible execution paths of the application and all possible
inputs. This analysis also reveals which gates can never be exercised by
the application. Based on this analysis, we perform input-independent peak
power (Section 7.3.2) and energy (Section 7.3.3) calculations to determine
the peak power and energy requirements for a ULP processor.
7.3.1 Input-Independent Gate Activity Analysis
Since the peak power and energy requirements of an application can vary
based on application inputs, a technique that determines application-specific
peak power requirements must bound peak power for all possible inputs.
Exhaustive profiling for all possible inputs is not possible for most applica-
tions, so we use the symbolic simulation-based hardware-software co-analysis
presented in Chapter 4 that uses unknown logic values (Xs) for inputs to effi-
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Figure 7.9: Our technique performs input-independent activity analysis
that enables determination of accurate peak power and energy requirements
for a ULP processor.
ciently characterize activity for all possible inputs with minimum simulation
effort. During symbolic simulation, the simulator captures the activity of
each gate at each point in the execution tree. A gate is considered active if
its value changes or if it has an unknown value (X) and is driven by an active
gate; otherwise, the gate is idle. The resulting annotated symbolic execution
tree describes all possible instances in which a gate could possibly toggle for
all possible executions of the application binary. As such, a gate that is not
marked as toggled at a particular location in the execution tree can never
toggle at that location in the application. As described in the next sections,
we can use the information gathered during activity analysis to bound the
peak power and energy requirements of an application.
7.3.2 Input-Independent Peak Power Requirements
The input to the second phase of our technique is the symbolic execution
tree generated by input-independent gate activity analysis. Algorithm 4
describes how to use the activity-annotated execution tree to generate peak
power requirements for a ULP processor, application pair.
The first step in determining peak power from an execution tree produced
during gate activity analysis is to concatenate the execution paths in the
execution tree into a single execution trace. We use a value change dump
(VCD) file to record the gate-level activity in the execution trace. The exe-
cution trace contains Xs, and the goal of the peak power computation is to
assign values to the Xs in the way that maximizes power for each cycle in
the execution trace. The power of a gate in a particular cycle is maximized
164
Algorithm 4 Input-Independent Peak Power Computation
1. Procedure Calculate Peak Power
2. {E—O} VCD ← Open {Even—Odd} VCD File // maximizes peak power in even—odd cycles
3. T ← flatten(Execution Tree) // create a flattened execution trace that represents the execution tree
4. foreach {even—odd} cycles c ∈ T do
5. foreach toggled gates g ∈ c do
6. if value(g,c) == X && value(g,c-1) == X then
7. value(g,c-1) ← maxTransition(g,1) // returns the value of the gate in the first cycle of the
gate’s maximum power transition
8. value(g,c) ← maxTransition(g,2) // returns the value of the gate in the second cycle of the
gate’s maximum power transition
9. else if value(g,c) == X then
10. value(g,c) ← !value(g,c-1)
11. else if value(g,c-1) == X then
12. value(g,c-1) ← !value(g,c)
13. end if
14. end for
15. {E—O} VCD ← value(*,c-1)
16. {E—O} VCD ← value(*,c)
17. end for
18. Perform power analysis using E VCD and O VCD to generate even and odd power traces, PE and PO
19. Interleave even cycle power from PE with odd cycle power from PO to form peak power trace, Ppeak
20. peak power ← max(Ppeak)
when the gate transitions (toggles). Since a transition involves two cycles,
maximizing dynamic power in a particular cycle, c, of the execution trace
involves assigning values to any Xs in the activity profiles of the current and
previous cycles, c and c− 1, to maximize the number of transitions in cycle
c.
The number and power of transitions are maximized as follows. When the
output value of a gate in only one of the cycles, c or c − 1, is an X, the
X is assigned the value that assumes that a transition happened in cycle c.
When both values are Xs, the values are assigned to produce the transition
that maximizes power in cycle c. The maximum power transition is found
by a look-up into the standard cell library for the gate. Since constraining
Xs in two consecutive cycles to maximize power in the second cycle may not
maximize power in the first cycle, we produce two separate VCD files – one
that maximizes power in all even cycles and one the maximizes power in all
odd cycles. To find the peak power of the application, we first run activity-
based power analysis on the design using the even and odd VCD files to
generate even and odd power traces. We then form a peak power trace by
interleaving the power values from the even cycles in the even power trace
and the odd cycles in the odd power trace. This peak power trace bounds
the peak power that is possible in every cycle of the execution trace. The
peak power requirement of the application is the maximum per-cycle power
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Figure 7.10: To determine a bound on peak power, we generate two
different activity profiles – one that maximizes power in even cycles (left)
and one that maximizes power in odd cycles (right).
value found in the peak power trace.4
Our VCD generation technique is illustrated in Figure 7.10. We use the
example of three gates with overlapping Xs that need to be assigned to max-
imize power in every cycle. We show two assignments – one that maximize
peak power in all even cycles (left), and one that maximizes peak power
in all odd cycles (right). Assuming, for the sake of example, that all gates
have equal power consumption and that the 0→ 1 transition consumes more
power than the 1 → 0 transition for these gates, the highest possible peak
power for this example happens in cycle 6 in the “even” activity trace, when
all the gates have a 0→ 1 transition.
7.3.3 Input-Independent Peak Energy Requirements
Our technique generates a per-cycle peak power trace characterizing all pos-
sible execution paths of an application. The peak power trace can be used to
generate peak energy requirements. Figure 7.11 shows per-cycle peak power
traces sampled from our benchmark applications. Since per-cycle peak power
4It is possible that glitching between clock edges can impact the power profile for an
application. This impact can be accounted for by Primetime’s power analysis [126].
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varies significantly over the compute phases of an application, peak energy
can be significantly lower than assuming the maximum peak energy (i.e.,
peak power ∗ clock period ∗ number of cycles). Instead, the peak energy of
an application is bounded by the execution path with the highest sum of per-
cycle peak power multiplied by the clock period. To avoid enumerating all
execution paths, we use several techniques. For an input-dependent branch,
peak energy is computed by selecting the branch path with higher energy.
For a loop whose number of iterations is input-independent, peak energy can
be computed as the peak energy of one iteration multiplied by the number of
iterations. For cases where the number of iterations is input-dependent, the
maximum number of iterations may be determined either by static analysis
or user input (as suggested by prior work [159]).5 If neither is possible, it
may not be possible to compute the peak energy of the application; however,
this is uncommon in embedded applications [65].
7.3.4 Validation of X-based Analysis
To demonstrate that our symbolic execution-based (X-based) activity anal-
ysis marks all gates that could possibly be toggled by an application for
all possible inputs, we performed a validation check by comparing the sets
of gates toggled by input-based simulations for several different input sets
against the set of gates marked as potentially toggled by symbolic simula-
tion. Figure 7.12 illustrates this comparison for two input-based simulations
of the mult benchmark with different input sets – those that have the lowest
and highest number of toggled gates. In the figure, toggled gates common to
X-based and input-based simulation are shown as Xs, and gates that are ex-
clusively marked by symbolic simulation as potentially toggled are shown as
blue triangles. As expected, there are no gates that are exclusively marked
by input-based simulation. Our validation results show that all the gates
toggled by input-based simulation are also marked as potentially toggled by
X-based symbolic simulation, validating the correctness of our approach for
characterizing toggle activity.
We perform a second validation of our technique by comparing the peak
power traces generated for benchmarks by our technique against power traces
5The number of loop iterations is bounded for all evaluated benchmarks. In general,
applications with unbounded runtimes are uncommon in embedded domains.
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Figure 7.11: The per-cycle peak power varies significantly over the course of
an application, showing that the worst-case average power can be
significantly lower than peak power. Therefore, the peak energy can be
significantly lower than the product of peak power and application runtime
would suggest.
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Figure 7.12: Toggled gates for mult with low-activity inputs (top) and
high-activity inputs (bottom), compared against potentially toggled gates
identified by X-based analysis. X-based simulation marks all gates that
can potentially toggle for an application for all possible inputs. This set of
gates (unique x ∪ common) is a superset of the gates that toggle during an
input-based application execution (common).
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Figure 7.13: The X-based peak power trace generated by our technique for
an application provides an upper bound on all possible input-based power
traces for the application (result shown for mult).
generated by input-based execution of the benchmarks. The validation re-
sults confirm that our peak power trace always provides an upper bound on
the power of any input-based power trace. Figure 7.13 shows an example;
the X-based peak power trace for the mult application is always higher than
the input-based power trace. These validation results also show that the
X-based peak power trace closely matches the input-based trace, indicating
that the peak power and energy requirements generated by our technique are
not overly conservative.
7.3.5 Enabling Peak Power Optimizations
Since our technique is able to associate the input-independent peak power
consumption of a processor with the particular instructions that are in the
pipeline during a spike in peak power, we can use our tool to identify which
instructions or instruction sequences cause spikes in peak power. Our tech-
nique can also provide a power breakdown that shows the power consump-
tion of the microarchitectural modules that are exercised by the instructions.
These analyses can be combined to identify which instructions executing in
which modules cause power spikes. After identifying the cause of a spike,
we can use software optimizations to target the instruction sequences that
cause peaks and replace them with alternative sequences that generates less
instantaneous activity and power while maintaining the same functionality.
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After optimizing software to reduce a spike in peak power, we can re-run
our peak power analysis technique to determine the impact of optimizations
on peak power. Guided by our technique, we can choose to apply only the
optimizations that are guaranteed to reduce peak power.
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Figure 7.14: A snapshot of instantaneous power profiles for mult at two
different COIs where peaks occur. Our technique analyzes the instructions
in the pipeline (top) to find each COI’s culprit instructions that cause the
peak power in each pipeline stage along with the per-module peak power
breakdown (bottom) to identify which instructions in which
microarchitectural modules are responsible for a peak.
Figure 7.14 shows an example where our technique identifies peak power
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spikes in cycles 146 and 150. Our technique also reports the instructions
in each stage of the pipeline during those cycles of interest (COIs), as well
as the per-module power breakdown for those cycles, which identifies the
modules that are consuming the most power. This information can be used
to guide optimizations that replace the instructions with different instruction
sequences that induce less activity and power in the modules that consume
the most power. Since software optimizations can impact performance as
well as peak power, we will discuss optimizations that reduce peak power
and their impact on performance and energy in Section 7.5.1.
7.4 Methodology
7.4.1 Simulation Infrastructure and Benchmarks
We verify our technique on a silicon-proven processor – openMSP430 [63],
an open-source version of one of the most popular ULP processors [121, 94].
The processor is synthesized, placed, and routed in TSMC 65GP technology
(65nm) for an operating point of 1V and 100 MHz using Synopsys Design
Compiler [122] and Cadence EDI System [123]. Gate-level simulations are
performed by running full benchmark applications on the placed and routed
processor using a custom gate-level simulator that efficiently traverses the
control flow graph of an application and captures input-independent activity
profiles (Section 7.3). We show results for all benchmarks from [64] and
all EEMBC benchmarks that fit in the program memory of the processor.
These benchmarks are chosen to be representative of emerging ultra-low-
power application domains such as wearables, internet of things, and sensor
networks [64]. The IPC of these benchmarks on our processor varies from 1.25
to 1.39, with an average of 1.29. Power analysis is performed using Synopsys
Primetime [126]. Experiments were performed on a server housing two Intel
Xeon E-2640 processors (eight cores each, 2GHz operating frequency, 64GB
RAM).
Section 7.2 shows measured data for an MSP430F1610 processor that
demonstrate that different applications have different peak power and en-
ergy requirements, and the requirements of an application can vary signifi-
cantly for different inputs. The results motivate an application-specific input-
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independent technique for determining the peak power and energy require-
ments for ULP processors. For the results in Section 7.5, we perform evalua-
tions on the open source openMSP430 processor [63]. Figures 7.15a and 7.15b
confirm that the peak power and energy requirements of openMSP430 also
depend on the application and application inputs. Note that the results in
Figure 7.7 and Figure 7.15 differ because they are for different implementa-
tions of the MSP430 architecture (MSP430F1610 and openMSP430), with
different process technology (130 nm vs. 65 nm) and operating frequencies
(8MHz vs. 100 MHz).
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Figure 7.15: Different applications and different input sets for the same
application have different peak power and peak energy requirements
(results for openMSP430).
7.4.2 Baselines
For baselines, we compare against conventional techniques for determining
the peak power and energy requirements of processors. An overview of the
baseline techniques can be found in Figure 7.4. The design specification-
based baseline (design tool) is determined by performing power and energy
analysis of the design using the default input toggle rate used by our de-
sign tools [126]. The stressmark-based baselines (GB input-based) use stress-
marks that target peak instantaneous power and average power. Kim et al.
used a genetic algorithm to automatically generate stressmarks that target
maximum di/dt-induced voltage droop for a microprocessor [160]. We modi-
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Table 7.3: Benchmarks.
Embedded Sensor Benchmarks [64]
mult, binSearch, tea8, intFilt,
tHold, div, inSort, rle, intAVG
EEMBC Embedded Benchmarks [65]
Autocorr, FFT, ConvEn, Viterbi
Control Systems Benchmark
Proportional Integral Controller (PI)
fied their framework to generate stressmarks that target peak instantaneous
power and average power for openMSP430. The profiling-based baseline
(input-based) is generated by performing input-based power and energy pro-
filing for several input sets and applying a guardbanding factor of 4/3 to the
peak power and energy observed during profiling. The guardbanding factor
is the same as in prior studies [161, 162] and is appropriate for the input-
dependent peak power variability exhibited by our benchmarks (Figure 7.7a).
7.5 Results
We use our technique described in Section 7.3 to determine peak power and
energy requirements for a ULP processor for different benchmark applica-
tions. Figure 7.16 compares the peak power requirements reported by our
technique against the conventional techniques for determining peak power re-
quirments, described in Section 7.4.2. The results show that the peak power
requirements reported by our X-based technique are higher than the highest
input-based application-specific peak power for all applications, confirming
that our technique provides a bound on peak power. The results also show
that our technique provides the most accurate bound on peak power, com-
pared to conventional techniques for determining peak power requirements.
For example, the peak power requirements reported by our technique are
only 1% higher than the highest observed input-based peak power for the
benchmark applications, on average. Other techniques for determining peak
power and energy requirements are significantly less accurate, which can lead
to inefficiency in critical system parameters such as size and weight (see Sec-
tion 7.1).
Our technique is more accurate than application-oblivious techniques such
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Figure 7.16: Our X-based technique for determining peak power
requirements provides the most accurate (least conservative) guaranteed
bound on peak power.
as determining peak power requirements from a stressmark or design specifi-
cation, because an application constrains which parts of the processor can be
exercised in a particular cycle. Our technique also provides a more accurate
bound than a guardbanded input-based peak power requirement, because it
does not require a guardband to account for the non-determinism of input-
based profiling (shown in Figure 7.16 as error bars). By accounting for all
possible inputs using symbolic simulation, our technique can bound peak
power and energy for all possible application executions without guardband-
ing. The peak power requirements reported by our technique are 15% lower
than guardbanded application-specific requirements, 26% lower than guard-
banded stressmark-based requirements, and 27% lower than design specifi-
cation-based requirements, on average.
Since our technique is application-specific and does not require guard-
bands, one question is: “Why is the bound provided by X-based analysis
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more conservative for some applications than others?” The answer is that
since X-based analysis provides a bound on power for all possible inputs,
it becomes more conservative when there is greater possibility for input-
dependent variation in power. For example, the multiplier is a relatively
large, high-power module, with high potential for input-dependent variation
in power consumption. For some inputs (e.g., X ∗ 0), power consumed by
the multiplier is minimal, since there are no partial products to compute.
For other inputs (e.g., two very large numbers), the power consumed by the
multiplier is much larger. Since our symbolic simulation technique assumes
Xs for inputs, we always assume the highest possible power for a multiply
instruction. Therefore, X-based peak power requirements for applications
that contain a large number of multiplications may be more conservative
than X-based requirements for other applications.
Conversely, the tea8 application, which performs encryption, only uses low-
power ALU modules – shift register and XOR – that have significantly less
potential for input-induced power variation. As a result, X-based analysis
closely matches input-based profiling results for this application. For all ap-
plications, even those with more potential for input-induced power variation,
our X-based analysis technique provides a peak power bound that is more
accurate than those provided by conventional techniques.
Our technique also provides more accurate bounds on peak energy than
conventional techniques, partly because of the reasons mentioned above, and
also because our technique is able to characterize the peak energy consump-
tion in each cycle of execution, generating a peak energy trace that accounts
for dynamic variations in energy consumption. Using a design specifica-
tion to determine peak energy is particularly inaccurate, since it does not
consider dynamic variations in the energy requirements of an application.
The guardbanded input-based technique, which does consider dynamic vari-
ations, provides a more accurate peak energy bound than the design speci-
fication for all benchmarks. However, it does not always provide a more ac-
curate bound than the design specification for peak power, since peak power
is an instantaneous phenomenon that is less dependent on dynamic varia-
tions. Figure 7.17 presents peak energy of different benchmarks, normalized
to application runtime in cycles, i.e., peak average power, which character-
izes the maximum rate at which the application can consume energy. In
Figure 7.17, the peak energy requirements reported by our technique are
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Figure 7.17: Our X-based technique for determining peak energy
requirement (normalized to application run-time in cycles, i.e., the peak
average power) is more accurate than existing conventional techniques.
17% lower than guardbanded application-specific requirements, 26% lower
than guardbanded stressmark-based requirements, and 47% lower than de-
sign specification-based requirements, on average. As expected, application-
specific normalized peak energy (Figure 7.17) varies less than peak power
(Figure 7.16), since peak energy characterizes average peak power over the
entire execution of an application, whereas peak power corresponds to one
instant in the application’s execution.
As described in Section 7.1, more accurate peak power and energy require-
ments can be leveraged to reduce critical ULP system parameters like size
and weight. For example, reduction in a Type 1 system’s peak power require-
ments allows a smaller energy harvester to be used. System size is roughly
proportional to harvester size in Type 1 systems. In Type 2 systems, it is
the peak energy requirement that determines the harvester size; reduction in
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Table 7.4: Percentage reduction in harvester area compared to different
baseline techniques, averaged over all benchmarks, for different percentage
contributions of the processor peak power to the system peak power.
Baseline 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 100%
GB-Input 1.49 3.73 7.47 11.21 13.45 14.94
GB-Stress 2.60 6.47 12.95 19.42 23.31 25.90
Design Tool 2.68 6.70 13.41 20.12 24.14 26.82
peak energy requirement reduces system size roughly proportionally. Since
required battery capacity depends on a system’s peak energy requirement,
and effective battery capacity depends on the peak power requirement, re-
ductions in peak power and energy requirements both reduce battery size for
Type 2 and 3 systems.
A ULP system may contain other components, such as transmitter/re-
ceiver, ADC, DAC, and sensor(s), along with the processor. All of these
components may contribute to the system’s peak power and energy, and
hence, the sizing of the harvester and battery. Tables 7.4 and 7.5 show the
percentage reduction in the harvester size and battery size, respectively, from
our technique for different fractions representing the processor’s contribution
to the system’s peak power and energy. For a real system such as the one
shown in Figure 7.2, which has a harvester area of 32.6cm2 and a battery
volume of 6.95mm3, the area reduction of the harvester is 4.87, 8.44, or
8.75cm2 if the system is designed using guardbanded input-based profiling,
guardbanded stressmark, or design tool, respectively, for estimating the peak
power of the processor. Similarly, the volume reduction of the battery is 0.42,
0.63, or 1.12mm3, respectively.6 As expected, savings from our technique are
higher when the processor is the dominant consumer of power and energy in
the overall system.7
6The battery is a thin film battery of dimensions 5.7mm × 6.1mm × 200 µm (area of
34.7mm2). Assuming the height of the battery does not change, the corresponding savings
in battery area are 6.07, 9.01, and 16.18mm2, respectively.
7ITRS 2015 projections show that the microcontroller will be the dominant consumer
of power in future IoT and IoE systems [82].
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Table 7.5: Percentage reduction in battery volume compared to different
baseline techniques, averaged over all benchmarks, for different percentage
contributions of the processor energy to the overall energy of the system.
Baseline 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 100%
GB-Input 1.74 4.37 8.74 13.11 15.73 17.48
GB-Stress 2.59 6.49 12.98 19.48 23.37 25.97
Design Tool 4.66 11.66 23.32 34.98 41.97 46.64
7.5.1 Optimizations
As discussed in Section 7.3.5, our technique can be used to guide application-
level optimizations that reduce peak power. Here, we discuss three software
optimizations, suggested by our technique, that we applied to the bench-
mark applications to reduce peak power. The optimizations were derived by
analyzing the processor’s behavior during the cycles of peak power consump-
tion. This analysis involves (a) identifying instructions in the pipeline at the
peak, and (b) identifying the power contributions of the microarchitectural
modules to the peak power to determine which modules contribute the most.
The first optimization aims to reduce a peak by “spreading out” the power
consumed in a peak cycle over multiple cycles. This is accomplished by
replacing a complex instruction that induces a lot of activity in one cycle
with a sequence of simpler instructions that spread the activity out over
several cycles.
The second optimization aims to reduce the instantaneous activity in a
peak cycle by delaying the activation of one or more modules, previously
activated in a peak cycle, until a later cycle. For this optimization, we focus
on the POP instruction, since it generates peaks in some benchmarks. The
peaks are caused since a POP instruction generates high activity on the data
and address buses and simultaneously uses the incrementer logic to update
the stack pointer. To reduce the peak, we break down the POP instruction
into two instructions – one that moves data from the stack, and one that
increments the stack pointer.
The third optimization is based on the observation that for some applica-
tions, peak power is caused by the multiplier (a high-power peripheral mod-
ule) being active simultaneously with the processor core. To reduce peak
power in such scenarios, we insert a NOP into the pipeline during the cycle in
which the multiplier is active.
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mov &0x013a, r15;
pop r2;
mov &0x013a, r15
mov #0, r9
mov @r1, r2
add #2, r15
OPT	1
(a) OPT 1
mov &0x013a, r15;
pop r2;
mov &0x013a, r15
mov #0, r9
mov @r1, r2
add #2, r1
OPT	1
(b) OPT 2
mov -6(r4), &0x0132
mov -4(r4), &0x0138
mov 0x013a, r15
mov -6(r4), &0x0132
mov -r(r4), &0x0138
nop
mov 0x013a, r15
OPT	3
(c) OPT 3
Figure 7.18: Instruction optimization transforms.
The three optimizations we applied to our benchmarks to reduce peak
power are summarized below. The optimizations are shown in Figure 7.18.
• Register-Indexed Loads (OPT 1): A load instruction (MOV) that ref-
erences the memory by computing the address as an offset to a register’s
value involves several micro-operations – source address generation, source
read, and execute. Breaking the micro-operations into separate instructions
can reduce the instantaneous power of the load instruction. The ISA already
provides a register indirect load operation where the value of the register is
directly used as the memory address instead of as an offset. Using another
instruction (such as an ADD or SUB), we can compute the correct address and
store it into another register. We then use the second register to execute the
load in register indirect mode.
• POP instructions (OPT 2): The micro-operations of a POP instruction
are (a) read value from address pointed to by the stack pointer, and (b)
increment the stack pointer by two. POP is emulated using MOV @SP+, dst.
This can be broken down to two instructions –
MOV @SP, dst and ADD #2, SP.
•Multiply (OPT 3): The multiplier is a peripheral in openMSP430. Data
is MOVed to the inputs of the multiplier and then the output is MOVed back
to the processor. For a two-cycle multiplier, all moving of data can be done
consecutively without any waiting. However, this involves a high power draw,
since there will be a cycle when both the multiplier and the processor are
active. This can be avoided by adding a NOP between writing to and reading
from the multiplier.
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Figure 7.19: Peak power reduction (left axis) and peak power dynamic
range reduction (right axis) achieved by optimizations. These reductions
are enabled by our analysis tool and provide further reduction in energy
harvester size.
Figure 7.19 shows the reduction in peak power achieved by applying the
optimizations motivated by our technique. Results are quantified in terms
of peak power reduction, as well as reduction in peak power dynamic range,
which quantifies the difference between peak and average power. Peak power
dynamic range decreases as peaks are reduced closer to the range of average
power. Reduction in peak power dynamic range can improve battery lifetime
in Type 2 and 3 systems, and reduction in peak power requirements can be
leveraged to reduce harvester size in Type 1 systems (see Section 7.1). Our
results show that peak power can be reduced by up to 10%, and 5% on
average. Peak power dynamic range can be reduced by up to 34%, and
18% on average. Figure 7.20 shows the peak power traces for an example
application before and after optimization, demonstrating that optimization
can reduce the peak power requirements for an application.
Since optimizations that reduce peak power can increase the number of
instructions executed by an application, we evaluated the performance and
energy impact of the optimizations. Figure 7.21 shows the results. Applying
the optimizations suggested by our technique degrades performance by up to
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Figure 7.20: A snapshot of instantaneous power profiles for mult before and
after optimization.
5% for one application, and by 1% on average. On average, the optimizations
increase energy by 3%. Although the optimizations increase energy slightly,
they can still enable reduction in size for Type 1 systems, in which harvester
size is dictated by peak power, and may also reduce the size of Type 2 and
3 systems, where both peak power and energy determine the size of energy
storage and harvesting components (see Figure 7.3).
7.6 Related Work
Peak power has been analyzed in several settings in literature. In particu-
lar, several techniques have been proposed to estimate the peak power of a
design. Hsiao et al. [163, 164] propose a genetic algorithm-based estimation
of peak power for a circuit. Wang and Roy [165] use an automatic test gen-
eration technique to compute lower and upper bounds for maximum power
dissipation for a VLSI circuit. Sambamurthy et al. [166] propose a tech-
nique that uses a bounded model checker to estimate peak dynamic power
at the module-level. The technique is also functionally valid at the processor
level. Najeeb et al. [167] propose a technique that converts a circuit behav-
ioral model to an integer constraint model and employs an integer constraint
solver to generate a power virus that can be used to estimate the peak power
of the processor. To the best of our knowledge, no prior work exists on de-
termining application-specific peak power for a processor based on symbolic
simulation.
The above techniques require a low-level description of the processor (be-
havioral or gate-level). Techniques have also been proposed at the architecture-
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Figure 7.21: Performance degradation and energy overhead introduced by
peak power optimizations is small (average: 1%).
level to predict when power exceeds the peak power budget or to lower the
peak-to-average power variation. Sartori and Kumar [168] propose the use of
DVFS techniques to manage peak power in a multi-core system. Kontorinis
et al. [162] proposed a configurable core to meet peak power constraints with
minimal impact on performance. Our technique identifies the peak power and
energy requirements of a processor through hardware-software co-analysis.
Estimating peak energy of an application has been previously studied as
the worst case energy consumption (WCEC) problem [159, 80, 169]. How-
ever, prior techniques do not use accurate power models, instead relying on
microarchitectural models, which do not consider the detailed state of a pro-
cessor or input values. As observed by [170], the power of an instruction
can differ based on the previous instructions in the pipeline and its operand
values. Our peak power computation technique analyzes an application on a
gate-level processor netlist, allowing us to account for the fine-grained inter-
action between instructions and the worst-case operand values. The result is
an accurate power model that can be used for WCEC analyses such as the
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example analysis in Section 7.5. Prior work on worst-case timing analysis
simply identified the timing-critical path through the program. However, the
timing-critical path through a program may not be energy-critical [159, 169].
We calculate energy across all paths through gate-level simulation to deter-
mine the path with highest energy.
7.7 Summary
In this chapter, we showed that peak power and energy requirements for an
ultra-low-power embedded processor can be application-specific as well as
input-specific. This renders profiling methods to determine the peak power
and energy of ULP processors ineffective, unless conservative guardbands are
applied, increasing system size and weight. We presented an automated tech-
nique based on symbolic simulation that determines a more aggressive peak
power and energy requirement for a ULP processor for a given application.
We show that the application-specific peak power and energy requirements
determined by our technique are more accurate, and therefore less conser-
vative, than those determined by conventional techniques. On average, the
peak power requirements determined by our technique are 27%, 26%, and
15% lower than those generated based on design specifications, a stressmark,
and profiling, respectively. Peak energy requirements generated by our tech-
nique are 47%, 26%, and 17% lower, on average, than those generated based
on design specifications, a stressmark, and profiling, respectively. We also
show that our technique can be used to guide optimizations that target and
reduce the peak power of a processor. Optimizations suggested by our tech-
nique reduce peak power by up to 10% for a set of benchmarks.
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Chapter 8
Software-Based Gate-Level Information Flow
Security for IoT Systems
The growing movement to connect literally everything to the internet (i.e.,
IoT) through ultra-low-power embedded microprocessors poses a critical chal-
lenge for information security. Gate-level tracking of information flows has
been proposed to guarantee information flow security in computer systems.
However, such solutions rely on non-commodity, secure-by-design processors
whose requisite redesign and remanufacture are at odds with the cost require-
ments of IoT. In this chapter, we observe that the need for secure-by-design
processors arises because previous works on gate-level information flow track-
ing assume no knowledge of the application running in a system. Since IoT
systems typically run a single application over and over for the lifetime of
the system, we see a unique opportunity to provide application-specific gate-
level information flow security for IoT systems. We develop a gate-level
symbolic analysis framework that uses knowledge of the application running
in a system to efficiently identify all possible information flow security vul-
nerabilities for the system. We leverage this information to provide security
guarantees on commodity processors. We also show that security vulnerabili-
ties identified by our analysis framework can be eliminated through software
modifications at 15% energy overhead, on average, obviating the need for
secure-by-design hardware. Our framework also allows us to identify and
eliminate only the vulnerabilities that an application is prone to, reducing
the cost of information flow security by 3.3× compared to a software-based
approach that assumes no application knowledge.
8.1 Introduction
Wearables, sensors, and the internet of things (IoT) arguably represent the
next frontier of computing. On one hand, they are characterized by ex-
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tremely low power and cost requirements. On the other hand, they pose a
dire security and privacy risk. As the internet of things progresses toward
the internet of everything, where nearly everything is connected to the inter-
net via an embedded ultra-low-power processor, higher connectedness implies
more security attack vectors and a larger attack surface. Similarly, immersive
usage models imply newer, more sinister consequences. The security and pri-
vacy concerns are not theoretical either. In the last couple of years, reported
IoT attacks include compromising baby monitors to enable unauthorized live
feeds [171], interconnected cars to control a car in motion [172], smartwatches
and fitness trackers to steal private information and health data [173], power
grids and steel mills to render them oﬄine [174], and medical devices with
detrimental, perhaps fatal, consequences on patients’ health [175]. Conse-
quently, security and privacy need to be first order design concerns for IoT
systems.
Information-flow security is one of the most well-studied approaches to
providing security and privacy in computer systems [176, 177, 178, 179, 180,
181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187]. The goal is to track flows of information
through a computer system and either detect or prevent illicit information
flows between tainted (e.g., untrusted or secure) state and untainted (e.g.,
trusted or non-secure) state. Tracking and managing flows allows a computer
system to support different information flow policies and provide information
flow guarantees that security and privacy constructs and protocols can be
built upon. An information flow security-based approach can be invaluable
in context of IoT systems due to the above discussed security and privacy
risks associated with such systems.
The vast majority of techniques for tracking and managing information
flows operate at the level of the ISA or above. While these techniques allow
tracking and management of explicit information channels, they are largely
incapable of doing the same for implicit or covert channels (including timing
channels) [186]. Gate-level information flow security approaches [186, 187]
have been proposed to allow tracking and management of information flow
channels at the finest-grained digital level – gates. These approaches typi-
cally augment hardware logic blocks with gate-level information flow tracking
(GLIFT) logic to perform information tracking. They also specify a method
for performing compositions of augmented logic blocks. A gate-level approach
allows tracking of all information flows – implicit, explicit, and covert – al-
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lowing one to build secure-by-design systems [188, 189] with varying degrees
of programmability, performance, and area.
While gate-level approaches are effective at providing information flow se-
curity, such approaches require hardware modifications. For example, re-
quired hardware support may include stacks of isolated timers that can
reset the PC, new pipeline control hardware, support to manage memory
bounds masking, and partitioned memory structures (caches, branch predic-
tors, etc.) [189]. While these modifications may be acceptable for certain
high-assurance systems [189], the ultra-low cost requirements of many IoT
applications and the volume nature of their microcontrollers may prohibit
such modifications.
We observe that many of the required architectural changes arise because
prior works assume that all software besides the kernel is completely un-
known. Since many emerging IoT applications run the same software again
and again for the lifetime of the system, we argue that there is a unique
opportunity to build low-overhead gate-level information flow techniques for
these IoT systems. Many IoT systems – consider wearables, implantables,
industrial controllers, sensor nodes, etc. – perform the same task (or a small
set of tasks) repetitively. However, cost reasons dictate that these systems
are implemented using a programmable microcontroller running application
software instead of an ASIC. We observe that for such systems, it may be
possible for a commodity microcontroller to guarantee gate-level information
flow security for a given application, even if a guarantee cannot be provided
for all applications.1 Similarly, for some applications where gate-level infor-
mation flow guarantees are not met, it may be possible to guarantee gate-level
information flow security only through minimal changes to the application
software, even if these changes will be inadequate at providing guarantees for
all applications (or for other processors). The ability to guarantee gate-level
information flow security for the applications of interest on commodity hard-
ware, even if no guarantee is provided for all applications, allows trusted IoT
execution without the programmability, performance, and monetary costs
of specialized secure-by-design systems derived from previous gate-level ap-
proaches.
1In this dissertation, we refer to the application as the entire binary code loaded into
a system’s program memory. This includes all computational tasks as well as all system
software.
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We rely on these observations to build a software tool that performs gate-
level information flow tracking for a given application on a given processor
design without any hardware design effort. The tool takes as input the
processor’s gate-level netlist, unmodified application binary, and informa-
tion flow policies of interest, and performs symbolic (i.e., input-agnostic)
gate-level simulation of the application binary on the netlist to determine
if any of the information flow policies could be violated. If none of the in-
formation flow policies could be violated at the gate-level, the processor is
declared to guarantee gate-level information flow security for the application.
If an information flow policy could be violated, the tool reports the offending
instruction(s) to the programmer as warnings or errors. This information
can then be used by the programmer or the compiler to modify application
software such that gate-level information flow guarantees are met for the ap-
plication. This analysis can be applied to an arbitrary application and even
for a commodity hardware design. Also, our approach can be used selectively
for the applications limiting overheads only to certain applications that need
software modification.
This chapter makes the following contributions:
• We present the first approach to track gate-level information on a per-
application basis. Our approach is software-based and can track gate-level
information even on a commodity hardware design.
• We show that feedback from our application-specific gate-level informa-
tion flow tracking can be used to modify application software in a way that
guarantees information flow security.
• We show that application-specific software modification to prevent only
the insecure information flows that a system is vulnerable to can reduce
overheads significantly (i.e., by 3.3×), on average, compared to an “always
on” software-based approach that assumes no knowledge of the application
running in a system.
8.2 Background and Related Work
Information flow security aims to (1) determine if any information flows ex-
ist from one state element (e.g., a variable in a program) to another state
element and to (2) prevent or warn users of such flows when a flow violates
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A AT B BT O OT
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 1 0 1 0
0 0 1 1 1 0
0 1 0 0 1 0
0 1 0 1 1 1
0 1 1 0 1 1
0 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 0 0 1 0
1 0 0 1 1 1
1 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 1 1 0 1
1 1 0 0 1 0
1 1 0 1 1 1
1 1 1 0 0 1
1 1 1 1 0 1
A B
O OT
AT BT
Figure 8.1: Example truth table for gate-level information flow tracking of
a NAND gate. A ‘1’ in the taint value columns (shaded gray) represents a
tainted value (e.g., untrusted or secret values). Taint is propagated through
a gate based on the gate’s input values (e.g., A,B) and their corresponding
taints (e.g., AT , BT ). If a tainted input can affect the output (e.g., when
A = 0, AT = 1, and B = 1), the output becomes tainted. However, a taint
does not propagate to the output when a tainted input cannot affect the
output (e.g., due to masking, as when A = 1, AT = 1, B = 0, and BT = 0).
an information flow policy. Past work [176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181] has per-
formed information-flow tracking at the software level and demonstrated its
effectiveness at detecting a set of security vulnerabilities without modifica-
tion of the hardware (i.e., applicable on commodity hardware). Other work
[182, 183, 184, 185] proposes hardware modifications for improved efficiency
and accuracy of ISA-level information flow tracking. Unfortunately, these
approaches not only require hardware modifications, but they may still miss
information flows that crop up as a result of the low-level implementation
details of a processor [186]. Our approach aims to achieve the advantages of
both software-based and hardware-based information flow tracking – applica-
bility to unmodified commodity hardware, accuracy in tracking information
flows, and minimal runtime overhead – without the corresponding limita-
tions.
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In order to track all forms of digital information flow, Tiwari et al. [186]
proposed gate-level information flow tracking (GLIFT). As shown in Fig-
ure 8.1, GLIFT augments each gate in a design with taint-tracking hard-
ware. The taint of a gate’s output is determined by the values and taints
of its inputs. By propagating taint values through each gate, tainted data
(e.g., untrusted or secret) can be tracked from input ports (or other marked
data, including instructions in program memory) through the processor at
the gate level to guarantee that no tainted data reaches an output port that
should remain untainted (e.g., a trusted or non-secret output). When fabri-
cated with the base design, GLIFT can dynamically track taints at a high
degree of accuracy, albeit at up to a 3× overhead in hardware. More recently,
GLIFT has been used to statically track information flows [189]. In this work,
an analysis called *-logic is used to statically track taints for a microkernel
with no non-determinism running on hardware designed to be easily verifi-
able. The focus was on performing gate-level information flow tracking for
a specific, application-agnostic secure-by-design system. We focus, instead,
on performing application-specific gate-level information flow tracking for
arbitrary IoT applications on commodity hardware, including applications
with control dependencies on unknown, tainted inputs. When analyzed with
*-logic, such applications could unnecessarily taint all software-exercisable
gates.
Based on the insights and verification of GLIFT, several secure-by-design
processors have been built. They range from a predication-based, non-
Turing-complete processor [186] to processors that can handle arbitrary com-
putations through hardware compartmentalization [188, 189]. While these
processors can guarantee that any software that runs on them cannot violate
a non-interference information security policy (i.e., no untrusted inputs can
affect trusted outputs and no secret inputs can affect non-secret outputs),
they can be limited in their programmability (e.g., [186] requires all loops to
be statically bounded while [188] does not naturally support unbounded or
variable-length operations) and require hardware modifications (e.g., parti-
tioned memory structures and memory bounds checking hardware). The
cost of any re-design of a commodity microcontroller may be prohibitive in
the context of IoT systems, given the huge diversity of IoT systems being
driven by commodity microcontrollers [138]. In this chapter, we design full
systems that ensure the same non-interference policy as [189] (i.e., no un-
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trusted input can affect a trusted output and no secret input can affect a
non-secret output), but on a per-application basis.
Recently, a body of work has emerged on developing hardware descrip-
tion languages and tools to design and verify information flow secure hard-
ware [190, 191, 192, 193]. While such works can prove that a hardware de-
sign meets an information flow security policy, even one that is commercial,
such as ARM’s Trustzone [193], these approaches cannot verify commodity
hardware that does not already implement information flow security. Our
approach targets commodity hardware, in addition to emerging hardware,
and allows application developers to demonstrate the security of their appli-
cations at a fine-grained level.
8.3 Motivation
In this section, we motivate an application-specific approach for gate-level
information flow security in IoT systems through a series of examples. In
the first example (Figure 8.2), we consider existing secure-by-design systems
based on gate-level information flow tracking. These systems have been de-
signed assuming that the application software running on the system is un-
known [186, 188, 189]. Figure 8.2 depicts a processor running an unknown
application (all Xs). In the figure, port P1 is an input port through which
the processor may read tainted data. Also, a partition in the data memory
is marked as containing tainted data. Since the application is unknown, we
are forced to assume that the unknown instructions may read tainted data
from all possible sources, propagate tainted data to all parts of the proces-
sor, and also write tainted data to all untainted ports and memory regions.
I.e., we must assume that an unknown application has the potential to cause
all possible information flow security violations. Faced with this possibility,
the only way to guarantee information flow security is to design a secure-by-
design system that includes hardware mechanisms to proactively prevent all
possible insecure information flows. While this approach results in a system
that is immune to all possible security violations that an arbitrary appli-
cation may cause, such stringent security measures require modifications to
processor hardware and may often be overly-conservative in an IoT system
that runs a single, and often simple, application. For example, consider Fig-
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Figure 8.2: Assuming that an application is unknown means that the
application may perform any action, including reading from all possible
sources of tainted data, propagating tainted data to all parts of the
processor, and writing tainted data through all untainted ports if
hardware-based mechanisms are not put in place to prevent insecure
information flows.
ure 8.3, which shows the same processor running a known application. When
the application is run on the processor, it never writes tainted data to un-
tainted ports or memory partitions.2 Therefore, it is possible to guarantee
information flow security for this system without making any changes to the
hardware or software. This example demonstrates that guaranteeing informa-
tion flow security is possible, even for an application running on a commodity
processor, when the application software is known. This is encouraging for
security-critical IoT systems, which, due to economic considerations, more
often than not rely on lightweight commodity processors.
For the next example, consider Figure 8.4, which shows the same processor
running a different known application that reads an input from a tainted port
an uses it as a base pointer (offset) to access data memory. Since the input
is tainted, it is possible that the memory address calculated from the offset
maps to the untainted region of memory, allowing tainted data to propagate
through the memory to an untainted output port. Thus, the application
contains a potential information flow security violation that could be either
2Tracking of information flow violations is simplified for demonstrative purposes in these
examples by assuming that the only flows that exist are the ones visible in the abstract
processor representation; actual identification of tainted information flows requires gate-
level tracking to ensure complete coverage [186] (see Section 8.4).
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offset = 3;
for (int i = 0; i < 25; i++){
a = <P1>;
c[i + offset] = a + c[i];
<P2> = c[i + offset];    }
for (int i = 0; i < 25; i++){
b = <P3>;
d[i] = b + d[i];
<P4> = d[i];             }
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Figure 8.3: An IoT system that runs a single application may not be
vulnerable to any insecure information flows, even when the application is
run on a commodity processor. In this example, tainted/untainted code
only uses tainted/untainted ports, and no insecure information flows are
possible.
exploited intentionally (e.g., an input supplied by a malicious attacker) or
exposed unintentionally (e.g., an unfortunate input supplied by an unwitting
user).
Although the application in Figure 8.4 is vulnerable to an insecure infor-
mation flow, it does not necessarily mean that the application must be run on
a secure-by-design system with hardware-based security mechanisms to en-
sure information flow security. Consider Figure 8.5, which shows a different,
functionally equivalent version of the same application running on the same
commodity processor. In this version of the application, the base address
(offset) read from the tainted port is filtered through a masking operation
that sets certain bits in the address (e.g., the most significant bits) to ensure
that addresses computed using the offset map only to the tainted region of
memory. Since this software change prevents the possibility of propagating
tainted data to an untainted output port, no information flow security viola-
tions are possible for the modified application. Thus, through knowledge of
the application and its potential security exploits, it is possible in this case
to prevent information flow security violations in a system only by making
changes to the software running in the system.
The examples in this section show that (1) it is possible to guarantee infor-
mation flow security on a commodity processor without the use of restrictive,
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PROCESSOR offset = <P1>;
for (int i = 0; i < 25; i++){
a = <P1>;
c[i + offset] = a + c[i];
<P2> = c[i + offset];    }
for (int i = 0; i < 25; i++){
b = <P3>;
d[i] = b + d[i];
<P4> = d[i];             }
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Figure 8.4: This application is vulnerable to information flows that could
jeopardize system security. The application uses tainted input data to
compute the address for a write operation. The write taints untainted
memory, allowing a violation when tainted data are sent out of an
untainted port.
offset = <P1>; 
Offset = mask (offset);
for (int i = 0; i < 25; i++){
a = <P1>;
c[i + Offset] = a + c[i];
<P2> = c[i + Offset];    }
for (int i = 0; i < 25; i++){
b = <P3>; d[i] = b + d[i];
<P4> = d[i];             }
P2
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Figure 8.5: A simple change to the application in Figure 8.4 (masking the
tainted memory address to limit its scope) renders the system immune to
insecure information flows, demonstrating that it may be possible to
provide information flow security on a commodity processor by changing
the software that runs on the processor.
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hardware-based information flow control mechanisms, and (2) it is possible
to eliminate information flow security violations in an embedded system sim-
ply by making software modifications. However, these possibilities can only
be realized with (1) knowledge of the application running in the system, and
(2) a means of identifying all possible insecure information flows to which
the application is vulnerable.
Based on these insights, we propose an application-specific approach to
guaranteeing information flow security for IoT systems that identifies all
information flow security violations that are possible for a system consisting
of a commodity processor and application software and provides software-
based techniques that can be used to prevent these information flow security
violations.
8.4 Application-Specific Gate-Level Information Flow
Tracking
Section 8.3 motivates the potential benefits of a software-based application-
specific approach to information flow security, but bringing the application
into the picture presents several challenges for gate-level information flow
tracking. While it does allow secure-by-design systems to be built on com-
modity hardware, it requires a means of identifying all possible insecure in-
formation flows that may occur in a system, for all possible executions of
the system’s software, for any possible inputs that may be applied to the
system. In this section, we describe an automated technique that takes as
input the hardware description (gate-level netlist) of a processor, the soft-
ware that runs on the system, and labels identifying trusted / untrusted (or
secure / insecure) inputs and outputs in the system and efficiently explores
all possible application-specific execution states for the system to identify
all possible insecure information flows in the system. The output from our
automated framework can be used to verify the information flow security of
a system as well as to guide and automate software modification to eliminate
information flow security vulnerabilities in the system.
Figure 8.6 shows the process for verifying a security policy using application-
specific gate-level information flow tracking. The first step performs oﬄine
input-independent gate-level taint tracking of an entire systems binary run-
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ning on a gate-level description of a processor. The initial components that
are tainted are specified by the information flow security policy (e.g., ports
labeled as untrusted or memory locations labeled as secret). The result of
taint tracking is a per-cycle representation of tainted state (both gates and
memory bits). The second step performs information flow policy checking
where the information flow checks specified by the information flow secu-
rity policy are verified on the per-cycle tainted state. The result is a list of
possible violations of the information flow security policy.
8.4.1 Input-Independent Gate-Level Taint Tracking
Algorithm 5 describes our input-independent gate-level taint tracking that is
built on top of the symbolic co-analysis described in Chapter 4. Initially, the
values of all memory cells and gates are set as unknown values (i.e., Xs) and
are marked as untainted. The system binary, consisting of both tainted and
untainted partitions,3 is loaded into program memory. Our tool performs
input-independent taint tracking based on symbolic simulation, where each
bit of an input is set to an unknown value symbol, X. Additionally, inputs
or state elements may be tainted according to the specified information flow
security policy (e.g., the non-interference policy described in Section 8.2).
Throughout simulation, logical values are propagated throughout the circuit
as standard ternary logic. Taint values, which are dependent on both the
taint values of inputs and their logical values, are propagated as described in
[186] and exemplified in Figure 8.1.
A key difference between our input-independent gate-level taint tracking
and prior analyses such as *-logic occurs when an unknown symbol propa-
gates to the PC. For example, directly applying a *-logic analysis on commod-
ity hardware to an application where the PC becomes unknown and tainted
results in most of the gates in the hardware also becoming unknown and
tainted, since most gates are impacted by the PC. However, in our analysis,
if an X propagates to the PC, indicating input-dependent control flow, our
simulator branches the execution tree and simulates execution for all possible
branch paths (i.e., the abstract representation of the PC is made concrete
3Note that tainted and untainted code partitions do not indicate that the corresponding
instructions are marked as tainted or untainted in the program memory, although our tool
allows them to be.
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while still retaining the taint values), following a depth-first ordering of the
control flow graph. Since this naive simulation approach does not scale well
for complex or infinite control structures which result in a large number of
branches to explore, we employ a conservative approximation that allows
our analysis to scale for arbitrarily complex control structures while conser-
vatively maintaining correctness in exploring possible execution states. Our
scalable approach works by tracking the most conservative gate-level state
that has been observed for each PC-changing instruction (e.g., conditional
branch). The most conservative state is the one where the most variables are
assumed to be unknown (X). When a branch is re-encountered while simu-
lating on a control flow path, simulation down that path can be terminated
if the symbolic state being simulated is a substate of the most conservative
state previously observed at the branch (i.e., the states match or the more
conservative state has Xs in all differing variables), since the state (or a more
conservative version) has already been explored. If the simulated state is not
a substate of the most conservative observed state, the two states are merged
to create a new conservative symbolic state by replacing differing state vari-
ables with Xs, and simulation continues from the conservative state.
The result of the conservative approximation technique is a pruned execu-
tion tree that stores both the logical and taint values at each point. Once
a state, such as S2, is observed for a second time, there is no further ex-
ploration down that path since all further states have already been consid-
ered. This conservative approximation technique allows input-independent
gate-level taint tracking to complete in a tractable amount of time, even
for applications with an exponentially large or infinite number of execution
paths.4
8.4.2 Information Flow Checking
The result of input-independent gate-level taint tracking is a conservative
symbolic execution that represents all possible executions of the entire sys-
tem’s binary. This symbolic execution tree is annotated with logical gate
4Some complex applications and processors might still require heuristics for exploration
of a large number of execution paths [71, 72]; however, our approach is adequate for ultra-
low-power systems, representative of an increasing number of future uses which tend to
have simple processors and applications [82, 4]. For example, complete analysis of our
most complex system takes 3 hours.
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Figure 8.6: Application-specific gate-level information flow tracking
evaluates specific information flow security policies across all possible
executions of the entire system binary, producing a list of all possible
violations.
Algorithm 5 Input-Independent Gate-Level Taint Tracking
1. Procedure Taint Tracking(system binary, design netlist, security policy)
2. Initialize all memory cells and all gates in design netlist to untainted X
3. Mark tainted ports and gates according to security policy
4. Load system binary into program memory
5. Propagate reset signal
6. s← State at start of system binary
7. Table of previously observed symbolic states, T .insert(s)
8. Symbolic execution tree, S.set root(s)
9. Stack of un-processed execution points, U .push(s)
10. mark all gates untoggled(design netlist)
11. while U != ∅ do
12. e← U .pop()
13. while e.PC next != X and !e.END do
14. e.set inputs X() // set all peripheral port inputs to Xs
15. e.set taints(security policy) // taint appropriate state according to security policy
16. e′ ← propagate gate values(e) // simulate this cycle
17. t← propagate taint values(e′,e) // determine taint values for e’
18. S.add simulation point(e′,t) // store logical and taint state
19. if e′.modifies PC then
20. c← T .get conservative state(e)
21. if e′ 6⊂ c then
22. T .make conservative superstate(c,e′)
23. else
24. break
25. end if
26. end if
27. e← e′ // advance cycle state
28. end while
29. if e.PC next == X then
30. c← T .get conservative state(e)
31. if e 6⊂ c then
32. e′ ← T .make conservative superstate(c,e)
33. foreach a ∈ possible PC next vals(e′) do
34. e′′ ← e.update PC next(a)
35. U .push(e′′)
36. end for
37. end if
38. end if
39. end while
198
Cycle S ST In InT rst rstT S’ S’T
0 X 0 X 0 1 0 X 0
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
2 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1
Execution	Tree:
Circuit:
State	Machine:
SIn
S’
CLK
rst
clr
QD
In
In
In! In!
Cycle S ST In InT rst rstT S’ S’T
3 1 1 X 0 0 0 X 1
4 X 1 X 0 1 1 X 1
5 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
Cycle S ST In InT rst rstT S’ S’T
3 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1
4 0 1 X 1 1 0 X 1
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Figure 8.7: Example of application-specific gate-level information flow
tracking.
values and associated taint values. Using these taint values, information flow
checking can be performed where the specific security policy is checked. An
example information flow security policy is defined by [189]: input and out-
put ports are labeled as trusted or untrusted and, independently, as secret
or non-secret (i.e., untrusted and secret are two taints that are analyzed sep-
arately). An attacker is assumed to have complete control over all untrusted
inputs to the device and controls the initial implementation of untrusted
code, which is known at analysis time. No untrusted information can flow
out of a trusted port, and no secret information can flow out of a non-secret
port.
8.4.3 Illustrative Example
This section illustrates how application-specific gate-level information flow
tracking works. Figure 8.7 depicts application-specific gate-level information
flow tracking on an example portion of a processor circuit using a symbolic
execution tree that identifies all information flows in all execution paths of
an application.
Consider a small portion of a processor represented by the simple state
machine in the top left of Figure 8.7 and implemented by the circuit in
the bottom left of the figure. During application-specific gate-level informa-
tion flow tracking of the application binary, the gate-level circuit is symbol-
ically simulated using logical 1s, 0s, and Xs (i.e., unknown value symbols).
Along with the values of each gate, a taint value is associated with each gate
and is propagated according to the gate type and input values of the gate
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(taint values are shown with a light gray background). The right side of
Figure 8.7 contains an example (abbreviated) symbolic execution tree that
tracks taint values through all possible execution paths of an application dur-
ing application-specific gate-level information flow tracking. In cycle 0, the
circuit starts out in an unknown, yet untainted state (i.e., both S and In
are Xs while ST and InT are 0s). As a result of the untainted reset asserted
in cycle 0, the circuit enters a known state, S = 0. Input In becomes an
untainted 1 in cycle 1, resulting in the circuit transitioning to an untainted
S = 1 state in cycle 2. After cycle 2, the PC (not shown) becomes an un-
known value (X), so symbolic simulation is split into two paths. Since In
is a tainted 0 in cycle 2 and propagates its taint to S ′, both branches start
in a tainted state S = 1 in cycle 3. In cycle 3 of the left-hand path, In,
which is unknown and untainted is XORed with S, which is tainted, and the
circuit transitions into an unknown tainted state (S = X,ST = 1). In cycle
4 of the left-hand path, a tainted reset is asserted, which puts the circuit
into a known state, S = 0. However, since the reset signal was tainted, the
output state of the flip-flop remains tainted (ST = 1). This illustrates that
a tainted reset signal will not untaint processor state elements. However, on
the right-hand path, an untainted reset is asserted in cycle 4. This does reset
the circuit into a known and untainted state (S = 0, ST = 0).
After tracking taints through every execution of the application, the execu-
tion tree characterizes all possible information flows for the application and
can be used to identify all possible information flow violations. The specific
conditions that we check for violations are described in Section 8.5.1.
8.5 Guaranteeing Information Flow Security for an
Application
In this section, we describe software-based techniques that eliminate infor-
mation flow security vulnerabilities in applications. Section 8.5.1 establishes
conditions that are sufficient to guarantee information flow security, and Sec-
tion 8.5.2 describes software transformations that are designed to guarantee
that an application that is vulnerable to insecure information flows will sat-
isfy the sufficient conditions. In Section 8.5.3, we verify that the software
transformations achieve information flow security when run on a commodity
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processor, and in Section 8.5.4, we prove that the transformations satisfy the
sufficient conditions and ensure information flow security.
8.5.1 Sufficient Conditions for Guaranteeing Information
Flow Security
In this section, we lay out a set of conditions that are sufficient for guar-
anteeing the non-interference information flow security policy described in
Section 8.2. Later, we will show how our application-specific approach to
information flow security satisfies these conditions.
(1) All processor state elements are untainted before untainted code (i.e.,
trusted or non-secret code) is executed.
(2) Tainted code does not taint an untainted memory partition used by un-
tainted code.
(3) Untainted code does not load data from a tainted memory partition.
(4) Untainted code does not read from tainted input ports.
(5) Tainted code does not write to untainted output ports.
While the conditions above are not necessary for guaranteeing information
flow security, they are sufficient; i.e., a system that maintains the conditions
will not leak information. For an information leak of tainted data to oc-
cur, tainted data must be accessible to an untainted task in some state or
memory element or through a port; a leak occurs when an untainted task
propagates accessible tainted data to an untainted output that it has access
to, or when a tainted task sends tainted data directly to an untainted output.
The conditions above are sufficient to guarantee information flow security be-
cause they preclude all possible direct (through a port) or indirect (through
state or memory) channels through which tainted information could leak.
The first four conditions preclude all possible indirect information flows of
tainted data, stating that if an untainted task executes in a taint-free pro-
cessor, its memory partition remains taint-free, and it does not load tainted
data from tainted memory or ports, its computations and outputs will remain
untainted. The last condition precludes direct information flows of tainted
data, stating that a tainted task is not allowed to write to untainted output
ports.
Since the set of conditions above are sufficient, a system that meets the con-
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ditions guarantees non-interference. Secure-by-design processors use hard-
ware-based information flow control mechanisms to guarantee that the above
conditions are met for all possible applications that execute on the proces-
sor [186, 188, 189]. However, none of the conditions above are actually
necessary to guarantee non-interference. For example, it is acceptable for
state elements to be tainted when an untainted task executes (a violation
of condition 1), as long as the computations performed by the task do not
depend on any tainted state elements. Similarly, exceptions can be made
for all the sufficient conditions (they are not necessary). Thus, as long as
the original non-interference property (see Section 8.2) holds, any or all of
the sufficient conditions described above may be relaxed. This insight has
several interesting implications. (1) Since our symbolic analysis technique
for input-independent gate-level taint tracking can check whether the non-
interference property holds for all possible executions of a known application
without forcing the application to meet the conditions above, it is possible to
provide a security guarantee for any application that has no possible viola-
tions, even on a commodity processor that is not secure by design. (2) Since
symbolic input-independent gate-level taint tracking can identify all possible
instances where an application causes the non-interference property to be
violated for a system, it can be used to identify locations where an appli-
cation must be modified to prevent insecure information flows, as well as to
verify whether a modified application is secure. (3) Some applications have
no possibility of violating one or more of the conditions above. Therefore,
some security mechanisms applied by secure-by-design processors represent
unnecessary overhead for those applications. On the other hand, if insecure
information flows can be eliminated through software modifications, the mod-
ifications can specifically target only the insecure information flows to which
an application is vulnerable, potentially reducing the overhead of providing
security for the system and enhancing programmability (by imposing fewer
restrictions on software).
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8.5.2 Software Techniques to Eliminate Insecure Information
Flows
When the sufficient conditions for information flow security described in the
previous section are not satisfied, it is possible for tainted information to
leak. For example, allowing an untainted task to read and operate on tainted
data may result in tainting of a processor’s control flow state, and subse-
quently the execution of an untainted task. Specifically, if a processor’s
program counter (PC) becomes tainted, then all subsequent instructions will
be tainted. Therefore, the control flow of an untainted computational task
can also become tainted if it executes after a tainted task that taints the
processor’s control flow state. In fact, once the PC is tainted by a tainted
task, it is possible that control may never become untainted, even if control is
returned to untainted code. Preventing information flows from tainted to un-
tainted code must include prevention of all direct information flow (e.g., the
tainted code cannot call a yield function to return to untainted execution)
and all indirect information flow (i.e., there must exist a mechanism that
deterministically bounds the execution time of the tainted code). To avoid
information leaks through control flow, there must exist an untaintable, de-
terministic mechanism that recovers the PC to an untainted state that fetches
code from an untainted code partition.
Another common way for information to leak in a commodity processor
is through the memory. If code that is allowed to handle tainted informa-
tion writes to data memory using a fully tainted address, then the entire
data memory, including partitions belonging to untainted code, will become
tainted. For example, if tainted code reads a value from a tainted input port
and then uses the value as an index to write into an array, the tainted ad-
dress causes the entire data memory to become tainted, not just the memory
location pointed to by the address. To avoid such leaks, a mechanism is
needed to guarantee that no possible execution of tainted code can write to
an untainted data memory partition.
For cases where an application violates the sufficient conditions and is vul-
nerable to insecure information flows, we propose two software transforma-
tions, analogous to the hardware mechanisms presented in [188], that target
and prevent insecure information flows.
Untainted Timer Reset: An untainted timer can be used to reset the
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PC to an untainted location after a deterministic execution time of running
tainted code, thus guaranteeing that tainted code cannot affect the execution
of untainted code. However, on a commodity processor (e.g., openMSP430),
generating such a timer is challenging for two reasons. First, common mech-
anisms for setting the PC, such as interrupts, still depend on the current,
possibly tainted state of the pipeline to determine when the PC is reset.
Second, the timer must not become tainted. As an example, on the open-
MSP430, a timer could be directly tainted by tainted code writing to its
memory-mapped control register. To overcome these challenges, we propose
using the watchdog timer that is common to many microcontrollers to reset
the entire processor after a deterministic-length period of tainted execution.
We use our symbolic simulation-based analysis to guarantee that the watch-
dog remains untainted.
Figure 8.8 shows our proposed watchdog timer reset. During the execution
of a context switch in an untainted system code partition, the watchdog
timer is set to a predetermined value for the computational task that is
being switched in. The untainted system code then transfers execution to
the tainted computational task. This tainted task can make full use of the
processor, except writing to the watchdog or an untainted memory space
partition or port, possibly propagating taints throughout the pipeline. When
the untainted watchdog expires, it resets the entire pipeline with a power-on
reset (POR).5 Since this reset is untainted, the state within the pipeline will
be reset to untainted values, including the PC.
While using the watchdog timer flushes tainted data from the processor,
the subsequent reset state is only untainted if the watchdog timer itself re-
mains untainted. Since applications are known during analysis, the symbolic
simulation used during input-independent gate-level taint tracking allows us
to identify whether or not any tainted code can write to the control register
of the watchdog timer during any possible execution of the tainted code. If
there is no possibility of tainted code writing to the control register of the
watchdog timer, the write enable input for the control register is verified
to be untainted. The only information this can leak is the fact that the
tainted code does not access the watchdog timer – a known requirement for
5We assume that the POR does not reset memory. This is a reasonable assumption,
since many microcontrollers have non-volatile memory, including TI’s MSP430FRXX se-
ries.
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ADDR Instruction
0 nop
1 mov #100, r10
2 nop
3 nop
4 dec r10
5 jnz #2
6 jmp #0
Untainted
Tainted
PROGRAM	MEMORY
0x0000
ADDR Instruction
0 ; enable interruptsmov #0x0008, r2  
1 ; enable watchdogmov #0x5a0b, &WDTCTL   
2 nop
3 mov #100, r10
4 nop
5 nop
6 dec r10
7 jnz #2
8 nop
... ...
64 nop
PC
0x0001
PC
0x0002
PC
0x0003
PC
0x0004
PC
0x0041
PC
0x0000
PC
0x0002
WDG
0x0003
WDG
0x0040
WDG
0x0000
WDG
0x0000
PC
Figure 8.8: Untainted timer reset example: In the left-hand code listing, all
instructions after address 0 are marked as tainted. Once the first tainted
instruction is loaded, the PC quickly becomes tainted and the jump back to
the untainted instruction at address 0 does not reset the PC to being
untainted. However, by setting the watchdog timer during the untainted
portion of the code (the right-hand code listing) and padding the tainted
portion with nops, the PC can be reset to an untainted value in the
untainted partition of code.
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guaranteeing information flow security using our approach.
Note that this mechanism works naturally in multi-programming and task
switching environments that are common in realtime embedded systems. Be-
fore context switching to a tainted computational task, the untainted system
code simply sets the watchdog timer to the appropriate interval for the task
– either the maximum length of the task or the length of an OS time slice,
depending on the usage scenario. Expiration of the timer resets the processor
to an untainted state, as usual, which also resets the PC. The code at PC =
0 either contains or vectors to the system routine for switching in the next
context.
If a tainted computational task wants to use the watchdog timer, it may
not be possible to certify the system as secure unless (a) it is impossible
for the tainted task to cause a control flow violation or (b) an alternative,
functionally equivalent (or otherwise acceptable) option can be used in place
of the watchdog timer. Microprocessors typically provide several hardware
timers, and it may be possible to emulate the functionality desired by the
tainted task using a different timer. If it is not possible to use another
available timer, software optimizations such as prediction may be used to
eliminate the possibility of control flow violations.
Software Masked Addressing:
Figure 8.9 shows our proposed memory bounds masking. The left side
shows the original assembly code where a tainted address is used to store
data, tainting the entire data memory. On the right side, the assembly code
is modified to mask the memory address to guarantee that it falls within
the region of data memory to which tainted code is allowed to write. Input-
independent taint tracking can then verify that no taint is propagated to
memory regions that are untainted. While simple masking solves the mem-
ory address taint problem for the case where the PC remains untainted,
masking alone cannot guarantee information flow security when the PC be-
comes tainted. In this case, the tainted PC taints the masking instructions
themselves. However, during application-specific gate-level information flow
tracking, the program, including the added masking instructions, is known.
In this case, our information flow tracking analysis can verify that no possible
execution of the tainted code can generate an address outside of the regions
of data memory that are allowed to be tainted. If there is no possibility
of being able to write outside of allowed memory regions, there is no pos-
206
ADDR Instruction
0 mov #4096, &DMEM_250
1 mov #49, r15
2 mov.b #1, 0(r15)
3 mov #32, r15
4 ; read untrusted inputmov @r15, r15
5 mov #512, r14
6 add r15, r14
7 mov #500, 0(r14)
8 mov r15, &DMEM_200
ADDR Instruction
0 mov #4096, &DMEM_250
1 mov #49, r15
2 mov.b #1, 0(r15)
3 mov #32, r15
4 ; read untrusted inputmov @r15, r15
5 mov #512, r14
6 add r15, r14
7 and #0x03FF, R14
8 bis  #0x0400, R14
9 mov #500, 0(r14)
10 mov r15, &DMEM_200
DATA	MEMORY
Untainted
Tainted
PROGRAM	MEMORY
0x400
0x500
0x400
0x500
Figure 8.9: Memory mask example: In the left-hand code listing, the
instruction at address 4 reads a tainted and unknown input. At address 6,
the tainted input is used to calculate the address for a store at address 7.
Since the address is both unknown and tainted, that store ends up tainting
the whole data memory space. By adding two instructions at addresses 7
and 8 (see the right-hand code listing) that mask the address to only use
the tainted task’s memory partition, no untainted memory locations
become tainted.
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sibility of information flow, either explicit or implicit, between the allowed
and disallowed memory regions. The only information flow that can leak is
the information that the tainted application does not write outside of its al-
lowed memory region – a known condition for guaranteeing information flow
security.
8.5.3 Verification of Software Techniques
Here, we verify that our software techniques for guaranteeing information flow
security indeed work using the micro-benchmarks presented in Figure 8.8 and
Figure 8.9 and an unmodified openMSP430 processor. Consider the left-hand
code listing in Figure 8.8. We initialize the input-independent gate-level
taint tracking such that the instructions shaded gray are tainted. During
any possible execution of the application, once the PC becomes tainted, it
never becomes untainted again. However, if the watchdog timer is set using
untainted code (see the right-hand code listing in Figure 8.8), each execution
of the untainted code section has a trusted PC. Now consider the right-hand
code listing in Figure 8.9. Here, the code itself is not marked as tainted, but
the code reads data from a tainted port and uses it to index into an array.
During input-independent taint tracking, each input that is read from the
tainted port is tainted. We observe during information flow tracking that
the entire memory space becomes tainted, due to the propagation of tainted
data to a memory address calculation. When instructions are inserted that
guarantee that the unknown address is bounded to the tainted task’s region
in data memory, then the result of information flow tracking indicates that
no untainted memory locations can be tainted.
8.5.4 Proving Information Flow Security
Theorem : For a system S consisting of a processor P and application A, if
application-specific gate-level information flow tracking TS of S reports that
S is secure (i.e., satisfies the non-interference property), tainted data in P
will never influence the execution of a trusted computational task AI in S,
and P will never propagate tainted data through an untainted output.
Proof : For tainted data to influence the execution of AI , a taint must
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propagate from a tainted input of S to an untainted output written by AI
either through a state element of P , through the memory, or directly from a
port.
Case 1 – taint propagation through a state element: For taintedness to influ-
ence AI through a state element E , E must be tainted by a tainted computa-
tional task AJ and remain tainted while AI is executing on P . However, in
any case where TS identifies a possible tainted information flow from AJ to
AI , A is modified to invoke the watchdog timer mechanism to reset all state
elements in the processor after the execution of AJ and before the execution
of AI . Therefore, taint propagation through a state element is impossible,
as long as AJ does not interfere with the untainted operation of the watch-
dog timer. Since TS checks all possible execution states of A on P and also
reports that A is insecure if a taint propagates to the watchdog timer in
any possible state, assurance of security from TS means that it is impossi-
ble for tainted data to propagate through a state element and influence the
execution of AI .
Case 2 – taint propagation through memory: For taintedness to influence AI
through the memory, a tainted computational task AJ must write to some
memory locationM outside its tainted memory partition, and AI must read
from that memory location while it is executing on P . However, in any case
where TS identifies that AJ could write outside of its memory partition, A
is modified such that masking instructions are inserted to ensure that AJ
can only write inside its own memory partition. Furthermore, TS checks
all possible execution states of A on P and reports that A is insecure if a
tainted write is performed to untainted memory or a read is performed from
tainted memory by any untainted computational task. Therefore, assurance
of security from TS means that it is impossible for tainted data to propagate
through memory and influence the execution of AI .
Case 3 – taint propagation through a port: For taintedness to propagate to
an output through a port, either some AI must read from a tainted port or
some AJ must write directly to an untainted port. Both cases are reported
as insecure by TS as it evaluates all possible execution states of A. Therefore,
assurance of security from TS means that it is impossible for tainted data to
influence the execution of AI or propagate to an untainted output from a
port. 
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Figure 8.10: Software refactoring tool flow: Based on the results of
application-specific gate-level information flow tracking (Section 8.4), root
cause identification generates a list of instructions that violate the
untainted memory partitions condition and code tasks (e.g., functions) that
violate the untainted control flow condition. These can then be used by a
programmer or compiler to apply software-based fixes for the information
flow violations.
8.6 A Toolflow for Software-Based Gate-Level
Information Flow Security
We have developed an end-to-end toolflow, depicted in Figure 8.10, for de-
veloping systems that guarantee information flow security on commodity
processors. The first stage in the toolflow checks whether an application
conforms to a given information flow security policy. This stage takes as
input the application software, including application code, library code, and
system code, as well as the gate-level description of the processor, and per-
forms application-specific gate-level information flow tracking (Section 8.4)
on the system for a developer-defined information flow security policy that
provides tainted / untainted labels for hardware and software (e.g., ports,
code partitions, data partitions). The output of information flow tracking
is a list of all possible information flow violations that may be generated
by the application, along with cycle-accurate tainted state for each type of
information flow.
To guarantee information flow security for the system, all identified viola-
tions must be eliminated by modifying the application software. To this end,
the next stage of the toolflow reports potential information flow security vio-
lations to the developer at instruction-level granularity. This stage identifies
the root cause of each potential gate-level violation – i.e., the instructions
that lead to violations. For violations where the PC becomes tainted during
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execution of a tainted code partition, our root cause identification tool marks
the tainted partition as having tainted control flow, requiring the watchdog
mechanism to be invoked. In cases where a store instruction in a tainted
program partition can potentially write to an untainted memory partition,
the static instruction (identified by its address in the program memory) is
marked as needing masking.
The final stage of our toolflow refactors the software of the application in
order to guarantee information flow security. The necessary software modi-
fications identified by root cause analysis can be applied either manually or
automatically by the compiler (Figure 8.11).6 For each instance where the
compiler applies a modification to the software to eliminate a possible inse-
cure information flow, it also reports a compile error or warning (depending
on the severity of the violation) to the developer, indicating the line of code
that caused the violation and the change that was made to fix the viola-
tion. Errors are reported for direct information leaks of tainted data that
are not allowed (e.g., tainted code writes to an untainted output port), and
warnings are reported for violations that may indirectly lead to information
leaks if not fixed (e.g., a store from tainted code can write to an untainted
memory partition). Reviewing the list of compile errors and warnings can
be informative, since some violations and fixes are unavoidable (e.g., tainted
control flow resulting from a control instruction that depends on a tainted
input, which is fixed using the watchdog timer), while other violations may
be caused by unintended software bugs (e.g., a store that is vulnerable to
buffer overflow, which is fixed by masking). In the case of unintended soft-
ware bugs, changing the program code may avoid the need for automated
software modification to eliminate violations (e.g., fixing the buffer overflow
problem avoids the need to mask the store).
After software has been modified to eliminate all possible information leaks
of tainted data, application-specific gate-level information flow tracking can
be used to verify that it is now impossible for the system to violate the
6Two specific cases require programmer attention. First, if an untainted task directly
accesses a tainted memory location or input port or a tainted task directly accesses an
untainted output port, there is a fundamental violation in the software. In this case,
an error is reported and the programmer must either change the software to eliminate
the illegal access or redefine the information flow security labels. Second, if a tainted
task originally uses the watchdog and also requires the watchdog for information flow
guarantees, the programmer must either avoid using the watchdog or refactor the program
to avoid tainting control flow (see Section 8.5.2 for details).
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Figure 8.11: Automated software modification to eliminate information flow
security violations for MSP430 involves C/C++ source code compilation
and assembly into an object file that is linked with libraries, including a
runtime support library to generate an executable object file, which is
converted into hex that can be loaded into program memory.
Application-specific information flow tracking and root-cause analysis use
the final hex (program memory contents) to identify code tasks and store
instructions that can cause violations. If a watchdog timer is needed, it is
enabled in the system software via a #define. Any necessary mask
insertions are performed in the assembly file at the specific addresses
(instructions) identified by root cause analysis (if the watchdog was needed,
analysis must be performed again on the new assembly file prior to mask
insertion). The new, modified assembly file is run through the remainder of
the toolflow to produce a new hex file to be loaded into the program
memory.
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specified information flow policy, i.e., the system now guarantees information
flow security.
The feedback provided by our toolflow potentially represents another ben-
efit of application-specific information flow tracking over secure-by-design
processors. Our toolflow identifies and reports all possible causes of insecure
information flows. Thus, security vulnerabilities are brought to the devel-
oper’s attention and can be addressed appropriately, resulting in an appli-
cation that is secure. In a secure-by-design processor, hardware mechanisms
are used to alter the functionality of the application silently, so an applica-
tion’s security vulnerabilities may never be remedied, or even known. Also,
violations corrected silently in hardware may manifest as runtime errors. For
example, address masking performed by hardware can fix a buffer overflow
problem, but the result is probably to map the store to some erroneous lo-
cation inside the buffer, resulting in an erroneous execution / output for the
application.
8.7 Results
Processor and Benchmarks: We perform evaluations on a silicon-proven
processor – openMSP430 [63], an open-source version of one of the most
popular ultra-low-power processors [121, 94]. The processor is synthesized,
placed, and routed in TSMC 65GP technology (65nm) for an operating point
of 1V and 100 MHz using Synopsys Design Compiler [122] and Cadence EDI
System [123]. Gate-level simulations are performed by running full bench-
mark applications on the placed and routed processor using a custom gate-
level simulator that implements application-specific gate-level information
flow tracking (Section 8.4). We show results for all benchmarks from [64]
and all EEMBC benchmarks [65] that fit in the program memory of the pro-
cessor (Table 8.1). Benchmarks are chosen to be representative of emerging
ultra-low-power application domains such as wearables, internet of things,
and sensor networks [64]. Benchmark performance (IPC) on our processor
varies from 1.25 to 1.39.
We evaluate the information flow security of each benchmark running as a
tainted computational task on the system (ports it uses are labeled tainted).
System code is an untainted task consisting of the instructions needed to
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Table 8.1: Benchmarks.
Embedded Sensor Benchmarks [64]
mult, binSearch, tea8, intFilt,
tHold, div, inSort, rle, intAVG
EEMBC Embedded Benchmarks [65]
Autocorr, FFT, ConvEn, Viterbi
restart the benchmark after each execution.
8.7.1 Information Flow Violations
Application-specific gate-level information flow tracking reports all possible
information flow violations for an application. Table 8.2 shows which of
the unmodified benchmarks violated the sufficient conditions described in
Section 8.5.1. Seven benchmarks do not violate any of the conditions. Effec-
tively, our analysis shows that these benchmarks cannot violate our informa-
tion flow security policy on this processor. However, six benchmarks violate
sufficient conditions 1 and 2.7 These benchmarks require the techniques
described in Section 8.5.2 to guarantee information flow security. After per-
forming software modifications identified by our toolflow, all condition viola-
tions are eliminated.8 Thus, symbolic gate-level information flow tracking in
conjunction with software modification is able to guarantee information flow
security for these applications on a commodity processor without hardware-
based information flow control mechanisms.
7None of our benchmarks violate sufficient conditions 3, 4, or 5; however, this is not sur-
prising for well-written code, since the conditions preclude scenarios like reading memory
out of bounds or illegal port accesses.
8When *-logic analysis was used to verify information flow security on the six applica-
tions with information flow violations, it identified that the condition violations were not
removed. This is because these applications have control dependences on an unknown,
tainted input, which causes *-logic to taint the PC and make it unknown, resulting in
70% of the gates in MSP430 becoming unknown and tainted, even those required by the
software techniques to remain untainted (e.g., the watchdog timer). Therefore, a direct
application of *-logic analysis would not allow the software-based techniques to be verified
on commodity hardware.
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Table 8.2: Benchmarks that violate
sufficient conditions 1 and 2 for
information flow security (see
Section 8.5.1) before and after
modification.
Benchmark
No Mod Modified
C1 C2 C1 C2
binSearch X X - -
div X X - -
inSort X X - -
intAVG X X - -
intFilt - - - -
mult - - - -
rle - - - -
tHold X X - -
tea8 - - - -
FFT - - - -
Viterbi X X - -
ConvEn - - - -
autocorr - - - -
Table 8.3: Performance overhead (%)
for watchdog timer reset and memory
address masking applied with and
without application analysis.
Benchmark
W/o With
App App
binSearch 34.63 34.63
div 33.16 33.16
inSort 37.92 10.00
intAVG 45.56 11.90
intFilt 19.58 0
mult 150.9 0
rle 45.61 0
tHold 106.2 106.2
tea8 93.89 0
FFT 17.63 0
Viterbi 1.029 1.029
ConvEn 19.69 0
autocorr 42.15 0
8.7.2 Runtime Overheads of Software-Based Gate-Level
Information Flow Security
Since we eliminate possible tainted information flows through software mod-
ification, guaranteeing information flow security in our approach incurs per-
formance and energy overheads whenever an application has potential vio-
lations to eliminate. The right column of Table 8.3 (With App) shows the
performance overhead of using the watchdog timer and memory masking to
eliminate information flow security vulnerabilities in our benchmark applica-
tions. Since application-specific gate-level information flow tracking is able to
identify and eliminate only the tainted information flows that an application
is vulnerable to, applications that are not vulnerable to tainted information
flows require no modifications and incur no overhead. For applications where
modifications are necessary, masking is applied to store instructions that may
be tainted, and the watchdog timer is used to deterministically bound the
execution time of tainted computational tasks.
Since the MSP430 watchdog has a maximum interval length of 32768 cy-
cles, which may not be long enough to bound the longest execution time of a
computational task, we evaluate a system that implements time-slicing (e.g.,
as an RTOS might schedule one computational task across multiple time
slices). Also, since the execution time of a task may not be an even multiple
of one of the available watchdog timer intervals (64, 512, 8192, and 32768
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cycles), an infinite idle loop is added at the end of each benchmark to fill the
remainder of the final time slice. The number and duration of time slices are
selected to minimize overhead, based on the available watchdog timer inter-
vals and the overhead of state checkpointing and recovery (context switching)
for time slicing.9 Intuitively, using fewer, longer time slices for a given task
duration incurs less overhead for context switching but may incur more idling
overhead in waiting for the final watchdog interval to complete. Our toolflow
accounts for the overheads of context switching and scheduling the watchdog
timer, along with the maximum duration of a computational task, to select
the number and duration of watchdog intervals that minimize overhead while
providing a deterministic bound on execution time.
Since application-specific gate-level information flow analysis indicates pre-
cisely which computational tasks need to be protected by a watchdog timer
and which store instructions need to be protected by address masking, the
techniques can be applied only where necessary. On the other hand, guaran-
teeing information flow security for an unknown application requires mask-
ing of every store and time bounding of every tainted task using a deter-
ministic timer, since all sufficient conditions must be satisfied to guarantee
non-interference, even though they may not be necessary for a particular ap-
plication (Section 8.5.1). Without the ability to identify all possible tainted
information flows for all possible executions of an application on a commod-
ity processor using input-independent gate-level information flow tracking,
an “always-on” approach for information flow control would be required.
The left column of Table 8.3 (W/o App) shows the performance overhead
of using masking for all stores and time bounding for all tainted tasks, rep-
resenting a case where application analysis is not available and all sufficient
conditions must be enforced. In this case, performance overhead is 3.3×
higher than in the case where application analysis is able to target only the
possible insecure information flows for an application. Even considering only
the applications that have possible information flow security violations, ap-
plying software-based techniques only where necessary reduces performance
overhead by 24%. Overall, application-specific information flow analysis can
minimize the overhead of providing information flow security guarantees on
a commodity processor using software-based techniques.
9For openMSP430, the overhead of saving and restoring a task’s state is 20 cycles, and
watchdog timer initialization and reset takes 10 cycles.
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8.7.3 Information Flow Secure Scheduling:
A System-Level Use Case
In this section, we show that we can use the techniques developed in this
chapter to guarantee information flow security at the system level; we focus
on an IoT system that performs scheduling between multiple tasks. Specifi-
cally, we show that without any modifications to the processor, we can guar-
antee that (1) there are no insecure information flows across scheduled tasks,
and (2) no task can affect the scheduling performed by the system software.
In order to demonstrate these properties, we construct an IoT system in
which FreeRTOS [77] performs task scheduling between two tasks – div and
binSearch – where binSearch is an untrusted task (its input and output
ports are marked as untrusted), and FreeRTOS and div are both trusted.
The control flow of binSearch depends on an untrusted input value. Thus,
in the baseline case, after binSearch is scheduled on the processor, the pro-
cessor’s control flow becomes tainted. Among the consequences of this taint-
ing are that (1) the trusted task div becomes untrusted the next time it is
scheduled, and (2) the scheduling of FreeRTOS itself is compromised, since
it too becomes untrusted as a result of the tainted task.
To provide information flow security for this system, we use our toolflow
to modify the system’s application, consisting of FreeRTOS and the two
computational tasks. 330 store instructions in binSearch are identified as
potential security violations, and our toolflow applies memory masking to
these instructions. Also, our toolflow invokes the watchdog timer mechanism
around the untrusted task. This modification is performed in FreeRTOS
system code. The value of the reset interrupt vector is set to a location in
the middle of FreeRTOS’s scheduler interrupt. On a watchdog-invoked reset,
scheduling is performed as usual with the exception that the watchdog timer
is also reset with the scheduling timer prior to restoring the context of the
next task from its own stack. After modification, application-specific infor-
mation flow tracking verifies that the application runs successfully without
any tainting of the trusted task or the RTOS.
We measure the performance overhead of our modification using input-
based gate-level simulations; runtime is measured from when the first task
is scheduled to when both tasks have completed. The total performance
overhead of adding the watchdog timer reset and memory masking is only
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0.83%. The overhead is low since only binSearch requires memory masking
and the modifications required to add the watchdog timer to FreeRTOS’s
system code are small (e.g., FreeRTOS already requires context saving and
restoring).
The above example shows that we can guarantee gate-level information
flow security with low-overhead software modifications for an application
built on a commodity RTOS. More broadly, this shows that our techniques
are applicable at the system-level and can be used to verify complex and
system-level security properties.
8.8 Summary
IoT applications present a stress test for information flow security. The
rapidly increasing quantity and variety of IoT devices also increases the quan-
tity and variety of data handled by the devices, while driving down the power
and area constraints, leaving little budget for security in this security-critical
domain. In this chapter, we showed how knowledge of the application that
runs on an IoT device can be leveraged to identify all possible information
flow security vulnerabilities in the system, modify application software to
eliminate vulnerabilities, and provide a guarantee that a system is informa-
tion flow secure, even for systems built upon commodity ultra-low-power
processors commonly used in IoT applications. Since our analysis framework
identifies and eliminates only the information flows that a particular appli-
cation is vulnerable to, the cost of eliminating all insecure information flows
with our application-specific approach to information flow security is 3.3×
lower than a software-based approach that assumes no application knowl-
edge.
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Chapter 9
Summary and Future Work
Emerging applications in the IoT domain, such as wearables, implantables,
smart tags, and wireless sensor networks put severe power, cost, reliability,
and security constraints on hardware system design. Although ASICs can
provide power efficiency, due to design and programmability costs, these
IoT applications will be powered by ultra-low-powered microprocessors and
microcontrollers. This dissertation focuses on the architecture and design
of dependable ultra-low-power computing systems. Specifically, it proposes
architecture and design techniques that exploit the unique application and
usage characteristics of future computing systems to deliver low power, while
meeting the reliability and security constraints of these systems.
First, this dissertation considers the challenge of achieving both low power
and high reliability in SRAM memories. As the operating voltage of SRAMs
is decreased to save power, the fraction of faulty cells rapidly increases, forc-
ing a processor to operate at a higher voltage and thus higher power or
use costly error correction to allow low voltage operation. This dissertation
proposes both an architectural technique to reduce the overheads of error
correction and a technique that uses the nature of error correcting codes to
allow lower voltage operationg at the same reliability target.
Second, this dissertation considers low power and low cost. By leveraging
the fact that many IoT systems are embedded in nature and will run the
same application for their entire lifetime, fine-grained usage characteristics
of the hardware-software system can be determined at design time. This dis-
sertation developed a novel hardware-software co-analysis based on symbolic
simulation that can determine the possible states of the processor through-
out any execution of a specific application. This enables power-gating where
more gates are turned off for longer, bespoke processors customized to specific
applications, and stricter determination of peak power bounds.
Third, this dissertation considers achieving secure IoT systems at low cost
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and power overhead. By leveraging the hardware-software co-analysis, this
dissertation shows that gate-level information flow security guarantees can
be provided without hardware overheads.
Although this dissertation made contributions toward addressing all four
of the challenges for IoT processors, there is still work to be done. If many
IoT applications are going to be powered by energy-harvesting devices, new
architectural approaches will be needed that take into account the unique
characteristics of an energy harvesting system. First, processors powered
by energy harvesting systems are unlike current systems in that many such
systems are not energy-limited, but are power limited. Second, the avail-
ability of power can change drastically over time. One direction for future
work is developing low-power architectures to enable adaptive power-neutral
computing. Such approach should be able to significantly improve the power-
performance range that may be possible for future energy-harvesting systems.
While Bespoke processors provide power and area efficiency, they are lim-
ited in their programmability and provide limited to no performance bene-
fit. In order to provide increased flexibility, design frameworks for building
mostly general-purpose processors could be developed. For example, today
if we have an instruction to be removed we do not know all of the hardware
to be removed. Analyses similar to the hw-sw co-analysis can be developed
to identify the components used by an instruction. In fact, such a framework
can be cognizant of the costs and benefits of keeping an instruction in the
ISA. The resulting automated hardware editing can be performed at other
granularities as well.
Finally, since IoT systems will be involved in physical-facing applications
where potential consequences of a systems behavior are serious, it may be
critical to not only provide security, but also auditability. For example, being
able to reconstruct the interactions between multiple IoT system. Provid-
ing such functionality at the very low cost required by IoT systems will be
challenging. Using an analysis of both hardware and software together could
help address these challenges.
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